


# JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF PEACE AND CONFLICT



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# **JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF PEACE AND CONFLICT**

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The *JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF PEACE AND CONFLICT* is the annual journal of the Wisconsin Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, with its office at the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point, 900 Reserve St., Stevens Point WI 54481. Officers are Executive Director Eric J. Yonke (University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point), Associate Director Thomas J. Bickford (University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh), and Administrative Director Sarah Stillwell. The Institute is committed to a balanced review of diverse perspectives. Views of the authors are their own. The *Journal* is a refereed journal. To purchase a copy, send \$15 to the Wisconsin Institute at the above address.

**CALL FOR PAPERS:** The 2005-2006 issue of the *Journal* will publish a variety of scholarly articles, essays, poetry, and book reviews on topics such as war, peace, global cooperation, domestic violence, and interpersonal conflict resolution; including questions of military and political security, the global economy, and global environmental issues. We wish to promote discussion of both strategic and ethical questions surrounding these issues. Our audience includes scholars from a wide range of interests within the academy and educated members of the general public. Contributors should avoid discussions accessible only to specialists in their field. Submissions are accepted on a continuing basis. Contributors should first contact the office at wiinst@uwsp.edu for a brief style sheet. Articles not formatted according to the style sheet will not be considered.

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2004-2005 Annual Edition

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## **EDITOR'S FORWARD**

This issue marks the twentieth anniversary of the statewide convocation of college and university educators (November 1984) that led to the founding of the Wisconsin Institute. A chronology of these years is included as the last item. Based on the belief that democracy operates well only with public dialogue--indeed only at all--the Institute was founded to provide a forum for diverse viewpoints on crucial issues surrounding war and peace. The Journal has reflected this diversity. Many, many issues of policy and basic orientation to international affairs have been raised in our annual conferences, by our speakers program at the 22 campuses, and in these pages. In the early days, nuclear war, U.S. policy in Latin America and the Soviet-American rivalry dominated the discussion. Then it was the wars of the Yugoslav devolution. Today it is the Middle East, Africa, and the future order of the world as well as other topics. The right and necessity to speak out on public policy does not always come without dire cost. This issue is dedicated to Ignacio Ellacuria, a professor at the University of Central America who was assassinated by death squads in 1989. Our lead article by D. I. Gandolfo examines his views on nonviolence as they were forged in the struggles of Latin America in the terrible years of the 1980s. Also focusing on Latin American conflict is Matthew Rhody's paper on the U.S. war on cocaine and prospects for peace in the Andes.

Maintaining the intellectual ferment that comes from a diversity of views is the purpose of this Journal. Michael S. Pendergast, a former Strategic Air Command B-52 commander, writes on the complex relationship between justice and peace. A former U.S. Marine, recently stationed in Egypt, argues in his article for the need for decisive and forceful intervention to end the hemorrhaging wars in the Congo. Then we have a severe critic of current Middle Eastern policy by the distinguished Canadian political analyst, John Ryan. Also regarding Iraq, Andrew Fiala has written on what he calls "practical" pacifism in the aftermath of the war. Continuing with this theme, Rahul Mahagan's book on U.S. Power in Iraq and beyond is reviewed by David Michael Smith, who also contributed the article, "Global Fear and Loathing: How the World Really Sees the U.S.," an essay sure to provoke sharp comment from some. And John Tures has contributed an empirical study of the impact U.S. intervention has had on a number of "target countries."

We have also gladly offered a place to those who reflect in depth on the more philosophical and theological dimensions of these great issues, such as Peter Thompson's article on St. Augustine. Ian Harris, an internationally noted expert on peace education, looks at evaluating the impact of this discipline. We also review the new edition of Ian's seminal book, now co-written with Mary Lee Morrison, Peace Education. And we review Joseph E. Schwartzberg's monograph on UN reform, wherein he proposes a weighted voting system that will bring UN voting in line with the realities of power in the world.

Because important dimensions of international conflict can't be captured in academic prose, we have reopened the poetry section and invite authors to submit for next year's *Journal*. This year we have a poignant offering by Lisa Saleh, a set of poems we have grouped under the title "Palestinian-American Journal," and a biting poem by Arrigo and Crigler on "The Court-martial of Capt. Rockwood." Another new track for us is to include truly excellent undergraduate papers. Both Pears and Rhody are students.

Finally, this production could never exist without the aid of all who read and evaluate submissions, and the aid of my two wonderful Associate Editors, Deborah Buffton and Sarah Stillwell.

## **ERRATUM**

In the 2003-2004 issue we mistakenly attributed Peace Education: The Concept, Principles, and Practices Around the World to Ian Harris and Mary Lee Morrison as well as to its editors, Gabriel Salomon and Baruch Nevo; and failed to print our review of Harris and Morrison's book, also titled Peace Education, which is printed in this issue. Apologies to all. Kent Shifferd, Editor

## **IN MEMORIAM**

### **PROFESSOR IGNACIO ELLACURIA, 1930--1989**

[The following text is adapted from our lead article by D.I. Gandolfo.]

The Ibero-Salvadoran philosopher Ignacio Ellacuría first came to my attention in the manner in which he came to the attention of a lot of people: by his assassination. In El Salvador in the early morning of November 16, 1989, some three dozen members of the Atlacatl Battalion, an elite squadron of the Salvadoran army known for its horrendous human rights violations over the preceding decade, entered the grounds of the University of Central America (UCA) and killed six of the Jesuit priests living there as well as their housekeeper and her 15-year old daughter. . . most of the Atlacatl members who took part in these murders had been very recently and extensively trained by U.S. military experts from the U.S. Army's School of the Americas.

The murders brought international condemnation and were a major factor in the decision of the U.S. government to pressure the Salvadoran government into negotiating an end to its decade-long civil war against the Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (FMLN). Ellacuría was the killers' target, and the rest were killed in an unsuccessful attempt to erase witnesses. He was killed because of the life he led as an *intellectual engagé* as president of El Salvador's prestigious Jesuit university. . . .

The effect of the university's search for truth had become so threatening to the class that benefited from those structures that the decision was made, at the highest levels of the military, to kill Ellacuría. The killers were trying, quite simply, to erase the kind of influence that this very effective tool was having.

By the time of his death at age 59, Ellacuría was one of the major figures in El Salvador trying to resolve the civil war that had been raging there throughout the 1980s. He argued tirelessly for the path of non-violence through a negotiated settlement to the war. This stance endeared him to neither side, each one fearing that the power his arguments commanded would undermine the legitimacy of their own position. The army hated him, and in the government-controlled media there were frequent and extremely vicious attacks against him, claiming (falsely) that he was one of the key intellectual leaders of rebels; and while the FMLN respected him, they were frustrated by his endorsement of non-violence.

# Ignacio Ellacuría: Liberation Struggles and Nonviolence--a Latin American Perspective

## By D.I. Gandolfo

### Introduction

The Ibero-Salvadoran philosopher Ignacio Ellacuría first came to my attention in the manner in which he came to the attention of a lot of people: by his assassination. In El Salvador in the early morning of November 16, 1989, some three dozen members of the Atlacatl Battalion, an elite squadron of the Salvadoran army known for its horrendous human rights violations over the preceding decade, entered the grounds of the University of Central America (UCA) and killed six of the Jesuit priests living there as well as their housekeeper and her 15-year-old daughter (Wright, p. xxii, 220; most of the Atlacatl members who took part in these murders had been very recently and extensively trained by U.S. military experts from the U.S. Army's School of the Americas, which at that time was located at Fort Benning in Columbus, GA. (Cf., Whitfield, p. 8 ff., Doggett, pp. 535 ff.).

The murders brought international condemnation and were a major factor in the decision of the U.S. government to pressure the Salvadoran government into negotiating an end to its decade-long civil war against the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation (FMLN). Ellacuría was the killers' target, and the rest were killed in an unsuccessful attempt to erase witnesses. He was killed because of the life he led as an *intelectual engagé*. As president of El Salvador's prestigious Jesuit university (one of only two universities in the country, at the time), as editor of the respected and influential monthly journal of philosophy *Estudios Centroamericanos* (ECA), as a frequent contributor to the op-ed pages of the local newspapers, as the organizer of regularly scheduled popular and influential public discussions on the

national reality – in all of these capacities Ellacuría was a principal player on the Salvadoran political and cultural scene.

The primary instrument that Ellacuría fashioned to effect change in the national reality was the university over which he presided. While many accused him of having politicized the university, he responded that all human institutions are political by their nature, and that the important question vis-à-vis the university was only what is the proper way for it to be political. Ellacuría participated in the design and structure of the UCA (founded 1965) from its earliest days, always as a major contributor. The university, he argued, has an appropriate, legitimate political role to play *as a university*. It does not fulfill its political role by acting in the manner of a political party or a labor union, but by acting "universitarily," i.e., by doing the research, writing, publishing and teaching that uncover the truth and create new possibilities for the future (EPUD, *passim*).

In El Salvador, and the Third World in general, the truth is one of oppression and oppressive socio-politico-economic structures; the university's contribution to the possibility of a new and different future entailed understanding those structures and envisioning ways in which they could be changed. The effect of the university's search for truth had become so threatening to the class that benefited from those structures that the decision was made, at the highest levels of the military, to kill Ellacuría (Whitfield, p. 8 ff., Doggett, *passim*). The killers were trying, quite simply, to erase the kind of influence that this very effective tool was having.

By the time of his death at age 59, Ellacuría was one of the major figures in El

Salvador trying to resolve the civil war that had been raging there throughout the 1980s. He argued tirelessly for the path of non-violence through a negotiated settlement to the war. This stance endeared him to neither side, each one fearing that the power his arguments commanded would undermine the legitimacy of their own position. The army hated him, and in the government-controlled media there were frequent and extremely vicious attacks against him, claiming (falsely) that he was one of the key intellectual leaders of rebels; and while the FMLN respected him, they were frustrated by his endorsement of non-violence.

In his writings on the Salvadoran armed conflict, Ellacuría stops short of endorsing non-violence absolutely and argues from a pragmatic standpoint: neither the right-wing government nor the leftist guerilla forces have enough strength to win the war outright, and their struggle is killing thousands of innocent people, so both sides should come together and negotiate a settlement of the issues dividing them. (This does not mean that he was under any illusions as to which side was doing the overwhelming majority of the killing. Some 75,000 civilians died in the conflict; the United Nations Truth Commission found that 85% of the deaths were attributed to the army or affiliated death squads, 5% were attributed to the FMLN, and 10% were unattributable. (Betancur, p. 43, and *passim*.)

Ellacuría was widely known during his lifetime as one of the key contributors to the development of liberation theology in Latin America (Berryman 1990; see also Burke 2000 pp. 204-205, 215 n5). What was less known was that he had spent the last 15 years of his life at work on a *philosophy* of liberation, a work left unfinished and scattered across many writings, mostly unpublished, at the time of his assassination. In his liberation *philosophy*, he argued that philosophy, if it is to remain true to its essence, must put

itself in the service of the liberation of the poor and the oppressed, that philosophy, by its nature, must be a philosophy of liberation. In the rest of this paper, I will explore his position on non-violence and anchor it in his philosophy of liberation.

### **Part One: Liberation**

In one of the last articles he wrote, Ellacuría discusses in detail the concept of liberation. From this late article, one can compile a list of what liberation means for Ellacuría. Such a list would include:

- Liberation from material oppression: Liberation is, before all else, liberation from the lack of basic necessities. Without these, human life itself, let alone a *dignified* life, is not possible.
- Liberation from repression: Liberation from the methods used to terrorize people. Here are included all those institutions (juridical, ideological, policing) that motivate people more by the fear of punishment or the terror of being squashed rather than by offering ideals and human convictions.
- Liberation is at once individual and collective, social and personal. (TCIL, pp. 645-646. Note, while I have arranged Ellacuría's prose into bullet points in compiling this list, I have retained his vocabulary.)

One should keep in mind that this list, written in 1989, was composed nine years into El Salvador's war, one of whose combatants, the FMLN, took many of these points as their creed. In other words, Ellacuría is not speaking idealistically about what might be obtained in some distant future, but about what should be struggled for right now. For Ellacuría, liberation entails, first and foremost,

establishing the material and structural conditions necessary for eliminating an enslaving dependency, thereby allowing all people the freedom to determine the course of their lives. When he speaks of liberation, he has in mind an expanded idea, one that goes from the satisfaction of basic human material needs to things that are considerably more lofty, but always based on material and social conditions, recognizing both an individual component and a social component of liberty. As Héctor Samour puts it, "Liberation, as conceived of by Ellacuría, tries to avoid both being individualist, without thus denying individual liberty, and being collectivist, without thus denying or diminishing the liberty of others (Samour 1999, p. 115)." Luis Alvarenga characterizes Ellacuría's preoccupation with liberation this way:

In the world context, more specifically in Latin America, there is a series of political, economic and social power structures, historically determined, that prevent the popular majorities from being protagonists and creators of their own history. Capitalist domination restricts the development of potentialities to a small few, to the detriment of large segments of the population in our countries. This is the historical reality that Ellacuría had in mind in proposing the concept of liberation (Alvarenga 2001, p. 745).

Ellacuría's conception of what liberation entails derives from his analysis of history, an analysis which sees liberty as the goal towards which history is tending. We will examine this in some detail later. Here, we should note some of the concrete programs which he argued were necessary for a fuller realization of liberty: a land reform that would break up the huge holdings of the fourteen families who owned nearly all the arable land in El Salvador; and labor reform that empowered workers,

through unions, to have a real say in the conditions of their labor. In other words, much of the agenda needed for real liberation is precisely what the leftist guerilla forces, the FMLN, were fighting for. These forces were prompted to take up arms after decades of working for land and labor reforms with no results other than increased repression, including the murder of the movement's leaders and indiscriminate killing of peasants in villages where the movement had strength.

The classic question, which proponents of non-violence must always answer, thus presents itself: if the just demands of the poor, the oppressed, the disempowered, are met by the oppressor with extreme violence; and if this continues to happen, not just time and time again, but *generation after generation*, such that grandparents see grandchildren growing up in the squalor of preceding generations, and those grandparents have no reason to hope that things will be different for their great-grandchildren; what other choice do the poor have than to take up arms?

One might argue that education is another option, that what is lacking is an understanding, among the power elite (and perhaps even among the poor themselves), of the humanity and dignity of the poor, i.e., that the wealthy do not understand the immorality of structures and actions that perpetuate poverty, nor do they comprehend the legitimacy of the struggles of the poor to end it. Ellacuría agreed that the solution is, at least in part, one of education: the university which he helped to build (the UCA, whose student body is primarily made up of the sons and daughters of the elite) was organized to promote such an understanding. But that, in part, is why he was killed. So the question remains: if any and all non-violent attempts to change the structures of poverty and oppression are rebuffed with extreme violence, including the widespread use of torture, rape and murder of people in front of their families – and when this

extreme violence is met with indifference on the part of legal authorities, and is perhaps even encouraged and perpetrated by these same authorities – should the poor and oppressed take up arms?

Ellacuría argued that the poor should organize to effectively demand the material conditions needed for real liberty. And he argued that their struggle, for pragmatic reasons, should be non-violent. We will first look at his views on non-violence, which were expressed in his writings other than those in which his liberation philosophy took shape; then we will explore the connection between his liberation philosophy and his stance in favor of a negotiated settlement to the Salvadoran civil war. We are looking for the reasons why his views on non-violence never seem to go deeper than the pragmatic level, i.e., why he does not stand firmly on a principle of non-violence.

## **Part Two: Non-Violence**

The four papers in Ellacuría's published and unpublished works in which he addresses in a scholarly way the topic of non-violence all do so from a Christian perspective. However, in two of these, this perspective is not emphasized but only presented as background. These are the two essays on which I will focus. And these two are drafts of the same paper. The shorter one states that it was written at the request of the journal *Concilium*, where it was published in 1988 under the title "Non-violent Efforts for Peace and Liberatory Violence" (TNVP). The longer, unpublished version contains the material of the shorter one, but elaborates upon it. For example, both pieces contain a litany of violent struggles going on in the world in the 1980s, but in the longer essay the list is annotated. The countries of Central America are mentioned in both lists, but in the longer essay this comment is appended: "In Latin America we find the violent aggression of the United States by way of their proxies, the Contras, against the Sandinistas, [and] the revolutionary

struggles of El Salvador and Guatemala" (TNVP-DR, p. 1). Thus, the struggles in El Salvador and Guatemala are qualified as "revolutionary," the cause of the violence in Nicaragua is specified as external aggression, and the guilty party in this aggression is specified as the United States. I will use the longer version of the essay, whose full title is "Non-violent Efforts for Peace and Liberatory Violence: The Right of Resistance to Violence and Forms of Resistance in the Third and First Worlds." In this essay, Ellacuría considers the violence of resistance as exemplified in the revolutionary struggle in El Salvador and the actions of the Basque separatist group ETA in Spain, focusing the bulk of his analysis on the former. In my paper here, I will concentrate on his analysis of the revolutionary violence in El Salvador, and then anchor his analysis in the larger project of his philosophy of liberation.

Ellacuría begins by noting a moral hierarchy of violence: "There are different forms of violence not equivalent to each other such that the justification or permission for some does not carry with it the approval of other forms" (ibid., p. 3). Not all violence is equivalent. Two conclusions might follow from this observation. On the one hand, one might recognize a right to the use of certain forms of violence under certain conditions (e.g., self-defense); on the other hand, even if one wants to condemn all forms of violence, certain forms are more reprehensible than others and, therefore, more deserving of condemnation. Ellacuría notes that "[e]ven [Pope] Paul VI (in *Populorum professio*)... spoke of the possibility of a revolutionary insurrection if to a prolonged and obvious tyranny is added the violation of fundamental rights and of the common good of the country..." (ibid.). Paul VI went on, in the same document, to speak of a "structural injustice" that "cries out to heaven" (ibid.). In their pivotal 1968 meeting in Medellín, Colombia, the Latin American Catholic bishops, reflecting on the implications of a God whose love for the

world was such that s/he was present in the world and acting through human beings, began a process which became known as Liberation Theology. Ellacuría notes that part of this process was the “differentiation, qualification and classification ... of different kinds of violence. . . . Liberation Theology has made the overcoming of violence one of its principal objectives, but with this goal it [also] pledges itself to an analysis of that violence which is original and [thus] generative of other kinds of violence” (ibid., pp. 3-4). Two important points are being made here. First, the hierarchy of violence is refined to take account of causality: some forms of violence are more original than other forms, and the more original forms are the cause of many of the other forms. Secondly, Ellacuría announces that the *telos* towards which liberatory practice aims is the overcoming of violence but that this brings with it the need to understand the reality of violence. Such an understanding entails an analysis that uncovers the more original violence responsible for the generation of further violence.

Ellacuría presents three types of violence: 1) structural-institutional violence, 2) repressive, frequently terrorist violence, and 3) revolutionary violence. Let us take each of these in turn.

Structural-institutional violence is an oppression so extreme that it qualifies as more than unjust; it is a violence, one that threatens the most basic thing a human being has, her life:

When a social order, and not just a political order, is structured in such a way that the greater part of the population ... finds itself forced to live in a desperate poverty which constantly threatens their very lives, lives which do not have even the minimum for subsistence and for overcoming the constant threat of hunger, sickness, and the lack of education, shelter, work, etc., – it

must be said that such an order is not only unjust but violent. It is unjust because it places in danger the very substance of man, his life, and because it does not respect that which is most his, that which is owed to every person: his material life and a minimum of possibilities that this life not be taken ahead of time but rather be able to become a minimally human life. And it is violent because the very structures and institutions instantiated in the social order become ... an almost insuperable force that forces one, against one’s own will, to live an inhuman life. (ibid., pp. 4-5)

Justice, minimally, requires *structures* that a) do not endanger one’s life, and b) respect one’s material life and create the possibility that one’s life will not be taken ahead of time. Thus, the structures Ellacuría is criticizing are unjust because they condemn the vast majority of the population, and have done so for many many generations, to lives of grinding poverty that will be nasty and short. But in addition to being unjust, these structures are also violent because the injustice they embody forces one against one’s will to live inhumanly. The key piece of Ellacuría’s argument is his claim that unjust structures can be violent. The structures count as violent, he explains, because they force one to do something against one’s will: to live an inhuman life. Ellacuría does not explain the claim further, but we should explore it a little further since it plays such an important part in his argument.

The criterion he offers that would enable one to identify a situation as violent is this: “being forced to do something against one’s will.” We can allow that this is not controversial and that it can cover a wide range of circumstances that are easily recognized as violent: 1) situations in which the direct application of physical violence forces the victim into actions she would not otherwise have undertaken; 2) situations in

which the threat of violence is used to obtain the same end as in the first kind of situation. The criterion can be stretched further to cover situations in which neither actual physical violence nor the threat of violence is used and yet the victim is still forced to act in a way in which she would not have otherwise acted, e.g., with the use of psychological violence. Ellacuría expands the criterion still further so that it covers unjust social structures.

This is an important point. Once he classifies unjust social structures as violent, he goes on to argue that they are the source of other types of violence and that these unjust social structures must be changed if violence is to end. Here in this essay, space will not permit us to go further into an examination of this criterion. But before we move on, there are two observations to make. First, the idea that injustice counts as violence is not new to Ellacuría. Gandhi, for example, frequently pointed out that poverty was the worst form of violence. Second, there is a parallel to the idea of structural violence that may prove helpful in further investigations to clarify the concept: over the past generation, liberation theologians have been trying to extend the traditional notion of sin, typically thought of in individualistic terms, to cover unjust social structures. The resulting theological concepts of structural sin or social sin may prove helpful in elucidating further the concept of structural violence (cf., Pfeil, *passim*). Ellacuría, indeed, was one of the contributors to this reformulation of the concept of sin. For now, we will return to Ellacuría's schematicization of the three forms of violence.

The first type of violence, institutional-structural violence, is frequently supported by the second type of violence, repressive violence. "The continuing and systematic structural *oppression*, when it is affecting the majority of the population, can only be maintained by the most diverse forms of *repression*"

(TNVP-DR, p. 5, emphasis added). At first, seemingly non-violent forms of repression are used to keep the people docile. Ellacuría does not specify these seemingly non-violent forms of repression, but one can see what he intends: the various ideological tools – be they educational or religious, or from the various media – that can be used to convince people that their condition is natural, or deserved. For Ellacuría, this ideological repression is a form of structural violence. And if this low-intensity violence proves insufficient, the power elite "has no shame in using more violent forms of repression under the pretext that national security is threatened by communism – [but, it should be understood that what is really threatened is not *national* security but] the security of the *unjust social order* and *its corresponding political apparatus*." Grass-roots movements for structural change, long before they opt for violent means of resistance, are targeted for annihilation, and not just by the available legal means of repression but frequently by the use of "a violence that is strictly terrorist."

Ellacuría lived within a situation in which the ruling elite was quick to use the word "terrorism" to denounce anything that threatened their privilege. So he points out (and this is helpful to bear in mind in our own time and place) that, "Terrorism must be judged for itself, not as the actions of those who are already considered to be terrorists. Terrorism is not defined as the actions of terrorists; rather, terrorists are defined as those who commit terrorism." In other words, we must first decide what terrorism is, and then use that definition to label terrorists, not vice-versa. Ellacuría defines terrorism as "violent actions against defenseless people with the goal of terrorizing them in the pursuit of specific ends." And he points out that "there can be state terrorism, . . . class terrorism, and group or gang terrorism." As an example of state terrorism, he cites the atomic bombing of Japan by the U.S.; and as an example of class terrorism, he cites the

death squads operating in El Salvador. He concludes that, “[i]n Latin America, structural injustice (i.e., structural and institutional violence) is maintained very frequently not only by legal means of repression but by forms of terrorism” (ibid., pp. 5-6).

These first two kinds of violence – structural-institutional violence and repressive-terrorist violence – provoke a third kind: revolutionary violence. The latter comes about as “an inevitable response” to a violence that is much greater than itself, an evil “that *prevents* any other reasonable, non-violent attempt to end a state of affairs that is first and foremost not just the annulment of political rights but the negation of life itself” (ibid., p. 6, emphasis added). Ellacuría here is adopting a position similar to the one adopted by Kant vis-à-vis revolution. In the essay, “What is Enlightenment?” Kant argued that revolution is (only) justified to end tyranny, and tyranny is defined as the lack of structures insuring one’s ability “to make public use of one’s reason (Kant, *passim*, especially p. 4).” That is, when the freedoms of press, speech and assembly are lacking, one cannot hope to change the system by peaceful means because it is impossible to organize any kind of response to the oppression. For Kant, action to change a tyrannical system can only be violent.

Similarly for Ellacuría, structural oppression reinforced with terrorist repression prevents non-violent attempts to change the structures and thereby produces, inevitably, revolutionary violence. The inevitability stems not from a freedom-arresting determinism, but rather from a will to freedom inherent in human beings. Human beings desirous of freedom will inevitably fight back against oppressive structures, attempting to alter those structures.

Ellacuría states that revolutionary violence aims “to affirm negated life, to

survive in the face of the empire of death, to liberate oneself from that which prevents any realization, however minimal, not just of human dignity but of human life itself.” Structural violence and the repression used to maintain it are, literally, death. And the violent struggle against that death is life. The life-affirming choice, under conditions of terrorist-repression, is to take up arms in the struggle against death. “Revolutionary violence, when it is left with no alternative, takes up the armed struggle without necessarily becoming thereby a terrorist struggle” (TNVP-DR, p. 6). Ellacuría does not elaborate on the type of revolutionary violence that is not terrorist violence, except to say that it must be respectful of “war-time human rights” (ibid.).

But perhaps we can make use of a distinction developed by Nelson Mandela in his 1962 summation address to the court that sentenced him to life in prison (Mandela, pp. 220-228). In the speech, Mandela explained why the African National Congress (ANC) had decided, after nearly half a century of non-violent protest, to turn to violence, and he distinguished different forms of violence. He looked at the escalating levels of violence that his organization considered. At the first level were attacks against the material infrastructure used to maintain apartheid, at the second level were attacks against the personnel responsible for enforcing apartheid, and at the third level were random attacks against civilians. Mandela explained that the ANC would confine itself to the first level of violence, attacks against the material infrastructure. Ellacuría would clearly qualify the third level, random attacks against civilians, as terrorism, but would probably see both of the first two levels – attacks against the infrastructure *and* personnel of oppression – as inevitable revolutionary responses although he would probably also hold, as did Mandela, that attacks against the first should be tried before escalating to attacks against the second.

Pope Paul VI coined the often quoted

refrain, “if you want peace, work for justice,” and Catholic Bishops in the Third World took it a little further, declaring that “there can be no peace without justice” (Camara, p. 233). An unjust peace is not very stable, and even if high levels of repression can maintain an unjust peace, it is hardly commendable just because it is peaceful. As Rousseau noted, dungeons are very peaceful, but no one wants to live in them (Rousseau, p. 144). In fact, for Ellacuría, a so-called peaceful situation that is maintained through repression does not qualify, in reality, as peaceful. For Ellacuría, an unjust peace is an oxymoron. Ellacuría adds, in addition to Paul VI’s requirement of justice, the criterion of liberty as co-equal with justice as the necessary components of peace. “Notwithstanding the difficulties that arise in their implementation, liberation struggles, while placing primary emphasis on justice, do not overlook *the other primary factor for peace*, which is *liberty*. Liberation from structural injustice aims to make liberty a real possibility” (TNVP-DR, pp. 6-7, emphasis added). Ellacuría would perhaps re-coin Paul VI’s statement thus: if you want peace, work for justice and liberty.

Ellacuría could have plausibly made liberty a component of justice, insisting with the Pope and the Latin American Bishops that real peace will not be achieved if no attention is paid to unjust social structures. But in elevating *libertad* (liberty, freedom) to co-equal status with justice, Ellacuría is pointing the way forward: justice, and thus peace, will be achieved only when real freedom is available, in equal measure, to all people. To understand the focal status he gives to liberty, we must now turn to a consideration of his liberation philosophy.

### **Part Three: Liberation Philosophy**

In this section of the paper, we look at Ellacuría’s philosophy of liberation in order to be in a position to understand the central role he assigns to liberty (see also Samour 2000, *passim*; Gandolfo 2003, chs.

3-4; Gandolfo 2004, *passim*). We will then be able to explain, in the next section, why he takes the position he does on non-violence.

Ellacuría’s thought is influenced by Aristotle, Hegel, Marx, and phenomenology, but it is grounded primarily in the work of Xavier Zubiri (1898-1983), the important (if not well-known in North American circles) twentieth century Iberian philosopher under whose direction Ellacuría did his Ph.D. (1962-65) and with whom he worked closely until Zubiri’s death. Ellacuría’s liberation philosophy begins with a critique which grows out of Zubiri’s complicated and comprehensive philosophical system. This critique argues that the Western tradition made a fundamental error, from Parmenides on, in separating sensation and the intellect, an error which distorted all subsequent philosophy. This error resulted in what Zubiri termed the “logification of intelligence” and the “entification of reality.” By the former, Zubiri meant that the full powers of the intellect have been reduced to a predicative logos, i.e., a logos whose function is to determine what things are, in themselves and in relation to other things. Zubiri argued that while this is a vital part of intelligence, it is not the only part and not the most fundamental part.

Héctor Samour explains the logification of intelligence as the “rational process which ends up giving priority to logico-mental structures over real structures by reducing intelligence to its pure dimension of logos and reason (Samour 2000, p. 118).” In other words, by highlighting only part of intelligence, the overall work of the intelligence is distorted such that mental structures end up receiving priority over reality. Ellacuría noted that one ends up thinking that the primary act of intellection is logification and that without it the intellect cannot reach reality (SRIZ, p. 636). The mistake is in assuming that one only gets to what is real by way of concepts, by way of a predicative logos that names what is real. A part of

intelligence that is neither logos nor reason is left out. In addition to the work of logos and reason, Zubiri argued that the intelligence is responsible for the primordial apprehension of reality *as real*. Thus, for Zubiri, we are always already installed in reality and apprehend it as such from the start by what he termed the “sentient intellect,” the amalgamated, inseparable combination of sense and intellect.

When Western philosophy reduced intelligence to this predicative logos, the object of logos, i.e., the being of entities, became the sum total of reality: reality became entified. As Ellacuría observed,

[Zubiri] does not mean by entification simply that being has been reduced to a thing or an entity, that there has been a secular forgetting of being or a permanent oversight that does not care that being is not understood. Rather, he means that, from Parmenides on, *the entity and being have displaced reality* in philosophy, that philosophy has thus failed to be that which it must be, and that when being is not seen to be rooted in reality, human beings, intellectuals or not, wander from the exigencies of reality to the possible illusions of being. . . . Rooting being in reality, and not reality in being, is one of the fundamental proposals of Zubirian philosophy. In this manner, being is removed from the process of logification. . . . Not only reality but also respectivity [*respectividad*], and with it being, are physically actualized in the very impression of reality (Ibid., p. 637, emphasis added).

Thus, for Zubiri, in that something is received as real in the fundamental intellectual apprehension of reality, it is received as something independent from me. In this reception as something independent from me already lies the idea

of being: the thing as separate from and related to me. Samour points out that “this does not mean that one forgets being, or is distracted from it, but that one sees it rooted in reality, as a subsequent realization of reality, to guard it from any illusions or subjectivist interpretations (Samour 2000, p. 119).” The primary status of reality prevents being, which is rooted in it, from being interpreted randomly.

These two distortions (the logification of intelligence and entification of reality) can only be overcome by the recognition that sensation and intellection are not separate, that they are two aspects of a single faculty, the sentient intellect. Zubiri meant that, for human beings, the intellect is always sentient and sensation is always intelligent. The two faculties of sensation and intelligence are, for human beings, one and the same faculty. Human sensation is a type of sensation that is essentially different from the sense faculty of other animals, different by the addition of intelligence. In what way is human sensation essentially different than the sensation of other animals?

Part of every sensation that human beings have, Zubiri argues, is the awareness that the object sensed is real, i.e., that it has the property of being something in and of itself, independent from me, that it is not a willful extension of me. This recognition of the real as real is the fundamental act of the intelligence; it is the intellectual act that is part and parcel, structurally, inextricably, of every act of sensation. Through the unitary faculty of the sentient intellect we apprehend reality, and we apprehend it *as real*. The consequence of this is that we are always already installed in reality. We do not need to build a bridge between the mind and reality; the question about how the mind reaches what is real disappears. Rather, Ellacuría asserts that the primary question – metaphysical and ethical at once – is this: given that we are always already installed

in reality, what is the proper way to engage it? How are we to come face to face with reality?

The sentient intellect, like the rest of the body, evolved as a response to challenges posed by the environment. Intelligence is, before all else and as permanent foundation, biological. “Human intelligence is . . . initially and fundamentally a biological activity. . . . [It] is always sentient and, above all . . . it always carries out a biological function (HFMTL, p. 206).” This fundamental biological function is the survival of the human being, individually and as a species. In order to do this, intelligence must take account of things as they are, as they can harm or be useful to human beings. In other words, the first and principle task of intelligence is to figure out how to confront reality. “The formal structure of intelligence and its differentiating function . . . is not to comprehend being or to capture meaning, it is to apprehend reality and to confront it (ibid., p. 207).” As part of a biological being, the intelligence has to figure out how that being can engage the things that surround it, things it absolutely needs in order to stay alive. It is a biological imperative: because we need things, we have to figure how to engage them, understand them, gain our lives from them – this is the primary task of intelligence, a task which recognizes the priority of reality over meaning.

So, how are we to engage reality? How do we stand humanly in front of and within it? Ellacuría describes our encounter with reality in a dense and crucial paragraph (which actually consists of just one long sentence) in which the key terms are intricately interrelated:

Confronting ourselves [*enfrentarse*] with real things in their reality has a threefold dimension:

1) *becoming aware of the weight of reality* [*hacerse cargo de la realidad*], which implies being present in the reality of things

(and not merely being present before the idea of things or before their meaning), being “real” in the reality of things, which in its active character of being is exactly the opposite of being thing-like and inert, and implies being among them by way of their material and active mediations;

2) *taking up the weight of reality* [*cargar con la realidad*], an expression that indicates the fundamentally ethical character of intelligence, which has not been given to man so that he could evade his real commitments, but rather to take upon himself things for what they really are and for what they really demand;

3) *taking charge of the weight of reality* [*encargarse de la realidad*], an expression that indicates the praxical character of intelligence which only fulfills what it is, including its character of knowing reality and understanding its meaning, when it assumes as its burden doing something real. (Ibid., p. 208)

Ellacuría presents here an epistemology of engagement, one that recognizes that an epistemology has moral and political implications, something recognized by some gender and race theorists. Ellacuría shares in common with these theorists the recognition that where you stand affects what you see and that, therefore, the choice of the position from which one views/engages reality is not a value-neutral choice. He argues, like these theorists, that standing with the oppressed, the marginalized, is the best (most accurate, most complete, most human) place from which to engage reality. Like Hegel and DuBois, he recognizes that the slave has a knowledge of the master that the master does not have of the slave.

The first moment of the engagement with reality, *becoming aware of the weight of reality*, is the cognitive moment. In it, we are already present in reality, already among *things* and not merely before the idea or meaning of things. As we engage reality, we become aware a) that it is real, i.e., that it is something in and of itself, and

b) that it has weight, i.e., that it matters, that it has consequences, that doing anything (including doing nothing) has consequences. Since our understanding of reality is a function of our engagement with it, and since reality is historical, our understanding is conditioned by the actual possibilities of historical reality (Burke, p. 127).

The second moment, *shouldering the weight of reality*, is the ethical moment of the confrontation with reality. The purpose of intelligence is not to evade obligations imposed on us by reality, but to concern ourselves with things as they are, with the situation and what it requires from us. Ellacuría insists here that the intelligence is, thus, fundamentally ethical, that ethics is not a subsequent moment that we must choose to engage. The biological purpose of the intelligence is to figure out what is the right thing to do. In this second moment, shouldering the weight of reality entails planting oneself, acknowledging the necessity of choosing where one is to stand, choosing one's place, what Kevin Burke calls the "option of place," pointing out that "what one knows and who one becomes both depend on where one chooses to place oneself" (Ibid.).

The third moment, *taking charge of the weight of reality*, is the praxical aspect of the confrontation with reality. While the second moment involves decisions about actions, it is primarily concerned with a decision about where to place oneself (cf., *ibid.*, p. 115 n7). The third moment entails the recognition that intelligence only fulfills its function *as intelligence* when it charges itself with the burden of actually doing something in reality in order to transform reality. Most immediately, and foundationally, what should be done to assure survival? The result of praxis is to actualize possibilities present in reality, eventually to build new and better capacities in human beings, thereby creating new possibilities (Ibid., p. 127).

The confrontation with reality has these three dimensions not only because

human intelligence is historical, but because historicity is the very structure of intelligence. First, intellectual activity is conditioned by history. "Intelligence . . . in every instance, deals with specific theoretical possibilities that are constituted by, and as the result of, the march of history and that these possibilities represent the substrate from which it must do its thinking (HFTML, p. 209)." Second, since history always conditions intelligence, the latter must always take into account the various social interests influencing it; intelligence has to be critical so that it does not fall into mere ideology (cf., *Ibid.*, pp. 210-211). This is an important point into which space will not permit us to go much further (for further development, see Samour 2000, pp. 17 ff.). For Ellacuría, ideology critique becomes an important part of philosophy. It functions by emphasizing the history that lead to the reality under consideration. An example may help to clarify this. A study of homelessness in the U.S. must know the historical fact that the number of homeless people mushroomed in the 1980s when federal funds for a broad range of services, including and especially psychiatric services, were cut deeply and a high percentage of the people who had previously benefited from the services were now homeless. Confronted with this history, it becomes a lot harder to claim that the only people who are homeless are those who want to be. Knowing the history, what Ellacuría calls "historicizing" reality, is the way to avoid "ideologizing" it.

There is a third aspect of the historicity of the structures of intelligence: intelligence is intertwined with praxis, the motive force and building block of history. The immediate purpose of intelligence is praxis: acting to change reality. "Praxis needs intelligence . . . if it is not to be merely reaction, i.e, in order for it to be proper human praxis." On the other hand, intelligence needs praxis "to put it in contact with the source of most of its content," i.e., reality (HFTML, p. 211). One has to actually do something in and with

and to reality in order to see if intelligence is operating correctly, i.e., to see if it is enabling one to confront reality as a human being. History is the accreted deposits of praxis.

I should point out here that, for Ellacuría and Zubiri, reality exists only for human beings, not for animals. Animals respond to stimuli while humans are confronted with realities, hence the name that Ellacuría and Zubiri use for human beings: the “reality animal.” While other animals are faced with a predetermined cast of responses to a given stimuli, human beings in any given situation have an *open* spectrum of *options* from among which we must choose. We are, in effect, faced with the possibilities of many different realities, and our *choices* contribute to the determination of reality as it is realized. The openness of the options facing us is not something mysterious but a result of the evolutionary pressures that lead to the emergence of a sentient intelligence. The evolutionary niche occupied by human beings is one in which the cast of responses to a stimulus grew to the point where it was no longer easily predictable which response would be used. Our niche is the one where the vast number of possible responses opened up different potential realities, allowing us more fully to exploit reality’s possibilities. In other words, our niche is precisely *the freedom to choose from among the huge number of possible responses*, i.e., from among the great number of possible realities. To manage this operation of choosing, animal sensation evolved into the sentient intellect.

In using this distinction between humans and animals, Ellacuría is not attempting to privilege humans in a way that would be troubling to those interested in animal rights or, more broadly, the rights of the environment. Far from privileging humans, Ellacuría means to burden us with a responsibility for reality that it would not make sense to attribute to animals.

Ellacuría characterized Zubiri’s approach to philosophy thus: “to come as close as possible, intellectually, to the reality of things” (SRIZ, p. 643). Western philosophy “had not found an adequate way to confront and care for reality [*hacerse cargo de la realidad*]” (ibid., p. 633). The search for the right way to engage reality could name the motivation for Ellacuría’s work. For him, humans are now shouldered with responsibility for reality: we are charged with the task of figuring out what is the proper way of exercising the fundamental freedom opened up by the advent, within evolution, of the sentient intellect, and the exercise of this freedom determines the development of reality. In this sense, human beings are the responsible part of reality: we are the part of reality whose task it is to figure out how to respond to reality thereby creating a new reality unfolded out of the previous reality.

Seen from the perspective of action, the sentient intellect evolved to enable us to act more effectively in insuring our own survival. This is not selfish, as it may at first sound, given the element of responsibility that comes along with the sentient intellect. As the reality animal, our actions decide between various possible future realities. Thus, as the responsible part of reality, we are now charged with assisting in the further realization of reality.

As the part of reality responsible for its further development, humans must decide in which direction to take reality. What kind of development would constitute progress? Ellacuría argued that the progress evident in the development of reality thus far gives us the clue we need to determine the direction for further development.

If we look at development of reality, we can discern a progression from matter, to life, to human life. This progression has been under the control of, first, physical forces, then biological forces, and now, with the evolution of the being with sentient

intelligence, the progressive unfolding of reality is subject to the force of praxis: there is a gradual liberation of more developed forces. Subsequent forces do not erase the earlier ones, but rather subsume them dialectically. Thus, human praxis cannot ignore the physical and biological needs of reality: these are the imperatives that must be satisfied on the way to the full realization of praxis itself. The essence of praxis is *libertad*. Thus, the *telos* of this process of liberation is the liberation of liberty itself, a process for which the reality animal, the praxical being, is responsible. Thus the full realization of reality entails this: praxical beings acting to bring about the realization of the reality in which all praxical beings (i.e., all human beings) can realize the fullness of their praxical essence. In other words, physical and biological forces brought about the reality of human beings; but the nature of human beings is such that we are now responsible for the further and fuller realization of reality, which realization is precisely the liberation of all human beings such that they can realize the fullness of their essence. Thus, Ellacuría is able to argue that the metaphysics of reality demands a liberatory praxis from us: liberation, because of the essence of human beings and the nature of reality, is a metaphysical imperative.

#### **Part Four: Non-Violence and Liberation Struggles**

Within Ellacuría's philosophical analysis of reality, the goal of human action is to assist in the further unfolding of reality, the leading edge of which is history, i.e., human reality. Progress in history, in human reality, requires the creation of societies in which more and more, ultimately all human beings are free to be agents of their own and their society's development. Thus, acting to further unfold reality is precisely acting to liberate human beings. And this is the ultimate responsibility of human beings. For Ellacuría, this is the highest value, the one that trumps all others, including non-

violence. Acting to further the ability of praxical beings to realize their essence as praxical beings is the highest action for human beings.

Ellacuría develops, in contrast to the traditional idea of the common good, a conception of the "necessary good," that which is the absolute minimum needed for human beings, and in the pursuit of which violence may be used.

Certainly, armed struggle is always an evil which can only be permitted when it is sure to avoid greater evils. However, this greater or lesser evil is not measured from a presumed and abstract *common good* which makes peace, understood as the absence of war, the greatest good. Rather, it is measured from the perspective of the *necessary good* of the poor majority in the short and long term. And the necessary good of the poor majority is, before all else, the satisfaction of its basic needs and the real and effective respect for its fundamental rights. It is precisely the negation of this necessary and most universal good that renders revolutionary violence not only permissible but legitimate; at the same time, the necessary good becomes the fundamental criterion [used to critique] the use of such violence. To the extent that revolutionary struggle favors, extends and consolidates [the necessary good], it is justified and even, up to a point, *required*. To the extent that it hinders [the necessary good], if not in the short term then at least in the medium term, such a struggle remains unjustified in practice, no matter what theoretical justification it might have. (TNVP-DR, p. 8, emphasis added)

Ellacuría argues that violence is always an evil, but that there are degrees of evil and that some kinds of violence are

legitimated, even required as means of resistance to worse kinds of violence. He argues that peace is a good, but not the highest good. One hears echoes again of Rousseau's observation on the undesirability of dungeons, no matter how peaceful. For both Ellacuría (and Rousseau), peace is valuable but it is not the greatest good. Or rather, peace *understood as the absence of war* is not the greatest good. A peace in which the *necessary* good is respected is a greater good than the absence of war, and may *require* violence to achieve it. For Ellacuría, "the well being of the poor majority, [is] an end in itself that must not be sacrificed to any other value" (ibid., p. 10). Thus, the highest good is the welfare of society's worst-off. If a violent struggle can bring into existence the structures that minimally satisfy the material necessities for human life, then violent struggle is legitimate and even required. If a seemingly peaceful situation locks the oppressed into extreme poverty, then it is to be condemned.

Ellacuría does not stand on a principle of non-violence because he reasons that there are situations in which violence is legitimate and even required. However, he goes on to say that history has shown that revolutionary struggles against oppressive regimes, even though legitimate, still make life exceedingly difficult in the short and medium term for society's worst-off. He argues that advocates for the worst-off should therefore be advocating not peace *tout court*, which might be a 'peace' that maintains an oppressive status quo, but rather peaceful negotiations *towards a new reality* in which the lot of the worst-off is improved.

We can now appreciate why Ellacuría's constant calls for a non-violent solution to the problems dividing Salvadoran society did not amount to an absolute endorsement of a principle of non-violence. The absolute principle for Ellacuría is the liberation of human beings, with special focus on those who are worst-

off. Franz Fanon pointed out in his now classic work, *The Wretched of the Earth*, that talk of non-violence arose, *not* during the centuries of extreme violence committed by Europeans and North Americans against the people of the Third World, but *only* after the exploited began to organize effective, sometimes violent, resistance to that exploitation (Fanon, p. 61). I think that Ellacuría is aware of this, aware of the ways in which talk of non-violence can be used as a weapon by the oppressors to hamstring efforts by the oppressed, and he does not want to empower that tactic.

At the same time, Ellacuría is all too painfully aware of the tens of thousands of civilians who get caught between the forces of oppressive and repressive violence, on the one hand, and the forces of revolutionary violence, on the other hand. His untiring efforts for a negotiated settlement to the violence encased in and engendered by oppressive social structures in El Salvador sought to preserve those innocent lives.

So, while Ellacuría did not embrace an absolute principle of non-violence, he constantly worked non-violently for peace. I think the conclusion that can be drawn here is this: calls for a non-violent resolution to problems should be focused on the more original violence, the violence that causes other forms of violence. Hence the focus should *not* be on revolutionary violence but on the oppressive structures and repressive means that support those structures, thereby engendering the revolutionary response. Only in this way do calls for non-violence avoid reinforcing an oppressive status quo in the way feared by Fanon.

In the end, the well-being of the poor is, for Ellacuría, a supreme value. While this means that no other value, for example, non-violence, can negate it, we have also seen the high regard that Ellacuría has for non-violence. While my students often confuse the Delphic oracle's

pronouncement on Socrates, she did not say that he was the wisest, but only that none are wiser than Socrates – the difference being that we all can, and indeed should aspire to his level of wisdom. Similarly, in making the welfare of the poor an absolute value, Ellacuría is only saying that non-violence can never be placed above it. The ideal situation, and the one that those in solidarity with the poor must utopically pronounce, is a revolutionary non-violence that overturns the present structures of oppression and repression. But the principle goal is not non-violence, it is the creation of a state in which there are no oppressive structures. The violent struggles of the oppressed to achieve such a state should not be denounced. Rather, the greater and more original violence of oppressive structures must be constantly, creatively and effectively denounced. While non-violence is to be sought, the pressure towards it must be placed on those maintaining the structures of oppression, not on those struggling against such structures, because the locus of the more original violence is the *effective* and, more importantly, *just* place for such pressure to be applied. “From a realistic point of view, accepting certain forms of violence is inevitable . . . so long as it is a non-terrorist liberatory violence that aims, above all, for the liberation from the death that crushes the poor . . . in the Third World,” (TNVP-DR, p. 19). We might add, simply, that the group to whom Ellacuría refers, the poor in the Third World, make up the majority of humankind.

We have seen Ellacuría’s stance on non-violence and how it is grounded in his philosophy of liberation. Let me end with an observation on the relevance of this Latin American body of thought to North American culture, a culture far different from the one in which Ellacuría’s thought was developed. Ellacuría was trained as a philosopher, he was the chair of the philosophy department, and almost all of the courses he taught were in that department. Yet he devoted most of his

published writings to theology. He once explained his reasons for doing this: in Central America, in the 1960s, 70s and 80s, theology was more *effective* than philosophy, more effective because, in a society in which the vast majority of people were Catholic, theology could make use of the institutional network and, more importantly, the language of the Catholic Church (Cardenal, pp. 1015-1016; Gonzalez, p. 980).

The interesting possibility for North American philosophers is that, in the far more secularized culture of the U.S. in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, we might come to a different conclusion: philosophy might be more effective because it can make use of the institutional network of universities and the language of rational discourse, both of which may be more effective here than religious language and institutions. Ellacuría clearly made the right choice for his time and place: one can hardly deny the tremendous contribution liberation theology has made to the liberation struggles of oppressed people in Latin America. Is there a way for philosophy to make similarly *effective* contributions to the efforts in U.S. society to bring about a more humane, more just, fairer arrangement?

### **Bibliography**

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All translations from Spanish are mine.

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# Evaluating Peace Education

## By Ian Harris

“The tests and exams normally used in schools are unsuitable for the evaluation of peace education outcomes, because they do not evaluate a state of mind, but rather the level of acquired knowledge.”

(Bar-Tal, 2002: 34)

Peace educators provide an awareness of the problems of violence and teach about the efficacy of peace strategies to alleviate violence. They promote the values of planetary stewardship, global citizenship, and human relations. Peace education advocates assume that citizens who become alarmed about the dangers of violence and learn how to promote peace will do something to change their behavior and the political systems that promise war and environmental damage, and that those actions will reduce destruction.

Education implies, at best, a change in consciousness. In most cases it implies learning facts and theories—information that may or may not result in a change in attitudes or a desire to work for peace. Even if peace educators persuade students about the dangers of violence and instill in them a desire to do something about those threats, students may have neither the will, the capacity, the knowledge, the skills, nor the power to take action that would result in a more peaceful world. Therefore peace educators face an important quandary: How can they best assess their effectiveness in bringing peace to the world?

For over 100 years enlightened educators have been practicing peace education in schools and community settings (Stomfay-Stitz, 1993). In spite of their efforts and activities of millions

of people who have joined and actively supported peace movements during this time, the world has grown more violent with ethnic and religious conflicts. Many well-meaning individuals who turn to peace education sense an increasing reliance on peace through strength strategies to manage human affairs and despair about the inability of humans to manage their conflicts with peacemaking and peace-building strategies. Feeling that their efforts have not been able to stem the flood of militarism, they often become burned out and cynical about the prospects for peace. If they had a realistic sense of what their peace education efforts can achieve, they might take more satisfaction from their efforts to create peace.

Peace education evaluations attempt to answer the question: After learning about peace, do people become more peaceful or do they work for peace and hence does the intensity of violence in a given conflict reduce? This latter formulation is known in the peace research community as ‘peace writ large’ and refers to “peace in the big picture or overall situation in the country.” (Church and Shouldice, 2002: 38) In order to address this question, peace education evaluation involves formative and summative measures.

Formative evaluations concern the delivery of a peace education program. What activities were conducted, whom the intervention reached, number of participants, number of meetings, etc., and whether or not the goals of the education project were achieved? Was the project completed? Did it reflect appropriate use of resources that fit the capacity of the organization doing the instruction? Formative evaluations of peace education programs operations can lead to program improvement, but do not

answer the question posed in the previous paragraph about peace writ large.

Summative peace education evaluation tries to document the impact of peace education instruction upon pupils. It addresses such questions as: "Are pupils more peaceful as a result of this instruction?" "Do they have knowledge of alternatives to violence?" "Are their attitudes more tolerant towards others?" Such evaluations use quantitative and qualitative means to assess learner satisfaction with a particular peace education program. Summative peace education programs can document cognitive changes as a result of peace education instruction. Many of these evaluations try to demonstrate whether or not people exposed to peace education become more peaceful and hence contribute to peace writ large.

This article will attempt to answer the question: What can and can't be provided from peace education evaluations? After a discussion of some of the pressure on peace educators to produce valid assessments of their efforts, this article will summarize some of the research on peace education evaluations. The middle section will present some of the complications for peace education evaluation, describe what can be expected of such evaluations and discuss some challenges associated with them. Finally, a conclusion will present some limits that will help guide peace education evaluation efforts in ways that will be fruitful.

### **The Need for Evaluation of Peace Education**

There is considerable pressure to prove that peace education efforts are effective, pressure that comes from many sides—from the educational research community, from policy makers looking for ways to reduce levels of violence, from taxpayers supporting peace education programs in public schools, and from the larger peace

community that looks to peace education as a potential path to peace.

The educational research community seeks to document new techniques for teachers that can improve their instruction. Ever since the time of the Goals 2000: Educate America Act (1994), passed by the U.S. government that included as one of its goals, "Every school in America will be free of drugs and violence and will offer a disciplined environment conducive to learning," there has been considerable attention paid to educational efforts to reduce levels of youth violence in and outside schools (Burstyn, et al., 2001; Cassela, 2001; Elliot, Hamburg, & Williams, 1998; Hoffman, 1996). These efforts include prevention and peacebuilding strategies in schools (Gladden, 2002; DiGiulio, 2001; Harris 2000). Evaluations of these efforts attempt to show which of them are most successful in reducing school violence and hence in providing a peaceful climate for learning.

Policy makers want to know: Is peace education an effective way to address problems of violence? This pressure for tangible results is felt increasingly as levels of ethnic hatred and civil strife rise in a society. Whereas, international peace education might be controversial because it challenges war-enhancing policies of government, peace education that attempts to reduce conflict within civil society seems attractive to a wide spectrum of school personnel, government officials and civic leaders who want to know that it works before they pour precious resources into educating children about alternatives to violence. Such demands can be an obstacle to the growth of peace education because policy makers do not have hard data to support claims that it reduces violence.

In various cities in the United States community leaders and politicians have launched violence prevention programs to reduce youth

violence and civic crime. These efforts have included hiring more police (a peace through strength strategy) and developing emergency security plans in schools (Vestermark, 1996; Vestermark & Blauvelt, 1978). The educational aspects of these efforts include violence prevention programs in schools and community centers (Catalano, R. et al., 1998; Prothrow-Stith, 1991). These efforts in combination have been producing lower levels of street crime and urban violence in some cities (Braga, A., Kennedy, D., Waring, E., and Phiehl, A., 2001). However, the problem is in demonstrating that peace education activities helped produce these results.

Peace educators pressured from local school officials to show the value of peace education have a hard time developing rigorous studies to validate their efforts. Ideally such a study would compare a group of students who had received peace education training with a comparison group that didn't, but such studies are hard to carry out for the following reasons:

- 1) They require pre and post tests, access to school records, and to classrooms. Researchers have to get permission from schools, the teachers, and parents in order to conduct research on minors.
- 2) In places where children are mobile, it's hard to find the same subjects after a year to gather follow-up data.
- 3) Comparison groups are hard to control. Two samples of students may appear similar, but their participation in peace education learning can be influenced by a wide variety of factors, including parent beliefs, religious upbringing, previous experiences with conflict resolution education and external levels of hostility—factors over which teachers have no control. Subtle and dramatic exposure to violence and/or experiences with peace inside

and outside the classroom would also influence how well students responded to peace instruction. Some of the problems of matching samples can be overcome by randomizing a control group, but this increases costs.

4) Such studies are expensive and there is little money available for peace education research.

These many obstacles to conducting valid evaluations of peace education instruction make it hard for peace educators to satisfy the expectations of educational policy makers—school boards, principals, and superintendents—to verify the value of educational approaches to reducing violence.

The peace research community is also interested in peace education evaluation to see if educational efforts contribute to reducing violence and building peaceful societies (Adams, 2000). The problem with providing clear answers to these concerns has to do with the level of analysis. Is violence caused by government policies, media exposure, cultural and community norms, or individual behavior? The answer, of course, is all of the above and many other factors determine whether or not a person or a group of people become peaceful. In order to provide valid research about how peace education reduces violence, evaluators have to be able to establish a causal link between the reduction of violence and the specific instruction provided by peace educators. Such links are hard to establish because of many intervening variables.

### **Brief Summary of Research**

Baruch Nevo and Iris Brem (2002) in a comprehensive review of peace education (PE) literature from 1981-2000 found 79 studies that attempted to measure peace education program effectiveness. The majority of these demonstrated that they were

effective. However these authors did notice the following shortcomings of these studies:

- A) "Not enough attention is given to behavior"
- B) "The majority of PE programs appeal to rationality."
- C) "Delayed posttest is important; nevertheless, it is very rare in PE research."
- D) "generalizability of the program onto related individuals was hardly studied."

(p. 274, 275)

They concluded their study by noting, "80%-90% of the programs are effective/partially effective. This is an encouraging picture." ( 276)

Further evaluation is required if teachers and administrators are to devote their precious resources to implementing peace education curricula. Most evaluations of peace education programs establish criteria for assessing the success or failure of a particular program, but they have not reported adequately on the results of those programs upon the students in them, the communities they inhabit, and the broader problems of violence that these programs seek to address (as pointed out in points A & D above).

There are considerable differences between quantitative and qualitative approaches to peace education evaluation. Quantitative studies use control groups and sampling techniques to determine what a group of people have learned as a result of instruction. Qualitative studies typically study in depth a small number of participants and interview them or observe them to see what impact instruction has had upon their behavior. Quantitative studies have for a long time shown the benefits of peace education upon children (Grossman, Neckerman, and Koepsell, 1997; Johnson, Johnson, and Dudley 1992; Metis Associates, Inc., 1990). In general these studies show positive effects of

conflict resolution education programs that decrease aggression among children, reduce bullying in schools, and motivate children to achieve in schools. Several researchers have demonstrated that conflict resolution programs in schools have improved the capacity of students to handle conflict nonviolently, their relationship with peers, and their attachment to school. (Bickmore, 2002; Johnson & Johnson, 1996). The most extensive evaluation of a conflict resolution program in schools conducted with thousands of children in the New York City public schools showed a decrease in discipline problems with children who received instruction within a Resolving Conflict Creatively Program (R.C.C.P.) compared to their peers who did not get the instruction (Aber et al., 1998). A recent meta-analysis of evaluations of in school peer mediation outcomes for educational settings indicates that school climate improves after the implementation of a mediation program, that a mediation program reduces the perception of conflict in a school, and the number of suspensions, expulsions, and disciplinary actions. This analysis also shows that for those students who are trained in peer mediation, their knowledge of interpersonal conflict increases; they have more positive perceptions of conflict and an improved sense of themselves; and their grades increase. (Burrell, Zirbel, & Allen, 2003) These are powerful findings about the positive impact of one form of peace education, e.g. peer mediation in schools, but these same authors also voice a cautionary note about peace writ large:

The suggestions that students who are trained in conflict resolution strategies apply those skills to settings that are external to the school environment in which they are learned implies that training students can have longer-lasting impact and affect wide audiences (siblings, families and the community at large). Unfortunately, the lack of data

on this point does not permit inclusion of this feature as part of the meta-analysis. The potential transference of skills points to a target area for future research studies on the impact of mediation in schools.

(Burrell, Zirbel, & Allen, 2003: 9)

These studies define peace education in a narrow way: Does it have positive effects upon the behavior of children in schools? While it is valuable for teachers to know that conflict resolution education has positive benefits for children, these studies neither evaluate the long-term effects of this instruction upon the behavior of students, nor do they assess whether or not students become active outside the classroom to promote peace and hence reduce levels of violence in the larger society. As Joan Burstyn (2001) has pointed out:

Violence in schools mirrors the violence in society and is exacerbated by the availability of guns, urban and rural poverty, drug and alcohol abuse, suburban anomie, and the media's celebration of violence. Each of these must be addressed if people want to end violence.

(225)

Peace education evaluation is more complicated than conflict resolution education because peace educators hope to contribute to 'peace writ large.'

In-depth qualitative studies of the effects of peace education are hard to find. One study about an intentional peace community established in a Jewish-Palestinian village in Israel (Feuerverger, 2001) discovered that a comprehensive approach to learning about each other's different language and culture can help to reduce enemy images, but such feelings of empathy are influenced strongly by current events, so that hostilities that erupt in

places like the Middle East can offset attitudes that are acquired in peace education classes.

Very little summative research on the effects of peace education classes has been conducted. According to one study by William Ekhardt (1984) peace education itself does not produce changes in personality that might result in more peaceful behavior. Such changes in personality might lead to more compassion and less fatalism. However, this study (with a very small group of twelve students) does show attitude changes in the areas of ideology, morality, and philosophy. Peace educators can evaluate their students before and after such instruction to determine if students have adopted new attitudes, as a result of instruction. Michael Van Slyck and Marilyn Stern (1991) have demonstrated that it is possible to measure students' attitudes about conflict before and after conflict resolution education activities to see if their attitudes change, but these studies do not demonstrate that the behavior of individuals has actually changed. Harris has conducted several studies of peace education evaluations using quantitative and qualitative methods (Harris, 1995; Harris and Callender, 1995; Harris and Jeffries, 1998). In them he found that a holistic approach to peace education is more effective than a piecemeal approach.

Peaceful changes in student attitudes can occur as a result of classroom instruction, but nobody can predict whether they will last over time. For example, a graduate of a peace education class could be drafted and exposed to a military lifestyle, or as often happens, that student's country could go to war, which could produce a shift where the whole population might become more approving of militaristic values. An increase in hostility about enemy groups can negatively influence any nonviolent or non-militaristic tendencies students may have acquired in peace education classes.

## Complications

Trying to prove whether or not a particular peace education lesson is effective is somewhat like trying to evaluate whether or not a lesson in kindness produces kind people. Imagine how you would try to answer that question? Would you give a paper and pencil test (quantitative proof), or would you try to follow around the pupil who has received instruction in kindness to see whether or not that person behaves in kindly ways (qualitative proof)? Let's assume that you observe this person for a week. Going to her job, you notice that she is a production worker with pressure from her boss to produce at high levels and never has an opportunity to be kind at her job. Would you follow that woman home and observe her every action to see if she was kind? Would you rely on her supervisor's word? Would you interview her co-workers, members of her family? How can research studies be carried out that effectively evaluate whether or not a person has learned to be kind?

The question of time becomes a key factor in determining a summative outcome for a peace education class. In the above example, let's assume the researcher is observing our student to see if she is kind and notes her having a fight with her boyfriend. Observing such an event might negate the hypothesis of the study, e.g. that this person has learned how to be kind because of instruction she had received previously about the importance of being kind. Likewise with peace education, an observer at a particular time after a peace education event might not observe a graduate of that event acting in a peaceful way.

Peace education is such a complex subject that it is hard to structure evaluation programs to capture its complexity: "Peace education needs to be based on a holistic approach. Consequently, knowledge, values, attitudes, and behavior should

go hand in hand." (Bjerstedt, 2002: 10) Foremost among these challenges is: What do we mean by 'peace'? As Linda Groff (2002) has pointed out, 'peace' has many different meanings: It can mean the absence of war, or a balance of forces in the international system. It can also mean the elimination of physical and structural violence at both a micro and macro level. It can mean peace with different people (cultural peace) or peace with the planet, e.g. living sustainably with Earth's resources. For example, there is a difference between inner and outer peace. Inner peace concerns a state of being and thinking about others, for example, holding them in reverence; while outer peace processes apply to the natural environment, politics, culture, international relations, civic communities, families, and individuals. 'Peace' has different meanings within different cultures as well as different connotations for the spheres in which peaceful processes are applied.

There are many different aspects to peace learning that vary from an understanding of international relations to the ability to be compassionate. In conducting evaluations, peace educators have to be clear about what their objectives are. Since there are many different types of violence, there are many different forms of peace education, each focused on different forms of violence. These include teaching tolerance, human rights, knowledge of the United Nations, prejudice reduction, awareness of ecological crisis, conflict resolution skills, strategies for sustainability, roots of violence, etc. Because each problem of violence that is addressed in a peace education lesson is specific to a particular context, evaluators of such classes have to tailor their evaluations to the specific objectives of that lesson. When asking the question, How has a person or situation become more peaceful as a result of peace education instruction, it is important to analyze the context to see the type of conflict that instructors seek to address and the

elements of peace that are highlighted in that instruction.

The creation of peace is also complex. For example, consider the extensive anti-nuclear educational efforts that took place in North America, Europe, and Japan in the 1980s. There were college courses, street demonstrations, and considerable community education efforts designed to educate people about the threat of nuclear weapons and to influence policy makers to reduce their reliance upon deterrence theory. Political actions such as reducing nuclear stockpiles, passing of a comprehensive test ban treaty, and decreasing cold war hostilities seem to indicate that these efforts were successful. However, these changes in policies could be due to the personalities of Ronald Reagan and Michael Gorbachov, who were heads of the United States and the Soviet Union at that time. They might also have been caused by economic considerations, where politicians were concerned about the cost of producing nuclear weapons. How could it be proved that changes in nuclear policy were due to peace education activities?

With peace education, it's difficult to demonstrate the instrumentality of a particular act of instruction. Let's assume that one student in a peace education class afterwards works for peace. Is that due to what the instructor did, or was it caused by that student observing the behavior of the student's parents who were peace activists, or was the main reason that person acted peacefully because she was religious and believed in following the tenets of her spiritual beliefs that include the commandment, "Thou shall not kill"? What about the other students who did nothing that reflected upon their instruction in the ways of peace? Does their inactivity negate the worth of the instructor whose one student became an activist? Different people respond to peace education instruction in different ways.

Questions of teacher effectiveness raise the specter of educational evaluation. Teachers do not cause students to do anything. They plant seeds in pupils' minds and cannot know whether or not those seeds will develop into plants that ultimately bear fruits. 'To bear a fruit' for a peace educator would be to have a student become so concerned about the fate of the earth that the student does something to make the world more peaceful. However, teachers can not follow their students around to see whether they initiate efforts to bring peace to the world. Therefore, they cannot evaluate the effectiveness of their work by seeing whether their students become peace activists or the world grows more peaceful. Such questions could be answered with detailed longitudinal studies into the peace activities of graduates of peace classes, but, as mentioned before, it is almost impossible to conduct such studies. In actuality, teachers should evaluate themselves according to more immediate criteria. What effect has their teaching had upon their students' minds? Do their students understand various peace issues or can they demonstrate that they have acquired peaceful skills?

Even if a peace educator effectively motivates students to work for peace and those students follow through on those commitments, such actions may not produce results for many years. Because any such changes in the world will take years to come about, peace education does not appear to be an effective way to stop the immediate threats of war.

Presumably we want peace studies to contribute toward peace and less war, but peace educators seldom if ever have any control over world events such as war and peace. The most we can do, as a general rule is to influence the minds of

students who attend classes.

(Lazlo, 1974:84)

Peace educators can look to their students to see if they have developed new beliefs about economic well-being, sustainability, peace strategies, and justice as a result of their teaching endeavors. Do they have new ways of thinking about enemies? Whether or not these students actually work to promote changes in the world is another question. Peace educators cannot control all the complex variables that may contribute to whether or not a particular student works for peace (the action component). But teachers can control both the information given students and the manner in which it is presented. Peace educators can evaluate at the end of educational programs whether students have acquired knowledge about the roots of violence and strategies for peace. The effectiveness of peace education, therefore, cannot be judged by whether it brings peace to the world, but rather by the effect it has upon students' thought patterns, attitudes, behaviors, values, and knowledge stock.

### **What Can be Done?**

Program evaluation should establish criteria for assessing success or failure that will provide feedback mechanism for program improvements. Peace education evaluation tries to determine the extent to which a peace education program (p) within a context (x) entailing a particular type of instruction (i) attains an outcome (o).<sup>1</sup> Evaluators of peace education programs can evaluate the goals of those programs. Do they explain the roots of conflict and hence lay out the problems of violence strategically, so that those studying conflict see ways that the problems of violence can be addressed? Is the intervention proposed by the educators based upon an adequate analysis of the conflict? Is it realistic? In such a way evaluators can see if the goals of peace education programs are appropriate, both in terms of the pupils

needs and in terms of peace theory and whether the implementation covers these goals.

Evaluators of peace education programs can also evaluate the context within which peace education programs takes place. Peace has different meanings. There are positive (presence of democracy, economic well-being, sustainability, and human rights) and negative aspects (cessation of violence) to peace (Galtung, 1969). As mentioned earlier, conflicts vary in their scope from international to civil to domestic. Are peace educators able to make connections between the micro and the macro level of conflict analysis? A popular peace slogan is, "Think globally, act locally!" Do the goals of that program reflect the full scope of the problem(s) of violence addressed in that program? People within a conflict have different notions of peace. Does a peace education activity account for different perspectives? "Even though their objectives may be similar, each society will set up a different form of peace education that is dependent on the issues at large, conditions, and culture, as well as the views and creativity of the educators."

(Bar-Tal, 2002: 35) Evaluators can look at a particular peace education program to see if it reflects local cultural norms about peace.

Peace education is often about specific strategies for peace. Do the strategies proposed in peace education programs reflect adequately the possible solutions within that context? Do they bring in all the relevant actors? Are the appropriate governments, international organizations, or community based organizations brought into play in terms of finding a solution to the conflict? Are the strategies being proposed realistic, within the capabilities of the actors involved in conflict?

Peace education evaluators can always look at the types of instruction involved in peace education programs. They can evaluate both the teachers'

and the students' language, the pedagogy, and the appropriateness of peace instruction. How does the teacher talk about peace? Does that teacher use peaceful words or does the instructor use violent terms of speech, like 'stick to your guns.' Does the instructor bring uncritically into peace instruction violent cultural myths that glorify the slaughter?

Peace education should be cooperative, where pupils in small groups are exploring the various problems of violence they face. Everybody has experiences with violence, and students have important insights to contribute in how to reduce it. A peace education classroom should therefore be inclusive and democratic, so that these diverse viewpoints are heard and respected.

Peace education evaluation can look to determine if the lessons taught about peace are age appropriate. During the 1980s peace educators were very careful not to overly frighten young people with devastating scenarios brought about by the wholesale use of weapons of mass destruction. Young people have more immediate concerns about violence that peace educators should be addressing rather than abstract aspects of peace theory more appropriate to a college classroom. Likewise, community members in adult forums focused on problems of violence want practical solutions to their concerns. Individuals have different ideas about peace and different notions about how to achieve security. Peace education programs should allow for these differing perspectives to surface and be debated in peace education instruction.

Peace education evaluators can also look to see if peace educators are practicing critical thinking skills in their classrooms. Peace education instruction should not present just one point of view and advocate for a particular solution. Do peace education programs encourage students to see the

conflict from contradictory points of view? Problems of violence are complex, calling for complex solutions. Peace education programs should present a variety of responses to conflict, known in peace theory as peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-building strategies, and let students evaluate which are most appropriate for the particular conflict under discussion:

A further consideration for evaluating peace education instruction has to do with moral sensitivity. When peace educators involve their students in group projects, students can learn to make choices both with a view of what is good for themselves, as well as what is good for the group. Developing feelings of responsibility for others in learning can become the basis of moral thinking.

(Harris & Morrison, 2003: 218)

A fundamental assumption of peace educators is the value of life and preserving the integrity of natural systems. Their instruction should focus on important values like caring and compassion, allowing students to reflect upon the intrinsic value of all living creatures. Empathy allows students in intractable conflicts to understand the reality of enemy perspectives. To understand the complexity of war and peace requires students to delve deeply into the values that undergird social organizations. By confronting the real life decisions that cause violence, peace educators enable deep reflection upon the human condition. In spite of the omnipotence of conflict, peace educators can emphasize that humans have a choice about how to behave—and can follow moral precepts to guide their behavior.

Finally, peace education evaluators can assess the outcomes of peace education instruction. They can test students to see what knowledge they have acquired and what skills they

have learned. This of course is best determined by pre-intervention and post-intervention comparisons. Here peace education evaluations are concerned with the cognitive goals of peace education instruction.

Summative evaluations of peace education programs provide feedback about the impact of these programs. Evaluators can look to see what knowledge and skills have been acquired as a result of instruction. These kinds of evaluations can help determine whether or not pupils have changed their attitudes about war and peace issues. They fail to show whether or not those changes in attitudes will lead to changes in beliefs, which in turn will lead to changes in behavior that might result in changes in policies and institutions that cause violence. (McCauley, 2002)

Another form of summative evaluation involves establishing, prior to peace education implementation, indicators of success and determining after the delivery whether or not these indicators have been met. In the United States a common indicator for school violence and conflict resolution programs is numbers of suspensions, expulsions, and referrals to the principal's office, etc. (Gottfredson & Gottfredson, 2002; Hunter, Elias & Norris, 2001) If these indicators decrease, that alternative dispute resolution program is said to be successful. In evaluating dialogue groups peace researchers look to the number of friendships developed between members of antagonistic groups (Pettigrew, 1998).

Indicators of success for peace education programs include: Were any new agreements reached subsequent to the instruction? Were there any observable changes in climate surrounding the conflict? Did people respond differently to the conflict after the peace education intervention? Were the peace proponents engaged over time in trying to address the conflict? Did

the educational program lead to institutional solutions and a linking dynamic where people concerned about the problems reached out to others to seek solutions?

### **Rewards, Challenges and Frustrations**

In order to avoid frustrations about the lack of their direct ability to make the world more peaceful, peace educators have to understand the complex nature of their endeavors. They sow seeds that may germinate in the future to produce new levels of peace strategies and degrees of consciousness about the problems of violence that plague human existence. In teaching about peace and violence they take one small step towards creating a less violent world, and they should appreciate the importance of that step. Apropos is a Buddhist saying that a journey of a thousand miles starts with the first step. Peace educators may not be changing the social structures that support violence, but they are attempting to build a peace consciousness that is a necessary condition for creating a more peaceful world.

A particular student, stimulated by a peace course, who talks to his/her friends or family, might provoke others to think more carefully about the commitment to militarism that governs political affairs. Often students who take peace education classes become peace educators themselves by organizing forums on war and peace issues. When these forums stimulate others to think through the efficacy of different peace strategies, they create a ripple effect, where people who learn new knowledge share insights with others, and the message spreads. These ancillary activities lie outside the control of the original peace educator who started this chain of events, but the important point is: If that educator had not had the courage to denounce the violent state of the world, none of those people subsequently affected by that message may have ever been

challenged to think about alternatives to violence.

Peace educators make important contributions to peace by building upon the peaceful instincts of students and creating a space for discussion of the problems of violence. These educational efforts are not a sufficient condition for achieving peace, but they are necessary. People's traditional patterns and ways of thinking need to be challenged in order to overcome the culture of violence that dominates world.

In a computer age peace education takes on exciting global dimensions as peace educators link up with colleagues in distant parts of the planet. Peace education activities can help create the kind of consciousness described by Teilhard de Chardin (1965) --where people from different cultures develop shared understandings and individuals reach out to others across national and ethnic boundaries. Hence peace educators share with their students a global awareness about the complex problems of violence and a consciousness of alternatives to violence. That consciousness can help reverse some of the powerful norms that support militarism. "If the world is to move away from the brink of terror, then new approaches, new combinations of reality, new risks must occur. Higher education should play a vital role in the evolution of such an imaginative spirit."  
(Dwyer, 1984: 315-328)

Education for peace has to build a belief in the future by creating in students a sense of hope that the world will be better and that the differences that peace educators bring about through creating a peace consciousness are important.<sup>2</sup> People work for peace in a variety of arenas--in the highest reaches of power, in their homes, in the streets, in church sanctuaries, in clandestine meetings, and in classrooms. Peace educators use their professional skills to contribute to the dialogue to create a safer world. They

may not see immediate results, but they have to appreciate the importance of taking that first step, of doing something about the violent threats that dominate modern life, and of using their training to build a consensus for peace.

Peace education does not pretend radically to change the pupils' attitudes in the course of a few lessons. It considers itself as one of the factors on a long-term process of transforming ways of thinking. And it will only produce any real effect if an attitude of international solidarity is advocated by politicians or at any rate by important and influential groups within society.

Political action will be necessary to change human behavior from reliance on violent means to settle disputes, and resolve conflicts. Peace educators may at some time participate in peace movement activities or support particular causes, but as educators, they should focus primarily on teaching activities, appreciating the importance of educating others to help build the consensus that will provide a breeding ground for a sustainable future.

Peace educators are, therefore, engaged in a frustrating enterprise. They teach about human rights but still abuses occur. They provide knowledge about positive interpersonal communication but still there is domestic violence. They warn about the dangers of war but still wars erupt throughout this planet. Living in a violent world, they teach peace education courses because they want to make the world less violent, but the most they can do is provide knowledge about peace strategies and/or change some students' attitudes or dispositions towards violence:

The prospects for peace education are thus not very encouraging. The patterns of

violence in the international system, in individual societies, and in the minds of people are so ingrained that one needs to have a kind of neurotic stubbornness to hold fast to the concept of peace. Sigmund Freud once depicted the weakness of reason in the face of madness, unreasonableness, and the superiority of instincts. Yet, as he indicated, there is something special about this weakness: 'The voice of the intellect is low, but it doesn't rest until it is heard. Finally, after countless repeated impulses, it is heard. This is one of the few points where one may be optimistic for the future of mankind.' Education for peace can and must trust this low voice of reason.

(Ekhardt, 1984: 79-80)

Peace educators resemble prophets from classical Greek drama, crying out against the madness of violence and human slaughter, who are often ignored. They may never know if their efforts have an effect on "peace writ large." Seeing threats to the world, they predict doom but are denounced as being crazy, utopian, or unrealistic. They disseminate the findings of peace researchers about how to create a more peaceful world. Research advances a body of ideas that may or may not become part of public policy. Insights gained from peace research can provide information that might develop important strategies to create alternatives to violent policies pursued by individuals, groups, institutions, and nation-states. However, whether those strategies ever become official policy remains a function of political activity.

### **Conclusions**

This world will not become more peaceful until citizens develop a moral revulsion to current violent practices and the will to change reality in more peaceful directions. Education, by influencing students' attitudes and

ideas about peace, can help create in human consciousness values that will lead to a more peaceful future. Peace educators can provide knowledge about the roots of violence and different strategies for peace. They can contribute to students' attitudes about conflict. Formative evaluations can determine the appropriateness and quality of peace education lessons and how they can be improved. Summative evaluations can help determine what knowledge and skills have been learned as a result of instruction.

Bringing peace to this world is a complex activity that ranges in scope from political leaders negotiating arms agreements to lovers amicably settling disputes. Influencing politics lies outside the classroom realm. Teachers have certain cognitive and affective goals for their students, but they should avoid extravagant claims that their efforts will stop violence. Teachers may want their students to become aware of the role of violence their lives, but awareness does not necessarily lead to action. What happens a result of a particular instructional act is quite outside a teacher's control. The activities of educators do not seem so much to be changing political structures as creating both a belief system and a way of life that embraces peace. Building such beliefs and skills may be a necessary condition for building a culture of peace. They help tear down enemy images and forge a consensus against the use of violence.

### **Notes**

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<sup>1</sup> I am indebted to Professor Gavriel Salomon from the Center for Research on Peace Education at Haifa University for this formulation.

<sup>2</sup> For a good description of future studies see: *Youth Futures: Comparative Research and Transformation Visions*, (Gidley and Inayatullah,

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2002) or *Educating beyond Violent Futures*

(Hutchinson, 1996).

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## **An Analysis of Sharon's Unilateral Disengagement by John Ryan**

In his Herzliya speech on December 18, 2003, Ariel Sharon outlined a detailed new strategy to act unilaterally to bring about "peace," a process that would involve no negotiations with the Palestinians whatsoever. Briefly put, within about a year, Israel's "separation" wall would encircle the Palestinian West Bank settlements, creating about a dozen ghetto/enclaves. Israeli settlements within these enclaves would be "resettled" into the remaining West Bank area that eventually would be annexed by Israel. Stemming from this strategy, Sharon, in early February of 2004, announced that as a beginning to this process, the settlements in Gaza would be evacuated and "resettled" into the proposed "Israeli" West Bank. Once the entire settlement transfer is completed, the Israeli army will be withdrawn from the Palestinian enclaves, which Sharon would then magnanimously proclaim to be "a Palestinian state" – covering only about 45 percent of the West Bank. This would probably be accepted by the USA as fulfilling President Bush's "vision" of a two-state solution. To put this in perspective, the Palestinians would be confined to an area that would constitute about 10 percent of the original territory of Palestine before 1948.

This new creation would be a totally nonviable pseudo-state being both politically and economically dependent on Israel. In reality, surrounded by a massive wall and the Israeli army, this would not only be a South African-type apartheid Bantustan, it would constitute the world's largest prison camp. For any "misbehaviour," Israel could isolate any of the enclaves and make life in them intolerable, in the hope of convincing the Palestinians that any resistance would now be utterly pointless.

The execution of Sharon's plan is perfectly timed. In an election year in the USA, neither the Democrats nor the Republicans would utter a word against Israel – no matter how outrageous and devastating Israeli actions may be. While Sharon carries out these facts on the ground, he will play for time by pretending to seek negotiations with the Palestinians. However, once the encircling wall is completed and his unilateral move to annex the majority of the West Bank is opportune, Israel would terminate "negotiations" and blame Arafat for the breakdown. In a nutshell, this is the essence of Sharon's unilateral disengagement.

Despite some initial setbacks with his own Likud party and charges against him of corruption, by mid-summer of 2004, Ariel Sharon was perhaps even ahead of his own schedule. His proposal to pull out the 7500 Israeli settlers in Gaza and relocate them in the West Bank was described by President Bush as "historic and courageous actions." Considering that the West Bank and Gaza are both illegally occupied by Israel, it is amazing that Sharon has the audacity to try to dictate to the world which parts he is prepared to evacuate and which parts he plans to incorporate into Israel – and to be applauded for his actions by the U.S. president. In fact, not only did President Bush endorse Sharon's disengagement plan, he specifically endorsed Israel's retention of most of its illegal settlements in the West Bank, which would have the effect of annexing this territory to Israel. And further, he proclaimed that at this stage it is unrealistic for Palestinian refugees to consider any right of return to Israel. Bush capped these pronouncements by reiterating that these developments are progress in his Road Map for a two-state solution for Israeli and Palestinian people.

Apart from violating the Road Map principles by endorsing a non-negotiated settlement, far more serious is the fact that by these actions the U.S. President has sanctioned the violation of several Geneva Conventions as well as all UN resolutions passed on this issue to date.

Astonishingly, a week before Sharon obtained U.S. backing for his “disengagement” plan, he made the following statement: “The Palestinians understand that this plan is to a large extent the end of their dreams, a very heavy blow to them... In the unilateral plan, there is no Palestinian state.” Despite this open admission, President Bush blithely carries on the myth of a “two-state solution” within the context of his totally discredited Road Map.

In keeping with this Alice in Wonderland scenario, at the beginning of May and then in a further report in June 2004, the Quartet (the U.S., the EU, Russia, and the UN) endorsed the “Revised Disengagement Plan” of Ariel Sharon, and pledged to try to bring about a two-state solution for the Israelis and the Palestinians – although there is no provision for such a solution in Sharon’s “plan!” Moreover, in our current strange Orwellian world, the honourable diplomats seemed not to have read the following words in the first paragraph of the “plan”: “Israel has come to the conclusion that at present, there is no Palestinian partner with whom it is possible to make progress on a bilateral peace process.” Yet, a few months earlier the detailed 50-page Geneva Accord was made public -- the result of prolonged negotiations between reputable Israeli and Palestinian delegates. It’s as if this never happened.

Shockingly, by endorsing Sharon’s proposal, the Quartet (in effect, the international community) has accepted a procedure in which the Palestinian people will not be able to take part in the determination of their own fate. Although the Quartet’s communique of

May 4 calls for an end to the Israeli occupation and “notes that no party should take unilateral actions that seek to predetermine issues that can only be resolved through negotiation and agreement between the two parties...”, this is idle diplomatic rhetoric since the defining feature of Sharon’s “plan” is Israeli unilateral action. Somehow, the Quartet ignores the clearly stated *modus operandi* of Sharon’s “plan” in which everything will be decided by Israel alone, with the backing of the U.S. Despite the lofty rhetoric, it appears that whatever Israel and the U.S. carry out, these actions will be automatically accepted by the other members of the Quartet. It’s as if the international community, under orders from the U.S, absent-mindedly accepted an Israeli dictum that from now on the Palestinian people will not be consulted in determining their own destiny. That this will somehow lead to peace is nothing short of delusion.

To compound this extraordinary development, on June 23, 2004, the U.S. House of Representatives, in a vote of 407 in favour and only 9 opposed, endorsed Sharon’s efforts to colonize and annex about 55 percent of the Palestinian West Bank, conquered by Israel in the June 1967 war. By this action the U.S. Congress has effectively renounced all UN Security Council resolutions which call on Israel to withdraw from these territories. Until now all previous U.S. administrations had considered these resolutions as the basis for Israeli-Palestinian peace. Furthermore, the now sanctioned illegal Israeli settlements violate the Fourth Geneva Convention which forbids any country to transfer parts of its civilian population onto territories seized by military force. Also, by referring to these settlements as being “in Israel,” the US effectively recognizes their annexation, even before Israel has made its move.

Obviously, the U.S. position is that Sharon’s Israel, unlike Hussein’s Iraq, need not abide by UN Security Council

resolutions – a touch of shameless hypocrisy that's bound to further antagonize the Muslim world.

Interestingly, by not even mentioning in their resolution the once highly-touted Road Map, this effectively destroys it. And here a few weeks before, the Quartet, in approving Sharon's disengagement policy, did it within the context of the Road Map, albeit in a rather disingenuous manner. Of further note, by endorsing Bush's April letter to Sharon that "the United States will do its utmost to prevent any attempt by anyone to impose any other plan," Congress has taken a stand to block any attempt by Israeli moderates and Palestinians to bring about peace by means of the Geneva Accord. Of greatest consequence, however, the U.S.'s endorsement of Israel's annexation of land conquered by war is a direct challenge to the United Nations Charter. Since this was an overwhelming bipartisan vote, what does this say to the world about the U.S.'s view of international law?

Israel's "Security Fence," an egregious euphemism for the apartheid separation wall, is a key feature in Sharon's disengagement strategy. Ninety percent of its 435-mile (700 km) route is to be built on Palestinian land. Being built supposedly for security purposes, its real function will be to confine and restrict the Palestinian population into about a dozen enclaves in an area covering about 45 percent of the West Bank – leaving the remaining 55 percent open to further Israeli settlement and eventual annexation.

The Sharon juggernaut suffered its first setback on July 9, 2004, when the International Court of Justice at The Hague, in a vote of 14 to 1 (the U.S. judge casting the single dissenting vote) issued an Advisory Opinion that the construction of the wall was "contrary to international law," work on it was to "cease forthwith," and that Israel is "under an obligation to make reparation for all damage caused by the

construction of the wall." The second setback came a few days later when on July 20, the UN General Assembly voted resoundingly (150-6) against the separation barrier and called for the wall's demolition.

Together, these two rulings represent an overwhelming, legitimate and rational global consensus – a democratic voice of global unity. Yet, in editorials and speeches across Israel and the U.S., hundreds of apologists protested that poor beleaguered Israel was being condemned for merely trying to ensure its security. Israel, with full support from the U.S., immediately announced that it would ignore both the Court and the United Nations. Given that the U.S. has thrust itself into Iraq to introduce to the region "freedom, democracy, and rule of law," how ironic that it now rejects the world's democratic, legal and moral consensus. Such contradictory behaviour brings with it not only a loss of credibility, but an unacceptable standard of integrity.

If Israel had truly wanted to build a legitimate security barrier, logic dictates that the structure should have been built on Israel's side of the 1967 border. Its length and costs would have been reduced by more than half, it would have provided maximum security, and there would have been no violation of international law. This was the argument used by the Palestinian lawyers, and the World Court agreed. The Court found that the first 125 miles of the wall's route involved the confiscation and destruction of Palestinian land, disruption to the lives of thousands of civilians, and that it constituted a de facto annexation of large areas of territory.

The essence of Sharon's disengagement strategy is to create conditions in the West Bank which will allow for the eventual annexation of over half the territory. It is for this reason that the wall is being built to not merely shield Israel from the Palestinians, but to completely encircle

all Palestinian settlements – hence a doubling of its length. But there is more to it than this. In evidence presented to the World Court, UN officials estimated that the lives of about 500,000 Palestinians will be directly affected. It will separate families from schools, hospitals, wells, jobs, and agricultural land. Since about 25 percent of farmers will be separated from their land and with over 100,000 fruit trees already destroyed, agricultural production may decrease by 20 percent or more. Not only towns, but villages and individual homes will be encircled, leaving only a single gate and checkpoint for entry and exit. Cultivated fields, water wells, and pasture land with herds of livestock will be separated from their owners. Where it took only minutes to travel from one location to another, with the wall in place it could then take hours. In effect, the wall has become part of an on-going Israeli process to make life as unendurable as possible for the Palestinians. The intention appears to be clear: in time, the hopelessly caged population may have no recourse but to leave, simply to avoid harassment and starvation. This is nothing less than a process of ethnic cleansing. Hence, the wall is meant for far more than just Israeli “security.”

As stated earlier, once the wall is completed and encircles the Palestinian settlements, Sharon’s plan is to then withdraw the Israeli settlements that would be enclosed within these Palestinian enclaves. These would be resettled in the adjoining West Bank area that eventually would be slated for annexation to Israel. At this point, Sharon would withdraw the Israeli army from the enclaves, and the walled in Bantustans could then be proclaimed to be a “Palestinian state” – no doubt to the acclaim and applause of the U.S.

Any such creation would be a nonviable pseudo-state, totally dependent on Israel. Any demonstrations or resistance would be ruthlessly suppressed.

This is not to say that Sharon’s strategy can be carried out as planned. There will be two obstacles: the settlers and the Palestinians.

Some of the Israeli settlements to be relocated are inhabited by rabid extremists and they would have to be removed by force. Their position is that to dismantle even a single settlement (even in Gaza) would establish a precedent that some day all the settlements could be removed. It would require a huge military effort with thousands of troops and war-like operations. Could the Sharon government survive a military operation against Israeli citizens that would verge on civil war?

As for the Palestinians, once they realize that Sharon is serious about destroying their prospects for a viable nation state, they will fight back with all possible means. In the unequal battle, it will be mainly Palestinians who will be killed, but these violent encounters may finally wake up the international community to try to stop Sharon’s blatant bid for greater acquisition of Palestinian territory. International efforts may have an effect, but probably the deciding factor will be the endurance of the two peoples and their degree of commitment to continue a bloody battle with all its social and economic implications.

In the way that Sharon’s war on Lebanon failed, his plan to set up an apartheid state may fail too. In such a case, Sharon would not retreat, but would simply change tactics. In the event that relentless pressure on the Palestinians would create a widespread insurgency movement such as had occurred in Algeria during the last stages of French colonialism, or as is now developing in Iraq in opposition to the American occupation, Israel would have essentially two options. The first would be a sensible, rational decision to finally negotiate a two-state solution, and to end the occupation and withdraw all Israeli settlements. The

second would be a drastic and dramatic move to expel all the Palestinians into Jordan.

It is virtually certain that if Sharon remained in power, he would never condescend to genuine negotiations and thereby abandon his dream for the creation of a "Greater Israel." For a peaceful resolution to occur, Sharon would have to be removed from power. If he stays in power and the situation deteriorates, he may gamble on a "final solution" to the Palestinian "problem." At an opportune time, he would conduct massive violent ethnic cleansing with tanks and troops in which almost the entire Palestinian population (two to three million) would be driven out of biblical "Greater Israel" up to the Jordan River. Lacking an "opportune time," a dramatic escalation of the present policy could starve the Palestinians of land, food, and a livelihood, leaving them no option but to go into exile in the hundreds of thousands. However, both these approaches are actually war crimes under the Geneva Conventions. Nevertheless, either way, for Sharon this would be the completion of his "grand design."

Sharon's dream of somehow creating an Israel with a Jewish majority in biblical "Greater Israel" is no secret. What's amazing is the degree to which the idea of massive ethnic cleansing of Palestinians is discussed in Israel – "transfer," it's called (as euphemistic a term as "collateral damage"). Martin van Creveld, Israel's most prominent military historian, as reported in Britain's *Sunday Telegraph* (April 28/02), pointed out that Sharon considers Jordan to be the real Palestinian state, and by inference, that's where all Palestinians should eventually be located. As Creveld says, Sharon "has always harboured a very clear plan – nothing less than to rid Israel [and the Occupied Territories] of the Palestinians." According to Creveld, Israel has worked out a detailed military plan on how to expel the entire West

Bank Palestinian population of two million or more in a lightning strike, all in a matter of about eight days. All that would be required is a suitable pretext and an opportune political moment. There's a strange ambivalence in the views of the Israeli public on this – over half the population would like to see the settlements dismantled, yet almost half would agree to Palestinian "transfer" under the "right" conditions. Moreover, a recent poll reveals that 64 percent of the Jewish public in Israel believes that the government should encourage Israeli Arabs to emigrate from Israel (*Ha'aretz*, June 22/04). What are we to make of this? The point is, if "transfer" should take place, where would this leave Israel and Diaspora Jews?

For Israel to expel the Palestinians and officially annex their territories would be an illegal land grab, in violation of international law (in addition to entailing war crimes). It would certainly be labeled as *Lebensraum* -- the acquisition of territory which a nation believes is needed for its natural development. Moreover, it would come with all the attendant historical baggage, which the world would view with revulsion. Over the years, Israel has consistently thumbed its nose at world public opinion and ignored countless UN resolutions, but such a course of action by Israel would push it beyond the pale, and it would become a permanent international pariah.

Without a doubt, Israel would be faced with trade sanctions by a wide range of countries. And forget about any "peace" with the Arab world. To be sure, Israel has its weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear), but this constant military preparedness would haunt and undermine the state and its people. And Sugar Daddy U.S. will surely some day have a change of government, and together with worries about Middle East oil security, it may very well change its policy towards Israel. If there were no longer over \$5 billion coming in each year – what then?

The U.S. doesn't have to live in the Middle East, but Israel has no choice and should be prepared to do so on its own.

How long before Israeli people would rue the day they didn't listen to Ben-Gurion, when he advised them in 1967 to withdraw from all the territory they conquered? Or heed the words of the "non-Jewish Jew" Isaac Deutscher, who also urged Israel to withdraw to its 1967 boundaries? Deutscher compared the Jews who were fleeing post-Hitler Europe to people jumping out of a burning building, and the Palestinians to innocent passersby who were crushed by the fall – the Jews had a right to escape, but they also had an obligation to make amends to the Palestinians.

And what about Diaspora Jews? They can't influence Israeli policies, but they nevertheless are identified with them, especially since Israel is insistent upon their allegiance. And so, unfortunately, Israel's behavior affects the way many people look at Jews. Misdirected efforts to get back at Israel may put innocent Diaspora Jews in danger of antisemitic attacks. Although antisemitism has many causes, it can't be coincidental that Sharon's "anti-terrorism" campaign against the Palestinians has been accompanied by a recent upsurge in antisemitism worldwide. Israel's flouting of UN resolutions and world public opinion are matters to consider as well. Moreover, many Jews lament the fact that Judaism's concern for ethics is being undermined by Israeli policies that often make a mockery of this traditional Jewish virtue.

In many respects, the real worry for Jews should be Sharon and his policies, and it's long overdue that they genuinely gave peace a chance. Although far from perfect, the successful negotiation of the Geneva Accord is proof positive that it may be possible to work out a fair, just and

peaceful solution to the satisfaction of both the Israelis and Palestinians.

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# **Occupied Iraq and its Possible Future Government**

## **by John Ryan**

Although Iraq has existed as a unitary state since its formation by the British in 1921, in reality it consists of three separate factions – the Kurds, the Sunnis and the Shiites. From its very beginnings until the current American occupation, the country has been held together by military force.

The Kurds are Sunni Muslims who form a distinctive ethnic group largely in the northern part of Iraq, with their own language and culture. They total about 5 million or 20 percent of Iraq's 26 million people. Adjacent to the Kurds are the Sunni Arabs also with about 5 million. The rest of the country, starting almost at Baghdad and extending southward, is the homeland of Shiite Arabs who comprise about 60 percent of the populace or about 15 million. Intermixed with these groups are Turkmen, Assyrian, Christians and others who total a million or more.

There has been historical antipathy between Sunnis and Shiites because starting with the British and extending to the Saddam Hussein regime, it was the minority Sunnis that kept Iraq together with military force. For decades, both Kurds and Shiites have been oppressed and killed by the thousands by regimes dominated by Sunnis. With the overthrow of the Hussein regime, the Sunnis have finally lost their position of dominance.

Undoubtedly, Iraqi people in general are relieved to be free of the Hussein regime, but they would have preferred to have done this themselves and not at the cost of being occupied by a foreign army. In fact, if it hadn't been for the US--enforced decade of UN sanctions that weakened the power of Iraqi people, they would have deposed Hussein themselves – in the way Marcos and Suharto were deposed. Nor is it lost on the Iraqis that the CIA recruited Saddam Hussein in the 1960s to

depose a leftist government and to kill off the progressive elite. And throughout the period of his worst excesses, including the killing of thousands of Kurds and Iranians by chemical weapons, the U.S. continued to provide economic and military aid to Iraq. It was only when Hussein no longer suited America's plans for an expanded military presence in the Middle East that the country was attacked under the guise of a totally fabricated pretext. The American hypocrisy of bringing "freedom" to Iraq is glaringly evident to all Iraqis, including school children.

Under American military occupation there is massive unemployment, reconstruction projects are not being offered to Iraqi companies, but are assigned primarily to American multinationals (which employ Americans and Asian migrants), and Iraqi resources and industries are being put up for sale to foreigners (in violation of international law). Moreover, with the daily alienation of the public by the brutality of some of the occupying troops and with general chaos and insecurity, it's no wonder that insurrection is spreading on a continuing basis.

With the prospect of an election in the USA, the Bush administration is under pressure to make it appear that sovereignty was turned over to the Iraqis, while nevertheless maintaining its occupation. Rather than trust any type of truly free election, the US wanted to create an "interim government" through a system that it would be in a position to control. The initial plan was to have the US-appointed Governing Council arrange to create "regional caucuses" that would select a "transitional Iraqi assembly" which in turn would select an "interim government." This interim government would then take over sovereignty at the

end of June 2004. The decision not to have an election for the interim government came partially from Noah Feldman, legal advisor to the US occupation, who said, "If you move too fast, the wrong people could get elected."

The fly in the ointment had been Shiite Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani who adamantly refused to accept the American dictated procedure – he had scuttled an earlier proposal as well. Instead he wanted the transitional assembly to be elected in a free and open election. Without the cooperation of the Shiites, who form 60 percent of the population, the Americans had been stymied. Moreover, until now, the main leadership of the Shiites has withheld support for an insurrection against the Americans because of the prospects of a forthcoming free election. If an election was pushed off into some distant future, it could be an invitation to a second front in the insurrection.

In desperation, the Americans begged the United Nations to intervene, and after a brief investigation, UN officials concluded that it would be possible to have an election, but not before the fall of 2004. Sistani agreed to this but demanded a guarantee of having an election within a few months. The US then pressured the Governing Council to hurriedly complete the draft of an Iraqi interim constitution. The document was drawn up and signed on March 8, 2004. Sistani grudgingly accepted its release, but issued a fatwa (a religious decree) that the constitution would not have legitimacy until it had been approved by an elected National Assembly. The interim constitution provides for an election to take place as soon as possible, but no later than January 31, 2005. The election would be for members to an Iraqi National Assembly, which would then form a Transitional Government. Its primary function would be to draw up a new constitution to be approved by a national referendum, after which an election would be held for a permanent

government no later than December 31, 2005.

In the meantime, however, for purposes of the forthcoming American election, the Bush administration had to create an Iraqi "interim government" to which sovereignty was to be turned over by June 30, 2004. To give this government a cloak of legitimacy, the USA once again turned to the United Nations, although only months before, they had no intention of doing this. Lakhdar Brahimi was appointed by the UN as a special envoy to play a central role in the creation of this entity. Since the prime function of this temporary government was simply to prepare the country for an election by January 31, 2005, Brahimi set out to appoint non-political technocrats to this body. Before he could accomplish his task, he found himself pushed to the sidelines by Paul Bremer, then head of the U.S. occupation forces. In short order Bremer and the Iraq Governing Council (previously appointed by the US forces) drew up a list of "reliable" Iraqis to form the government, and presented it to Brahimi for his approval. Rather than withdraw from his position in protest, under intense U.S. pressure, Brahimi allowed himself to be used to provide a UN "bluwashing," thereby giving the illegitimate process the illusion of international credibility. Hence, the interim government, like the Governing Council before it, is a creature of the USA, not the United Nations. Brahimi afterwards resigned, but this came too late to expose the U.S. manoeuvres, and the episode served to damage the credibility and legitimacy of the United Nations.

Brahimi's intention of selecting a group of non-aligned technocrats for the caretaker government was derailed because of the American fear that such a body might prove to be too independent. The U.S. wanted Iraqis who, while willing to offer occasional criticism, were in the final analysis beholden to US power. This was the case with the originally appointed Iraqi

Governing Council (IGC), who were basically discredited as puppets by the Iraqi public. Nevertheless, of the top five positions three were recycled from the IGC, and two were Kurdish leaders, outright allies of the U.S. A number of other ministers are also from the IGC, so the overlap is substantial. To a large extent, the IGC was simply renamed. Of note is that two-thirds of the 36-member interim government are former exiles who still carry foreign passports, chiefly British and American. Most of them have left their families abroad, which shows how skin deep their attachment is to Iraq. The Iraqi public realized immediately that this wasn't just an instance of "old wine in a new bottle" but of "old wine in a well-used bottle."

Iyad Allawi, a Shiite, was selected as prime minister, a particularly non-credible choice. He had lived in Britain for years and was known throughout Iraq for his longstanding role as a British MI6 and CIA agent. He had been responsible for a number of unsuccessful terrorist attacks against the Saddam Hussein regime, which killed only innocent civilians. He played an equal role to the convicted fraudster Ahmed Chalabi in providing "intelligence" about Saddam's infamous "weapons of mass destruction," including the ludicrous claim that Saddam could launch them in 45 minutes – which Tony Blair accepted at face value. Another recycled asset is Ghazi al-Yawar who will be the ceremonial President. He's a Western-educated engineer, a longtime exile, and represents the powerful Sunni Shamar tribe in northern Iraq. At least he wears ceremonial Arab attire and not a western business suit.

Let there be no mistake, however, the real power behind this "sovereign" government will be the 160 senior American "advisors," who will supervise all key ministries, including defence, police, finance, communications, and a new, CIA-trained secret police. As for the truly big decisions -- oil, banking,

industry, military, internal security, foreign relations, and military bases – these will be decided by the real government: the U.S. Embassy and American "advisers." The largest American embassy in the world is now in Baghdad, staffed by thousands of employees, and fortified in the Green Zone. John Negroponte has been sworn in as ambassador. This is an ominous choice, since during his period as ambassador in Honduras he shored up a brutal dictatorship and supported widespread human rights abuses and campaigns of terror. Also he played a key role in US aid to the Contra death squads that killed countless thousands of people in Nicaragua. None of this matters since President Bush proceeded to appoint him as the U.S. representative at the United Nations, and now he's been further rewarded by heading American interests in Iraq.

Shortly after the interim government was announced, in an almost *pro forma* manner, the UN Security Council endorsed it as "sovereign" and the US-dominated occupation forces are now considered a UN-mandated "multinational force." The UN resolution was designed to provide international legitimacy for the continuation of the U.S. occupation and control of Iraq. The UN fig leaf was obtained after a series of private sessions in which the U.S. was engaged in heavier than normal bribes and threats against Council members.

While the UN resolution stated that the "sovereign Interim Government of Iraq" would assume "full responsibility and authority by 30 June 2004," it included provisions to restrict its powers in every respect that would be adverse to US interests. For example, it basically had no effective control over the occupation forces nor could it request the occupation to end. Moreover, it did not have the authority to reverse the major decisions imposed on Iraq by pro-consul Bremer. This includes the laws privatizing Iraqi resources, allowing foreign corporations

to control the reconstruction process, denying press freedom, and other such matters. Because of Ayatollah Sistani's intervention and strong opposition, the UN resolution did not endorse or even mention the Iraqi interim constitution. This infuriated the Kurds because this document had given them a degree of autonomy and a veto over the new constitution still to be drawn up. As such, the newly appointed interim government is faced with an alienated Kurdish population.

On June 28, 2004, in an unannounced, swift and furtive manner, the U.S. Viceroy, Paul Bremer, "transferred sovereignty" to the Iraqi interim government. It was done in secret two days early so it wouldn't be marred by an expected violent offensive by Iraq's resistance movement. The fact that U.S. authorities and the ex-CIA intelligence officer who is now Iraq's "Prime Minister," with the backing of 160,000 occupation forces, could not hold a formal public ceremony for such an occasion is pretty informative of the general state of affairs in Iraq. In reality, the formation of a newly appointed government and the so-called "transfer of sovereignty" was essentially a publicity stunt with almost no substance to it. The day before the "transfer," Condoleezza Rice, in a television appearance made the comment that from now on if something goes wrong in Iraq, journalists should grill Prime Minister Allawi about it rather than the Bush administration. So it appears that this was a political charade designed to soothe the uneasy American voters who were increasingly alarmed by the unfolding Iraqi revelations, mounting casualties, and the almost \$200 billion US cost.

What isn't a charade, however, is that the US-led occupation forces have essentially lost control over most of Iraq – in both a physical sense and in public support. In the latest *USA Today/CNN* poll of Iraqis, only 23% -27% have a favourable view of the US and the UN. It's safe to assume that almost all Kurds

(one-fifth of the population) would still support the USA, so if this is factored in, it appears that among Iraqi Arabs, only 7% - 11% are favourably disposed to the US and the UN. The UN has never been forgiven because (under US pressure) it imposed a ten-year period of severe sanctions which caused the deaths of at least a million Iraqis and, by weakening Iraqi society, it basically kept Saddam Hussein in power.

Since the start of the U.S.--led invasion of Iraq, there has never been a day free of Iraqi resistance. The initial "war" ended in a few weeks, but actual fighting continued -- there was never such a thing as a formal surrender ceremony. Saddam's security services were never disbanded; they simply blended into the population, to be called back when and where needed. At first, the resistance was sporadic and was dismissed as "dead-enders." But the movement became more sophisticated, and recent attacks on Americans in Fallujah and Ramadi were carried out by well-disciplined men fighting in cohesive units. The resistance is an amalgam of Islamic fundamentalism, tribalism, and nationalism, with very few foreign elements. It appears that former army officers are coordinating and directing the campaign.

Until a few months ago, the occupation forces traveled fairly freely throughout the country, but not any more. In fact, since the new interim government took over, the insurrection has increased dramatically – more American troops were killed in the first half of July than during the month of June. At this rate, within a few weeks, the US troop casualties will exceed 1000, plus about 12,000 wounded. After Allawi stated publicly that he gave the go-ahead to recent U.S. airstrikes against suspected targets in Fallujah, for many Iraqis this confirmed that his government is merely the new face for the American occupation. Since the government wasn't elected and consists largely of exiles, it's being viewed as a Quisling regime, without soldiers,

except for some useless police. It does not have the legitimacy necessary to establish security forces capable of re-establishing order. And so, the assault is being conducted against both the Americans and their collaborators, and it will not end until the occupation ends.

Since the beginning of the Iraq debacle, some of the finest objective reporting on the ensuing events has been done by British journalist Robert Fisk, who speaks Arabic and has his home in Beirut. He writes for the British *Independent* and several recent passages (July 22/04) portray the current state of affairs:

“For mile after mile south of Baghdad yesterday, the story was the same: empty posts, abandoned Iraqi army and police checkpoints and a litter of burnt-out American fuel tankers and rocket-smashed police vehicles down the main highway to Hillah and Najaf.... They were in a convoy of 11 battered white pick-ups, pointing Kalashnikovs at the crowds around them, driving on to the wrong side of the road when they became tangled in a traffic jam, screaming at motorists to clear their path at rifle point. This was not a frightened American column – this was Iraq’s own new blue-uniformed police force, rifles also directed at the windows of homes and shops and at the crowd of Iraqis which surged around them....

“U.S. forces are under so many daily guerrilla attacks that they cannot move by daylight along Highway 8 or, indeed, west of Baghdad through Fallujah or Ramadi. Across Iraq, their helicopters can fly no higher than 100 metres for fear of rocket attack. Save for a solitary Abrams tank on a motorway bridge in the Baghdad suburbs, I saw only one other U.S. vehicle on the road yesterday.

“Iraqi government officials and Western diplomats tell journalists to avoid driving out of Baghdad; now I understand why. It is dangerous....Yes,

it is a shameful reflection on our invasion of Iraq – let us solemnly remember ‘weapons of mass destruction’ – but it is, above all, a tragedy for the Iraqis. They endured the repulsive Saddam. They endured our shameful UN sanctions. They endured our invasion. And now they must endure the anarchy we call freedom.... But what I saw was infinitely more disturbing: a nation whose government rules only its capital, a country about which we fantasize at our peril.”

Robert Fisk, *Independent* (July 9/04): “Large areas of the country – including at least four major cities – are now in the hands of insurgents. Hundreds of gunmen are now believed to control Samara, north of Baghdad. Fallujah and Ramadi – where four more US marines were killed on Tuesday – are now virtually autonomous republics.... Martial law is being introduced by an unelected government in the interests of ‘democracy’.... And if as many Iraqis believe, the continued presence of a vast American army lies behind the violence, then U.S. military support for the harsh new laws will only fuel the insurgency.”

And finally for this section, three events in the past have cast a revealing light on the self-defeating actions of the US occupation forces. First, after four American mercenaries (at first identified as “contractors” or “civilians”) were killed and their bodies desecrated in Fallujah, a massive military assault was directed at the city, which killed at least 6-700 people (most of these being innocent men, women and children). To “win” this battle would have required a protracted campaign, reducing the city of 300,000 to rubble – and causing a political earthquake. So the Americans retreated, leaving the city totally in the hands of insurgents, and completely off limits to all foreigners.

Second, after Israel’s assassination of the Hamas paraplegic Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the militant Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr denounced the action in a fiery sermon. Strangely, almost

immediately afterwards, his newspaper was shut down, an arrest warrant was produced, he was ordered to disband his militia, and U.S. forces set out to capture him, dead or alive. After a protracted battle with his militia, during which time the sacred shrine of Imam Hussein in Karbala was damaged by tank missiles, the U.S. withdrew, leaving Muqtada with a much greater following – and leaving the Shiites alienated and outraged by the sacrilege done to their shrine. Directly as a result, for the first time, the Shiites joined the Sunnis in the insurgency movement.

Third came the scandalous revelations (complete with hundreds of lurid photographs) of a campaign of torture and humiliation of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison, a former infamous Saddam prison. At first it was brushed off as an isolated incident and the work of a group of rogue soldiers, but then it came out that such measures were authorized at the highest levels of the Bush administration. It had worldwide repercussions and many observers viewed it as a moral tipping point -- the final step in transforming Iraq's foreign liberators into its oppressors. It appears that no matter how hard the Bush administration tries, it won't be able to restore the last bit of the fig leaf that had covered their illegal invasion and occupation of Iraq.

However the future unfolds, the UN mandated term for the Iraqi interim government must end by January 31, 2005. At that time, under the terms of Article 61 of the Iraqi interim constitution, the succeeding Transition Government will have to be elected. Interestingly, it will have the authority to negotiate a "security agreement" with the occupation forces, but it appears that it may not have the authority to refuse to negotiate such an agreement. The primary function of the Transition Government will be to draw up a permanent constitution, to be drafted by August 15 and to put to a

referendum for approval no later than October 15, 2005. Following this, a general election for a permanent government under the terms of the new constitution must be held by December 15, and the government must take office no later than December 31, 2005. This would then constitute the first independent democratic government in Iraq. In all likelihood, its very first action will be to order the occupation forces to leave Iraq. How the Americans will deal with this remains to be seen.

Laying out this election procedure is not to say that the USA may simply step aside and not try to interfere with Iraq's goal of gaining its freedom and independence. As an indication of this, before leaving office, Paul Bremer issued a directive to the interim government, which apparently it cannot rescind, that when it runs the election for the Transition Government it must exclude al-Sadr and his associates. Given the authoritarian streak exhibited by America's protégé, Iyad Allawi, and together with the American ambassador Negroponte, they may decide to exclude Baathists and any number of other candidates on various pretexts, with the intention of sanctioning only pro-U.S. groups. Although highly unlikely, but with highhanded methods, the present bunch of collaborating exiles may wind up forming the next "elected" regime – a shadow regime whose independence and sovereignty may be limited to garbage collection and goat catching. Any such attempt to thwart a free election would simply extend the insurrection until the day that Iraq would be free of foreign dominance and occupation.

The Iraqis have had ample cause to be suspicious of American intentions because since the takeover of Iraq, the USA has gone through a series of major policy shifts in its plans for the country. Considering that even the idea to attack Iraq was quite bizarre, the following is noteworthy. Despite the possibility of aggravating the insurgency movement, a brazen and ruthless proposal had

been advocated to essentially destroy Iraq as a unified state. In a *New York Times* article (November 25, 2003), Leslie Gelb, a former chairman of the United States Council on Foreign Relations, has put forth a “Three-State Solution” – that the Americans should create three mini-states in Iraq – Kurds in the north, Sunnis in the centre, and Shiites in the south. The frontiers would be drawn along ethnic, sectarian lines, and thousands of people may have to be forcefully moved by U.S. troops. “Washington would have to be very hard-headed and hard-hearted to engineer this breakup,” but it would facilitate the U.S. occupation. The basic object would be to isolate the troublesome and domineering Sunnis – cut them off from oil revenues and any U.S. assistance – and thereby have them “moderate their ambitions or suffer the consequences.” American troops could be largely withdrawn from their area, to be replaced by “the United Nations to oversee the transition to self-governance there.” So Iraq as a country would disappear, to be replaced by three ineffective “statelets” that the U.S. could control indefinitely from permanent military bases. A pipe dream? But it’s Gelb and his friends at the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations that helped to build the initial foundation for the war on Iraq. And they are still at it.

With the various pretexts for their war on Iraq left in tatters, the Bush administration’s policy documents reveal that an “expanded military presence in the Gulf area” may have been the fundamental objective of the war. With that accomplished, a further requirement would be a pliant Iraqi government that wouldn’t object to permanent American military bases on their land, to US control of Iraqi oil, or to the unfettered operations of US multinationals in their economy. To their dismay, however, the Americans are faced with an unrelenting insurgency that inflicts death and casualties to their troops and Iraqi collaborators on a daily basis. For them

to try to install an outright puppet government would bring on a full-scale Vietnam in spades. So it appears that the Americans may have no choice but to accept a genuine Iraqi government. But how could they then ensure that they’ll be able to maintain their multinational corporations and military bases in Iraq?

With all this uncertainty, most Iraqis are very concerned about the nature and structure of their eventual future government. The previous U.S.-appointed Governing Council was held in contempt, and the current similarly appointed Allawi interim government may soon be dismissed as Quislings and puppets as well. Anything emanating from the American occupation forces is highly suspect. Iraq’s best hope is for an open and free election, at which time the elected representatives would debate the alternatives confronting the country. The complexity of Iraqi society is such that until now it has been held together primarily by sheer military force. What should be the nature of their government to enable the people to have a peaceful and democratic society? The Iraqis are resourceful and intelligent people, and left to themselves they would work out a proposal for an appropriate government. The basic issue before the Iraqis is whether in a democratic system it’s possible to have the country run by a largely centralized government, or must it now be a federation of autonomous regions.

Since the Shiites form about 60 percent of the country’s population, if a central government were established, the Shiites would obviously dominate the political scene. No matter how democratically achieved, the conditions in the country are such that the Kurds and the Sunnis would be unlikely to accept centralized Shiite control. On the other hand, there is a deep fear in Iraq that if the country is split up into two or more regions, it may lead to the breakup of the country, not unlike the

proposal put forth by Leslie Gelb in the *New York Times*.

The newly created interim constitution provides for a form of federalism, somewhat similar to that in Canada. It's a federalism to be based on geography, history, and the separation of powers, but not on ethnicity or sect. This was done largely to accommodate the Kurds. Arabic and Kurdish will be official languages, and a Kurdish Regional Government will be recognized, but this does not satisfy Kurdish aspirations. Each of Iraq's 18 provinces, or governorates, will have governors and legislative assemblies. To some extent, this would diminish the powers of a Shiite-dominated central government in Baghdad. But is this degree of federalism sufficient to allay the fears of the minority Sunnis and Kurds? Would nothing less than autonomous regions within a federal structure be the answer?

The Kurds are central to the demand for a federation of autonomous regions. Kurdish people number at least 25 million but their homeland has been carved up by Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria – and nowhere are they recognized as a nation. Instead, over the years, genocidal campaigns have been launched against them, with their loss of life in the millions. The closest they've come to acquiring some degree of autonomy occurred in the past 13 years in Iraq, thanks to the "no-fly zone" imposed by the U.S. and the U.K. The Kurds supported the Americans in their attack on Iraq, and they are now not about to surrender their special status. They are advocating a federal government for Iraq in which their territory would be granted substantial autonomy. Given the harshness with which they were treated by the Hussein regime, it will be hard to deny this to them. Moreover, how long can the fiction be maintained that these people do not constitute a nation?

Arguments for other parts of Iraq to qualify for autonomy are somewhat

problematic, but not necessarily out of the question. It should be noted that it's only Kurds that qualify on the basis of ethnicity, language and culture. However, the two major groups that have been in contention with each other are the Sunnis and the Shiites, but their differences are those of religion and sectarianism. Ideally, a government should be secular, and religious factors should not play a role in it. However, because of the long history of considerable friction and discrimination based on their religious differences, these two groups may find it difficult to be governed by a single central government or a federation such as the one advocated by the interim constitution. This is further aggravated by the fact that the Shiites outnumber Sunnis three to one.

There is a further complicating factor in that although the bulk of each group resides in separate geographic areas, there is substantial intermixture of these people. For example, Baghdad is in Sunni territory, but there are at least two million Shiites in the city. Basra, although in the heart of Shiite country, has perhaps a million Sunnis. Moreover, the transition zone between these two groups is substantial. Any autonomy agreement for these two groups would have to make allowances for this geographic dispersion, and any suggestion for resettlement would be unthinkable.

Although geographic dispersion is an argument against autonomy, these two groups might nevertheless choose to work around this and opt for autonomy. If each of the groups should feel that at certain levels of government they would prefer autonomy, they might well decide to have autonomous regions. In this manner, there could be less friction and in the long run it could be in the best interests of the country as a whole.

Once the Iraqis start deliberating the nature of their constitution and government, the facts on the ground

and the logic of the situation confronting them may lead them to opt for a federation of autonomous regions. A carefully crafted federation should not expose them to the danger of the breakup of the state. In fact, a federation in which the people of each region have the autonomy to develop their economy and society according to their particular needs, without interference by outsiders, makes for a stronger and more unified country. In such a system, the regional government and the federal government are complementary and should add to the strength of each.

Such a federation would have a central government to administer overall national concerns. For example, there would be the necessity to maintain the economic integration of the country. Since oil forms the basis of the Iraqi economy, there would have to be a single state owned oil industry, administered by the federal government. The actual oil fields are largely in the territories of the Kurds and the Shiites – whereas interconnecting pipelines, many oil facilities and petrochemical plants, and the oil industry’s administrative structure are in Sunni territory. Any attempt to withhold oil revenues from the Sunnis would doom any prospects of Sunni cooperation for a federation. Oil is the kind of resource that should be shared by all Iraqi people if there is to be a prospect for peace in the region. In the interests of fairness and justice, oil revenue should be distributed to the autonomous regions on the basis of their share of the population.

Other areas under the jurisdiction of the federal government would be international relations and the country’s armed forces. Also included would be trade agreements, national economic policies, monetary and commercial policy, currency, excise taxes, and matters such as the post office. However, there would be no federal presence in the day to day affairs of the country’s autonomous regions.

From the viewpoint of international relations, a fully independent “Kurdistan” would draw the wrath of Turkey, Iran, and Syria because of the paranoia about their own Kurdish citizens. However, if the “autonomous Kurdish region” were an integral part of an Iraqi federation, it would be hard for them to interfere in such an arrangement.

Each of the constituent autonomous regions would have their own levels of government. In actuality, these would be more extensive than the federal government and would be in charge of all cultural affairs, education, health care, social and economic infrastructure, their own police forces, judicial system, and all matters dealing with local and regional concerns.

In a federation such as this, there would be no avenue for the Shiites, Sunnis or Kurds to interfere in matters concerning each other – which has been the basis for most of their previous ethnic/sectarian conflicts.

If such a new government structure for Iraq should evolve, the country would have the basis to become a peaceful democratic society. Indeed, following an initial democratic election and the will to carry out such an innovative government reorganization, it would take a number of months before all this could be achieved – providing there would be no interference by the Americans. But once such a federation would come into existence, what role would there be for an American army of occupation? Surely any self-respecting truly independent Iraqi government would order the Americans out of their country. But would they go? The Americans have over 700 military bases worldwide, and once they become established, they never seem to leave, e.g., after 50 years, they still have bases in Germany and Japan. Moreover, American dreams of empire have been freshly rekindled. So would the Iraqis be

faced with Americans on their territory  
for the next 50 years?

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# Just Evil: Augustine and the Rationalizations for War

## By Peter Thompson

St. Augustine was a powerful and influential voice for Christianity. Among his most significant contributions was his work on evil (as well as the related topics of sin and salvation), and his resolution of the theodicy of a just God and an evil world. Many of his theories became orthodox Christian doctrine, as did his just war doctrine, which has continued to be vital to this day. However, Augustine's just war theory contradicts his theories on sin and evil. Just war was intended to restrain evil; however, over the centuries it has been used as a rationalization for the greatest of inhumanities.

Before Augustine's conversion to Christianity, he was a Manichee. The Manichees had a dualistic view of good and evil, in which evil was a material substance representing the dark. The inconsistency of a just and powerful God and an evil world vexed Augustine in the years before his conversion. Augustine accepted that God created the world *ex nihilo*, and that God was just and that creation was good in all respects. He observed that evil exists in the world and believed that evil and good were opposites.

Augustine resolved the theodicy by the privation theory, i.e. "everything which is corrupted is deprived of good - which is beyond doubt. But if they are deprived of all good, they will not exist at all" (158) (63). Because evil is deprived of all good, it is not a substance. Similarly, because he saw evil as having no good, he could no longer find it in God's creation (which was all good). Because the Manicheans saw evil as a corruption of some part of God (135), Augustine's rejection of their views was complete. This led Augustine to conclude that humans were the source of evil. In neo-Platonist terms he described evil as a perversion of the will *when it turns aside from God, veering toward things of the lowest order* and becoming inflated with *desire* (150).<sup>1</sup> (emphasis added).

Our will is determined by our heart and affections, not by our reason. These attachments of the heart cause our will to follow, whether in flights upward toward God or downward into the depths (315). The further away we get from God, the more evil we become (50). "... the voice of my own error called me away from him and I was dragged down and down by the weight of my own pride" (87).<sup>2</sup>

It is this interplay, and our inability to choose the good, which leads us to sin which results in evil. Evil, for Augustine, was a product of inordinate (or unordered) love for creation (34). Describing his own inordinate love, Augustine confessed his sins of desire, including beauty, self complacency, vanity, curiosity, ambition, pride, etc (241-8). The corollary, properly ordered love, is a turning toward God. This loving God for God's own sake results in happiness.

In Augustine's mature belief, he redefined the failure of free will as a bonded or imprisoned free will, unable to choose the good. This attenuated free will originated from the original sin of Adam. Therefore, the human condition is analogous to being in jail, i.e. being unable to break free without the help of God. This reliance on God to initiate our ability to love God with proper order is the Augustinian doctrine of prevenient grace. Ultimately, Augustine believed that evil is punishment for sin. "It was part of the punishment of a sin freely committed by Adam, my first father" (173). The return of our ability to live without sin occurs through sanctification which is the transformation, beginning with grace, of our hearts and affections.

This arduously constructed theology of good and evil stemmed from Augustine's heart-felt love of God and abhorrence of sin and turning away from God. One of the categories of evil of which Augustine made special note was violence (65). In his loyalty to the church, he developed the just war doctrine, which, ironically opened the door to great evil. The circumstances of the creation of the just war doctrine indicate his motive was accommodation to the Roman Empire. During Rome's demise Christians were criticized for pacifism; in defense, Augustine theorized that there were conditions under which the evil of war could be tolerated to achieve the restoration of peace. However, peace as defined in the Roman Empire (and by the powers and principalities since) was not Christian peace. "Pax," Latin for peace, derives from "*pacisci*," which refers to making a treaty. For Romans a treaty was the unconditional surrender of a defeated state.<sup>3</sup> "Rome, be this thy care - these thine arts- to bear dominion over other nations and to impose the law of peace..." Vergil. *Aeneid*. The *pax* of Rome was the "peace through strength" of modern times. Both are quintessentially imperial.

At the root of Augustine's just war requirement of "right intention" was that violence is solely aimed at ridding the enemy of sin. "Be peaceful, therefore, in warring, so that you may vanquish those whom you war against, and bring them the prosperity of peace." To have peace in your heart, even and especially in the heat of battle was a crucial ingredient to resolving the tension between war and loving one's neighbor and enemy. This ordered love at the time of war, Augustine's foundation of avoiding evil, is virtually impossible. Military training depends on hatred of the enemy, objectifying its culture, and demonizing its leaders. This description of the enemy reminds us of Augustine's definition of evil: "But if they are deprived of all good, they will not exist at all." The state at war characterizes the enemy as evil and unhuman; this is done both to win battles and lessen the guilt of killing.

The just war theory leaves to humans Godly tasks. Politicians, generals, and citizens are to identify the "evil" which needs be restrained, determine when a cause is just, and gauge how many casualties are acceptable. God created the world; it is an affront to the

Divine to delegate the fate of creation to humans by the rubric of just war. Additionally, love of power and worship of Empire are idolatrous. "Wars and revolutions and battles, you see, are due simply and solely to the body and its desires." Plato. *Phaedo*.

St. Augustine carefully arrived at the distinction between good and evil, but his just war theory confused the two. The concept of "warring peacefully" is no more logical than the concept of "evil goodness." Augustine left Manichean belief by rejecting the corruptibility of God. But in accommodating Rome and allowing humans to decide who in creation is evil, he neglected his own theory of properly ordered love. Augustine, a giant of Christian thought, mapped out the path to avoid evil, but through his just war theory, led humanity away from that path.

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### Endnotes

1. Augustine, Sr. (1961). *Confessions*, Penguin Books, Ltd. While Augustine continued to use philosophical categories and descriptions from his neo-Platonist past (154), he no longer relied solely upon reason, and thus became anti-Socratic (117).
2. We can see the strong influence of Plotinus in this language; for Plotinus evil stemmed from the world and our souls' descent downwards in resistance to the generative system of creation.
3. Vincent C. Kavaloski. *Pax Romana*, Journal of the Wisconsin Institute: A Consortium for the Study of War, Peace and Global Cooperation, 1:1 (1991), 34-39.

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## Jus ad Pacem

### By Michael S. Pendergast, III

For war to be just ... [it]  
must lead to a just  
peace. [Lackey, p.43]

Utopia (Augustine's *civitas Dei*) does not exist and we are not likely to see an ideal state in the foreseeable future. But we can make an even stronger assertion based on Augustine's correct assessment (as seconded by Vitoria) that men (taken as a general term) are imperfect beings. This stronger assertion implies that not only will wars sometimes be inevitable, however much we should desire peace, but sometimes necessary as well, in order to restrain the *cupiditas*, the unrestrained and even passionate avarice and greed of some men for things that are not theirs to take.

Still, once we find ourselves enmeshed in war, and more particularly a just war (which, we believe as a self-evident truth, can only be waged by men who possess at least some disposition to beneficence), we have to understand how we can move from that state of affairs, the state of open, armed aggression, back to some form of peace. And since we have already ruled out the possibility of ever achieving peace in all the fullness that that term properly merits, a perfect, eternal, utopian peace should never be the goal we set our sights on. Waging "the war to end all wars" (as World War I was once so erroneously named) is beyond us, precisely because we are fallible creatures. The best we can reasonably hope to achieve, from a practical point of view, is reestablishing a temporary absence of antagonism or conflict ... and, more often than not, only an absence of open, armed conflict, with the antagonism and conflict that precipitated it continuing unabated.

But how do we accomplish this feat of moving from war to even an imperfect peace? It should (we believe) be intuitively obvious to all that no nation, state, or party can go to war without a just cause or wage war in an unjust manner and easily retain the possibility of procuring a just peace. But as true as this is, neither knowledge of *jus ad bellum*, the justice of [going to] war, which concerns when to fight, nor knowledge of *jus in bello*, justice in war, which concerns how to fight, nor even knowledge of both these forms of justice is sufficient to answer our question. (For this reason, we shall not provide an introductory overview of the rules of *jus ad bellum*, nor quickly move into a discussion of the rules of *jus in bello* in this short paper.<sup>1</sup>)

We need more. We need to understand what *jus ad pacem*, the justice of [going to] peace, which concerns when to cease fighting (and what *jus in pace*, which concerns how to live in peace) really means. The warriors who fight for us need to know when a war should end ... as well as how to bring a new state of affairs, peace, about, for they are the ones who will take the first steps to achieve this new peace. After all, if the goal of all just wars is peace, then in a very real sense any warriors who fight for justice

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<sup>1</sup> For an in-depth discussion and analysis of both *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, compare and contrast the presentations of Paul Christopher, *The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues* (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1999) and Douglas P. Lackey, *The Ethics of War and Peace* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; Prentice Hall, 1989).

are (or should be) peacemakers.<sup>2</sup> But what is *jus ad pacem*? To understand it better, let's start by addressing the hopefully simpler question: what are the signs that peace may be at hand, in any of its diverse approximations, however imperfect those forms?

### **When is Peace at Hand?**

Aristotle effectively answered this question (at least in summary form) in the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* when he reminded us:

We must realize that it is the universal custom of mankind to abandon mutual warfare, either when they think that the demands of the enemy are just, or when they are at variance with their allies, or weary of war, or afraid of their enemy, or suffering from internal strife. (Aristotle, 1425b11-16)

With regard to the more perfect forms of peace (that is, what we have defined as either a temporary or eternal state of affairs characterized by an absence of "againstment") all but one of these reasons ("the demands of the enemy are just") are trivial. But since the opportunity to seize inferior forms of peace will present itself more often than will the more perfect forms, from a practical point of view, each and every one of these reasons is indeed a very valid and good reason to seek peace ... for the losing party. As such and for such, these reasons are not trivial.

On the other hand, we must also ask ourselves whether these same reasons are non-trivial for the party that is not losing the war. Are they a

sufficient reason to accept or even mandate a return to peace? After all, if the war ends merely because one's enemy is weary, or afraid, or subject to internal turmoil, what is to guarantee that once they rest and regain their strength, or over time forget their fear or overcome their internal discord, they will not once again choose war over peace? None of the "trivial" reasons for peace are necessarily connected with the state of affairs that existed prior to the initiation of hostilities, let alone reasons why the losing party would no longer feel antagonistic or contentious with the victor. (In fact, it would seem likely that losing would only exacerbate such feelings.) Since this is so obviously true, and remembering that there are no guarantees, the victor must have its own reason — a non-trivial reason different from that of the loser — for choosing and making peace.

The side winning the war may see such signs that peace is at hand on the faces of its enemies, true, but how does the victor translate that fact into peace itself? More importantly, what does the victor require of himself at the end of a just war — and what can and should he require of the vanquished? To attempt to answer these questions let us look at examples of each of the five reasons Aristotle put forward as causes to abandon war, some drawn from history and some hypothetical. (In doing so, at times it may seem as if we are implying that in each case there is one and only one real reason that leads to peace. Bear in mind, however, that reality is often less simple than that presented in some text or historical example. There is usually more than just one valid reason for seeking peace in every example, however much one may be said to predominate.)

### The Demands of the Enemy are Just

At the conclusion of World War II, both Germany and Japan surrendered to the Allies. But more than this, these nations did not just cease warring, or even cease being antagonistic or contentious — both sought and came close to reestablishing real concord and

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<sup>2</sup> As a former aircraft commander of a B-52 strategic nuclear bomber in the Strategic Air Command (SAC) I must admit that I was greatly influenced by SAC's motto: Peace is Our Profession ... even before learning the philosophic roots that made that motto an expression of truth.

harmony with their former enemies. (In part, this close approximation to peace, in the fullest sense of the term, was perhaps achieved because those former enemies sought the same with the peoples of both Germany and Japan, at least on the U.S.-Great Britain-French side of the Alliance.)

Here we will briefly look only at the peace that was reestablished with Germany, beginning on 3 May 1945, only three days after Adolph Hitler committed suicide, with Admiral Karl Doenitz's initiation of peace overtures. (Peace with Japan will be examined separately later in this essay.) Note that it was only Hitler's suicide that effectively eliminated the few remaining roadblocks to the cessation of hostilities — they ceased resisting the Allies and sued for peace. But when we say "they," it is critically important to understand who the "they" refers to. It does not refer to the Nazi party or its members, generally speaking. Nor does it refer to the *Schutzstaffel*, the SS Blackshirts, comprising the Gestapo (secret police), some divisions of picked combat troops, Hitler's personal bodyguard, and concentration/extermination camp guards. And it does not refer to Hitler's inner circle, the men who had controlled Germany during the war.

As philosopher Kevin Gibson notes: The bad guys were removed, and good guys with some popular legitimacy and support took their place. Those you could make peace with. ... In the case of Germany and Japan, then, seems to be curious in that we did appear to wipe out the bad guys; but on closer analysis I don't think that is the case. I sense that these were illicit, gangster regimes, and when the core folks lost their support then peace was possible. That would contrast to cases where the bad guys just go under ground to regroup [Gibson, 2002].

This analysis seems substantially correct. The "they" in question thus

refers not to Hitler, or even his close associates,<sup>3</sup> but initially to senior members of the army and navy. Many of these officers had become disaffected with Hitler and his policies (as evidenced by the July 1944 assassination attempt against Hitler, which forced Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, Germany's premiere general and one of the senior officers implicated in the plot, to take his own life), if indeed they had ever really cared for them or those that had enforced them (the SS and the Gestapo).

But this highlights a more fundamental point: within German society a certain amount of fear of its own government had existed between 1933 and 1945. And however much Germans in general and the military leaders in particular may have appreciated throwing off the burdens of the Treaty of Versailles and remaking Germany into a proud and strong nation, many in the military, and presumably much of the civilian population as well, chafed under the demands of their own government. Worse still, some military leaders

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<sup>3</sup> Here it is worth mentioning that few had any real power as the war neared its end: Rudolph Hess, once the Deputy Führer, was already in prison, having lost influence and fled to Scotland in an attempt to arrange a settlement in 1941. Martin Bormann, Hess' successor, who exercised brutal power, fled Berlin after Hitler's death and vanished. Joseph Goebbels (and several high military advisors) followed Hitler's example and committed suicide. Heinrich Himmler, the head of the SS and Gestapo, fell from Hitler's favor earlier in 1945, as did Hermann Wilhelm Goering, when he failed to stop Allied air attacks on Germany. And Albert Speer, the Minister of Armaments, refused to obey Hitler's orders to destroy German industry, feeling they would be needed by the German people after the war (though this late act of mercy did not prevent him from being convicted at Nuremburg).

realized, even during the war, and the general population eventually came to realize, albeit mostly after the war, everything that this government had done in their name — a gangster regime they had placed in or allowed to come to power and then supported (willingly or unwillingly). And this knowledge, the knowledge of death camps and slave labor and all the inhuman practices that had been employed against their enemies and even civilian populations (including, remember, portions of their own population as well: the Jews, gypsies, etc.), had its effects.<sup>4</sup>

One of these effects was the creation of a sense of national guilt ... which, by extension, included not just a belief that their cause was unjust, but also that the enemies' cause was just, that is, that the demands of the enemy (in this case the Allies) were just. How much this may have helped shorten the war or led to a cessation of hostilities is debatable (and we will not investigate this at this time), but what seems clear is that this effect, when taken in conjunction with Allied responses following its victory (the prosecution of war criminals at Nuremberg coupled with the generosity of the Marshall Plan), did indeed create a remarkably just peace between the U.S.-Britain-France alliance and West Germany. (And even if we find we cannot or should not precisely term this *jus ad pacem*, we can and should call it *jus in vincere*.)

### **Variance with Allies**

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<sup>4</sup> As a note, not the least of these effects was a repentance among many liberal theologians and the creation of the Neo-Orthodox Movement. Neo-Orthodoxy repudiated the maxim that education was salvation, which was (and is) founded on the Platonic concept that no one does evil knowingly ... but the Germany of 1933 was the center of scientific and religious learning. And as such, it should have been the place, were the maxim true, least susceptible to embracing evil in any of its forms.

In World War II, one loser, Germany, acted based upon a realization that the demands of the enemy were just. But wars do not end solely because of what the losing nation, state, or party feels or believes. Wars also end, in part, based on what the victors feel or believe. This was particularly true during the Gulf War (Desert Shield/Desert Storm). Prior to the initiation of hostilities, the Allied goal was spelled out quite clearly by President George Bush. Indeed, it had to be spelled out in detail, both in order to secure Senate approval for the use U.S. military forces in support of the United Nations resolution authorizing the use of force, as well as to secure the unprecedented cooperation of our Middle Eastern allies for the basing rights so necessary for the prosecution of the war. The Allied goal was, in consequence, necessarily very limited in nature. In fact, it was essentially little more than the restoration of the *status quo ante bellum* (though it did include some additional security measures such as inspections, restrictions on the use of aircraft, etc.). Peace was thus defined as merely the absence of open, armed conflict, not some grander vision that included a major change in sociopolitical structures.

After driving Iraqi troops from Kuwait, these limited goals were quickly achieved, and the war ended. While it was true that General Norman Schwarzkopf appealed for more time in order to attempt to achieve peace under a different and more perfect definition (by removing the remainder of the Republican Guard, and presumably even Saddam Hussein and much of the Baath Party), when his appeal was denied, he obeyed his orders and negotiated the terms of peace with his counterparts.

Remember, the decision on whether to go to war or not (and subsequently, on whether to end a war or not) is not a military decision in our country, but rather a political decision. No one in the military, from the Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (the most senior general officer in the military) down to

the lowest infantryman, has the responsibility or authority to decide to start or end a war. So though Gen. Schwarzkopf pled for a change in the rules of engagement so that he could continue operations for another day or two more and thus actually win the war, his request was denied. Now from a strategic point of view, though the General was correct in wishing to truly win the war (that is, create a lasting chance of peace), from a tactical viewpoint (which included political considerations), President Bush was also correct. The rules of engagement that had been crafted were necessary for the construction and maintenance of the alliance that made Desert Storm possible in the first place. Thus as tempting as Gen. Schwarzkopf's request must have been, in insisting on compliance with the rules of engagement, as already agreed upon in the *jus ad bello* phase of the war, Bush showed that America would honor its commitments. The price that was imposed was that needed to avoid a "variance with allies" (or perhaps because of a "variance with allies"), made only a lesser form of peace possible.

#### The Weariness of War

The weariness of war should be, it would seem, the most commonly encountered of all the reasons given for abandoning mutual warfare. On the other hand, it may sometimes be difficult to isolate this as the cause for peace, since it may coexist or even underlie other, more apparent causes, such as variance with allies or its counterpart, internal strife. In some cases this weariness of war may refer to the fact that one party's will to fight has been exhausted, but in others, while the will may remain, other vital resources (sufficient numbers of men, arms, etc.) may be lacking.<sup>5</sup> In either case, the strength to fight on no longer exists.

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<sup>5</sup> This second situation has implications, as we will see in later essays, that may lead to guerilla and even terrorist movements.

A classic example of this situation occurred in the United States in 1877 when the Nez Percé were faced with forcible resettlement as part of a fraudulent treaty. Rather than accept such fraud, Chief Joseph attempted to lead his people, not in attacks on the United States government or its people, but rather in flight. Fleeing from their lands in Oregon, Chief Joseph attempted to get his people across the border to their lands in Canada. Thirty miles from the border, the Nez Percé were defeated, yet Chief Joseph won popular sympathy for his heroic stand and brilliant resistance, and, in no small part because of his magnificent surrender speech that has been titled, "I Will Fight No More Forever:"

I am tired of fighting. Our chiefs are dead. Toohuihuisote is dead. The old men are all dead. It is the young men who say no and yes. He who led the young men is dead. It is cold and we have no blankets. The little children are freezing to death. My people, some of them, have run away to the hills and have no blankets, no food. No one knows where they are. Perhaps they are freezing to death. I want to have time to look for my children and see how many of them I can find. Maybe I shall find them among the dead. Hear me, my chiefs, I am tired. My heart is sad and sick. From where the sun now stands, I will fight no more forever. (Chief Joseph)

Whether a just peace resulted is, however, another question. Unlike the case in which one party becomes convinced that the demands of the enemy are just, abandoning hostilities merely because of exhaustion gives no guarantee that justice will be served. On the other hand, this sad situation does serve to remind us of Augustine's advice that war, even a war waged for justice, should be undertaken only when it is the lesser of the two evils. And this is nothing more than the

advice Grotius rendered in more scientific terms as the Condition of Proportionality:

The requirement that wars be proportional to the costs entailed in prosecuting them ... demands a utilitarian calculation of the consequences that will result from resorting to arms. ... if the ruler harbors any doubts concerning the balance of good over evil that will result from the use of force, then war must not be undertaken. [Christopher, p.83]

But our examination of this case, and the one preceding it (variance with allies), seems to indicate that the decision-making process during the *jus ad pacem* phase of a war includes answering the same sort of questions as should have been asked and answered during the *jus ad bello* phase. The mere fact that the Saudis and others forced the alliance to accept a lesser form of peace than Gen. Schwarzkopf desired to achieve, or that Chief Joseph had to submit to the might of the U.S. cavalry, does not necessarily mean that a greater form of peace was, in fact, achieved or even potentially achievable. Wars and the terms of peace that follow them are, after all, the products of fallible men. Besides, the Saudis may well have been correct in believing that there would be less peace in the region were Saddam Hussein to have been forcibly removed. And Chief Joseph was almost certainly correct in believing that continued resistance would accomplish little more than insuring that the Nez Perce would become a name found only in history books. Thus the fact that a more perfect form of peace was not (or even could not, in some particular instance) be pulled from the fires of war can not of itself be used as an indictment of the concept of *jus ad pacem*.

#### Fear of the Enemy

Earlier we looked at what we considered the best reason for seeking peace, that is, when we conclude that

the demands of the enemy are just. Our example was Germany in World War II. Now we must return to that war and move from the European Theater to the Pacific Theater, to briefly examine why the Japanese Empire sought peace. As we noted at that time, Japan, like Germany, did not just cease warring, or even cease being antagonistic or contentious, but rather sought and came close to reestablishing real concord and harmony with their former enemies. (And as we also noted earlier, in part, this close approximation to peace, in the fullest sense of the term, was perhaps achieved because those former enemies sought the same with Japan, at least on the U.S.-Great Britain-French side of the Alliance.)

While it would be as much of a mistake to believe that General Curtis Lemay's strategic bombing had more effect on Japan than similar bombing did on Germany as it would be to believe that conventional bombing alone was sufficient to force either nation into submission and surrender, there was a glaring difference. Germany, prior to the death of Hitler, had the will to fight on, even in the knowledge that its cause was lost.

In a similar manner, following the loss of Okinawa, Japan was prepared to fight foot by foot across the home islands, making that conquest of those islands as bloody and costly as possible for American forces. Yet unlike in Germany, where the thought of losing the war had not occurred to most Germans until later in the war, from the very moment that it was realized that the attack on Pearl Harbor had occurred prior to the delivery of its declaration of war, at least some senior officers (notably Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who had planned and commanded that attack) who had feared America's industrial might, now feared that they had awakened a sleeping tiger.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> An appropriate turn of phrase, considering that the code word for the attack on Pearl Harbor, "Tora, tora,

Also unlike the case in Germany, Japan was the recipient of not just conventional bombing, for

On 6 August and 9 August 1945, the first two atomic bombs to be used for military purposes were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki respectively. One hundred thousand people were killed, [and] 6 square miles or over 50 percent of the built up areas of the two cities were destroyed. [Evolution, p.104]

Still, after the first bomb (named Little Boy) exploded 1,900 feet above the city of Hiroshima with a yield of 12,500 tons of TNT, there was an impasse “between civilian and military leaders. To the civilians the atomic bomb looked like a golden opportunity to surrender without shame, but the admirals and the generals still despised unconditional surrender and refused to concur.” [Rhodes, p.736] So, three days after the first device was employed, the second (named Fat Man) exploded on its secondary target (the primary, Kokura, being obscured by heavy ground haze and smoke). This bomb exploded 1,650 feet above the steep hills of Nagasaki with a yield of 22 kilotons. And when the military leaders still would not agree to surrender, Emperor Hirohito forced the issue [Rhodes, p.742].

Over the next few days, negotiations through Swiss intermediaries convinced Hirohito of “the peaceful and friendly intentions of the enemy,” reinforcing his decision to end the suffering:

I cannot endure the thought of letting my people suffer any longer. A continuation of the war would bring death to tens, perhaps even hundreds, of thousands of persons. The whole nation would be reduced to ashes. How then could I carry on the wishes of my imperial ancestors? [Rhodes, p.744]

Thus, even in the face of some last-minute acts of rebellion by some in the military [Rhodes, p.745], the Emperor had government officials draw up an imperial edict, which he broadcast to the nation on 15 August 1945:

Despite the best that has been done by everyone ... the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest. Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is indeed incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. ... This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the joint declaration of the Powers. ... The hardships and sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected hereafter will certainly be great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all ye, Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictate of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable. ... [Rhodes, p.745-46]

Now Hirohito was in error, if by the “unendurable and ... insufferable” he meant more than merely the loss of face involved in surrendering to *gaijin* (barbarians). Yet it would seem that this was all he had in mind since he had already become convinced of “the peaceful and friendly intentions of the enemy.” And he was definitely correct in his other assessment, for a grand (if not perfect) peace did result as Japan and America did indeed establish something approximating real concord and harmony over the next few decades. And it was well that fear led the Emperor to intervene. Had he not, the strife between the civilians in the government and the military would have

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tora”, is translated into English as “Tiger, tiger, tiger”.

caused not an end to the war, but its prolongation. And in that event, it is possible (though not likely<sup>7</sup>) that either Kokura or Niigata, since both cities were higher on the target list than Nagasaki [Rhodes, p.689], would have become the third city to be destroyed by an atomic bomb. What is certain, however, is that conventional bombing (which resumed shortly after Nagasaki was destroyed) would not have ended, but continued, destroying yet more cities and killing yet more of their inhabitants [Rhodes, pp.743 and 745].

### Internal Strife

On the other hand, internal strife may also cause a nation to abandon mutual warfare in other instances. Two of the best examples of this process or effect occurring in recent times must be the Soviet Union's experience in Afghanistan and our own earlier experience in Vietnam ... though what we are really speaking of is the internal reactions to what was occurring elsewhere. For our purposes, we will just look at our own reactions to the War in Vietnam.

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<sup>7</sup> Although General Leslie R. Groves, administrator of the atomic bomb project, had reported to General John C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, that he expected to ship a second Fat Man to the Pacific on 12 or 13 August and that it could be delivered to a target sometime after 17 or 18 August, Henry Wallace, the former Vice President and then Secretary of Commerce recorded in his diary that "Truman said he had given orders to stop the atomic bombing. He said the thought of wiping out another 100,000 people was too horrible. He didn't like the idea of killing, as he said, 'all those kids'." This is most likely true, since James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, is on record as saying, "We would keep up the war at its present intensity until the Japanese agreed to these terms [of the Potsdam Declaration], with the limitation however that there will be no further dropping of the atomic bomb" [Rhodes, p.743].

As Lackey notes, somewhat critically, "In affirming the American commitment to Diem, a mandarin Catholic dictator in a land of Buddhist peasants, President Kennedy revealed his intentions to James Reston in 1961: 'We have a problem making our power credible, and Vietnam looks like the place.' (Karnow, p.248)." But while it is true — Kennedy was certainly looking first to world politics, specifically the Cold War with the Soviet Union, and only secondarily at Vietnam in its own right [Lackey, p.48] — we mustn't forget Clausewitz' dictum that in war the use of force is controlled for a purpose, directed to an identifiable political result. And Kennedy, who also knew that political capital was finite and that politics was thus the art of the possible, was limited in what he could accomplish. And since Kennedy was correct in assuming that he was, with the best of intentions, fighting Communism (for the Soviet Union was acting in Southeast Asia through surrogates, Ho Chi Minh having been trained in revolutionary tactics in Moscow in the early 1920's<sup>8</sup>), he was not totally in error.

Neither, however, should we forget that Ho Chi Minh's movement, the Vietminh, was initially directed against French colonial rule. And as Lackey correctly notes, "more than anything they [the Americans] were fighting Vietnamese nationalism, which was as strong in the South as it was in the North. Had they been fighting only Communism, they might have won" [Lackey, p.47]. But America did not win, for in Vietnam War (as in the American War of Independence) the superpower, that is the "colonial" power, exhausted itself and went home.

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<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, in the 1920s there was no one else helping colonies that wanted to be free of their foreign rulers. Also, for a very brief biography of Nguyen That Thanh, a.k.a. Ho Chi Minh, see either [www.infoplease.com/ce6/people/A0823874.html](http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/people/A0823874.html) or [www.altenforst.de/faecher/geschi/vietnam/minh.htm](http://www.altenforst.de/faecher/geschi/vietnam/minh.htm).

Why America became exhausted, however, is another question. In part, for most of the Vietnam War (again, like the American War for Independence) all Ho Chi Minh (or George Washington) had to do was to avoid being defeated ... he did not really have to win a finite war. Thus, for the most part, it was America's war to lose ... and it was lost primarily at home, thousands of miles from the front lines in South Vietnam, as the administration lost the hearts and minds of enough of its own citizens as to make continued efforts against Ho Chi Minh impossible.

As Lackey points out:

[M]any people familiar with events in Vietnam through 1965 ... [knew] how the United States trained Diem's secret police and how they behaved, how at American instigation tens of thousands of peasants were uprooted from traditional villages and thrown into armed encampments, how American responses and judgments were biased by racist attitudes that ... [infected] American relations with Asian peoples ... [Lackey, p.48]

And undeniably it was this sort of mentality that led to such comments as "We had to destroy the village to save it." But it was this same attitude that motivated large numbers of Americans, people who wanted to think of themselves as decent and who wanted to do the right thing. These people thus opposed the war, usually in a quite vocal manner and sometimes (as during the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago) in a violent manner as well.

On the other hand, another group of Americans were almost as vocal in supporting the war. These people pointed out both the Soviet sponsorship of North Vietnam and the atrocities routinely committed by the Vietcong (Saigon's term for the insurgents). After all, political officials are traditionally treated as non-combatants, but "in 1961 alone, the Vietcong ... killed over 4,000 village chiefs, policemen, and

other officials of the Saigon regime" [Christopher, p.80]. And these supporters also wanted to think of themselves as decent and to do the right thing.

Each group pointed out evil acts in the side supported by the other. But each apparently failed to recognize a glaring and superficially paradoxical feature of just war theory: a just cause need not make for a just war [Lackey, p.39]. Lackey points this out quite clearly by noting:

Another little point in the logic of just war theory deserves attention. In just war theory, the terms "just" and "unjust" are logical contraries. It follows that in war one side at most can be the just side. But it is possible that both sides may be unjust ... If your enemy is evil, it does not follow ... you are good [Lackey, p.29].

And he ties this concept specifically to Vietnam, pointing out a lesson all politicians and warriors need to learn, taking it to heart so firmly as to never forget it:

In seeking to throw the foreigners out of Vietnam, the North Vietnamese fought with just cause, but the victory in a just cause brought exhaustion and madness, not justice. If American intervention was unjust, it need not follow that the war against American intervention was just. Perhaps the ultimate lesson of Vietnam is that violence in war, sufficiently prolonged, perverts winners and losers alike.<sup>9</sup> [Lackey, p.51-52]

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<sup>9</sup> This statement can be paraphrased with the shoe on the other foot, for America was trying throw the Soviet Union out of Vietnam and America also achieved only exhaustion and madness, not justice. Likewise, if the Vietminh or Vietcong's ends were just, it still need not follow that its means were just. But the result is the same, and so is the ultimate lesson to be learned.

But apparently both groups of Americans, anti-war protesters and the “my country right of wrong” crowd alike, missed this little point. The end result was that the war ended, not with a bang, but with a whimper. And the cause was not some new political agreement that was reached on what constituted just cause, but rather internal strife and lack of agreement that made continued fighting overseas all but impossible. But this meant that the war ended not with some movement towards reestablishing concord and harmony between Vietnam and the United States (let alone the two groups inside of America), but with peace that was merely an absence of open, armed hostilities.

### **The Relationship to *Jus ad Bellum***

The point we have been sneaking up upon, in looking at various examples of when peace is at hand, is our main contention, our hypothesis, that the most efficient and effective manner in which *jus ad pacem* can be carried out is rooted in the process of *jus ad bello*. Yet before we examine this hypothesis more fully, a few miscellaneous points need to be remembered and considered once again.

The first point we need to remember is this:

For war to be just, the winning side must not only have obtained justice for itself; it must not have achieved it at the price of violating the rights of others. A just war must lead to a just peace [Lackey, p.43].

On the other hand, we must also remember that we have taken “the uncontroversial view that moral rights can be forfeited by misconduct or waived by free choice” [Lackey, p.4]. These two tenants seem somewhat in conflict with each other. They seem to need to be balanced against each other, and in World War II we have an example (or perhaps two examples) of this balancing in action. It might have been argued that the German people

deserved any reparations laid upon them for allowing a democracy to degenerate into a Fascist dictatorship, as was done after World War I, though this was one factor that led directly to World War II. And it might have been argued that the Japanese people, still in the process of moving from feudalism into the 20<sup>th</sup> century, deserved no punishment at all. But both extremes were avoided by President Truman and Marshall (who had become the Secretary of State after the war). The civilian populations of these two countries were, to a large degree, not blamed<sup>10</sup>, yet on the other hand, the true war criminals in both countries, those who controlled their governments or executed obviously immoral orders, were tried and either executed or imprisoned.<sup>11</sup>

Still, at this point in time we will not attempt to lay out any formal rules on how to achieve this balance. In part this is because we suspect that if we did those rules would either be very general and amount to little more than has already been said and in part because we suspect that the *jus ad bellum* and *jus ad pacem* procedures might well be those rules. Furthermore, we also strongly suspect that as each war has its own character and flavor, each will have its own unique balance (a particularly appropriate solution, if only we can find it). In any event, it is still worth mentioning that even with the best of intentions<sup>12</sup>, we may err in performing this balancing act. And we fallible humans may do so on either

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<sup>10</sup> Remember, in Germany there was a growing sense of guilt over what had happened, and the culture in Japan conditioned its populace towards a reproachment with its occupiers ... both helping to reestablish harmony and concord.

<sup>11</sup> In point of fact, even now, some 55 years after the end of that war, war criminals are still being discovered and tried (though at a much reduced frequency).

<sup>12</sup> Which, the old maxim tells us, pave the road to hell.

side, either in seeking to force either too great a political change upon our enemies (out of misappropriated vengeance perhaps) or in forgiving them of too much (perhaps out of misplaced charity). Either could be (and probably is) counterproductive, that is, harmful to the overall process of reestablishing long-term harmony and concord (peace).

The second point to remember is that the ultimate outcome we seek through this balancing act, and the goal of war as well, is neither total victory nor unconditional surrender in and of themselves. Remember again Clausewitz' dictum that war, the controlled use of force, has as its purpose achieving an identifiable political result. Now hopefully this political result also leads to or causes that particular state of affairs which is our real goal ... peace. Still, as Gibson notes, "The notion of 'victory' matters a whole lot, and if it means [the] utter submission (not subjugation) or eradication of the enemy, then I guess you could win, but there would be very few standing at the end. ... The rhetoric of total victory doesn't work at all" [Gibson, 2002].

On the other hand, it may be well to remember that World War II ended with both Germany and Japan surrendering unconditionally — both submitted — and a rather decent peace followed (though counter examples, such as the Nez Percé example and World War I, may certainly be found). And it may also be well to remember that both the Vietnam War (and to an even greater extent the Korean War) and the Gulf War ended without any formal surrender (unconditional or otherwise). And the peace that followed each of these has not only been far from perfect, but sometimes (in Korea and Iraq) almost indistinguishable from a war composed of long truces and brief, intermittent periods of open, armed conflict. The notion of total victory may, in fact, be quite appropriate and not merely a rhetorical device, depending, of course, on how we actually define "total victory" (Saint Ambrose, 129).

Notwithstanding this objection, another of Gibson's observations does seem quite relevant and appropriate here: "If you win by suppression, lo and behold they come back to bite you later on (Bosnians and Croats, Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland) 400 years after the battle was over" [Gibson, 2002]. The problem in these cases is that the victor did not reestablish a state of affairs which truly merits the use of the term "peace." All they secured was the absence of (sustained) war.

But this leads us back to our hypothesis by causing us to not only repeat our fundamental question, but to elaborate upon it. 'How do we know peace is at hand ... if we have not really gone through the proper *jus ad bellum* questioning to produce a coherent answer (using the best facts, ethics, and logical reasoning available to us)?' After considering this question, Gibson has independently reached the same answer as we have: "You don't and therefore the up-front thinking is critical" [Gibson, 2002].

It is, therefore, our contention that if we have reasoned properly in the *jus ad bellum* phase, then the *jus ad pacem* criteria have already been spelled out in large measure. The best modern example of this is the Gulf War (Desert Shield/Desert Storm). Prior to the actual use of force by the Allies, the goal — the definition of what would constitute victory — was spelled out by President Bush. And the definition that was hammered out, remember, was agreed to by every one of those allies (not forced upon them by the United States). That definition was essentially the restoration of the *status quo ante bellum*, with some additional security measures designed to prevent a recurrence of war, since peace here was defined as merely the absence of open, armed conflict. And when this was achieved, the war ended.

True, General Schwartzkopf did appeal for more time in order to achieve a more perfect peace. But in doing so, he was essentially asking for a revision of the definition of victory. What he

sought was a political change that would either reduce or eliminate Iraqi antagonism and contention, by removing Saddam and the Baath Party, or, failing that, render them less powerful. Still, he obeyed his orders when his request was denied (as it quite properly was), since when to stop had been thought out in advance. And this is exactly what every just war requires, that it “be thought out ahead of time in such a way that those in control know when to stop ...” [Gibson, 2002]. Thus, however true Schwartzkopf’s understanding that a more perfect peace is (or ought to be) more desirable than a lesser form of peace, those in control of when wars end (and when they start) are not the warriors, and not even their commanders, but rather the presidents and ministers who rule both nations and the fighting forces of those nations.

But, we might ask, how much latitude do even government leaders have if they are to remain faithful to the concept of just war? To answer this question we are seeking to understand what generally belongs to justice in *jus ad pacem*. More specifically, we need to know whether we can justly refuse an enemy’s suit for peace and still continue fighting a just war.

And, in fact, this happened in World War II. Remember that after Hitler’s suicide, Admiral Doenitz’s initiated peace overtures on 3 May 1945. But the terms he offered did not meet the Allied demands. The war continued. Let us, however, look at a hypothetical situation that could have occurred a little earlier. Let us assume that Hitler had actually been killed in the assassination attempt of July 1944 (after D-Day, June 6, 1944, which had given the Allies a steadily expanding foothold in Normandy), and that the senior officers who masterminded the plot had gained a tenuous hold over the government. Let us also assume that hold was strong enough to eliminate the worst of the war criminals (the leaders of the SS and the Gestapo), but not sufficiently strong as to eliminate the more “moderate” Nazi leaders.

Let us then assume that Admiral Doenitz, General Alfred Jodl (Chief of the German Operations Staff), and Field Marshal Rommel had made the following offer to the Allies: Germany will immediately cease fighting, unilaterally renounce any and all claims to lands outside of Germany, and (once peace terms have been agreed upon) withdraw its forces to only those lands that properly belong to Germany (as well as reducing its military to the size and composition needed to protect those lands). But suppose the lands mentioned included not just Germany, but also Austria (which Hitler had annexed in March 1938) and the Sudetenland (the German-speaking region of Western Czechoslovakia ceded to Hitler by the Munich Agreement in September 1939). And remember, the first of these two events was not sufficient to start the war and the second was made precisely to appease Hitler and avoid the war.

But the question now is, would (and should) such an offer have been accepted? True, Hitler has been removed, as have the worst of the Nazis — but the Nazi party would remain strong, and so would the German military machine, which would still be controlled by the civilian government, over which the senior officers have only a tenuous hold. So would Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin have accepted this offer? And would it have provided a just peace? Churchill, an outspoken critic of the Munich Agreement (as, in our opinion, most probably Roosevelt was as well), would have neither accepted such an offer nor considered it representative of a just peace. But if this is so, and if the reasoning is correct, then we are faced with the state of affairs in which not all peace overtures encompass a just peace. What is offered is, therefore, fundamentally important — so fundamentally important to the concept of a just peace, in fact, that in some cases an inadequate peace must be forsworn in favor of prolonged war (as horrible as that sounds).

And this means that Ambrose' comments on war ...

It is clear, then, that these [cardinal] and the remaining virtues are related to one another. For courage, which in war preserves one's country from the barbarians, or at home defends the weak or comrades from robbers, is full of justice; and to know on what plan to defend and to give help, how to make use of opportunities of time and place, is part of prudence and moderation, and temperance itself cannot observe due measure without prudence. To know a fit opportunity, and to make return according to what is right belongs to justice [Saint Ambrose, 129].

... are equally applicable to peace as well. The only peace that should be acceptable is one that opportunity proves fitting to the circumstances; one that makes a proper return according to what is right and just. (The trick is to be prudent and moderate enough to figure out exactly what constitutes this peace ... and courageous enough to refuse to settle for less).

But this also means that just as the justification for war can never be absolute, so also the presumption towards peace (even in time of war) is always accompanied by limitation. James Turner Johnson's words thus seem appropriate here:

The achievement of just war theory was . . . to combine the general opposition to violence and bloodshed with a limited justification of the use of violence [even] by Christians. This limited justification required that the use of force be to protect a value that could not otherwise be protected, and it justified military service as an instrument for such protection of value. The presumption against violence nonetheless remained, so that the *justification could never become*

*absolute*: permission was always accompanied by limitation.<sup>13</sup> [Johnson, p.51-52]

The question we have to ask now is could just war theory allow us to cease fighting a war begun to protect a value that could not otherwise be protected short of attaining that goal. In general, the answer would appear to be no. Thus it seems that even permission to return to peace has limits. If there is "a limited justification of the use of force," there is, we assert, also a limited justification for terminating the use of the military as an instrument for such protection. As Lackey notes, "Just war theorists sometimes fail to notice that just war theory describes two sorts of just wars: wars that are morally permissible and wars that are morally obligatory" [Lackey, p.28-29]. Thus, if we are engaged in a war that is morally obligatory, we are limited in this important sense: we cannot accept peace as long as justice has not been served. In such times and in such cases, we are morally obligated to continue fighting for justice.

Thus if we use the criteria that a war must be proportional to the costs entailed by it in the *jus ad bellum* phase, it would seem that we should also use the same criteria that the peace secured should be proportional to the costs already paid (in blood and the nation's wealth) in the *jus in bello* phase before accepting it.<sup>14</sup> We could,

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<sup>13</sup> James Turner Johnson, *Quest for Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 51-52, as cited in Christopher, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

<sup>14</sup> Still, the paraphrase of a key sentence in Justice Robert Jackson's dissenting decision in *Terminiello vs. The City of Chicago* ("The Constitution is not a suicide pact.") holds a bit of wisdom (though perhaps more for the losing side than for the victors). At a point in time when peace is at already hand — and when, pragmatically speaking, the point of diminishing returns has been achieved (or passed) — we may legitimately wonder what real

therefore, legitimately modify one of Christopher's comments on war to make it applicable to peace, as follows:

The requirement that *peace* be proportional to the costs entailed in achieving it. [But] to make this utilitarian calculation ... requires a specific political end toward which the war is directed, an end determined in advance of the use of force ... a clearly articulated political objective [Christopher, p.83-84].

More importantly, the forgoing line of reasoning not only returns us to our hypothesis, but validates it. We should determine what constitutes a just peace prior to initiating hostilities. The questions we will need to ask during the *jus ad pacem* phase, and their answers, are (or should be) part of what is determined during the *jus ad bellum* phase.

Furthermore, this merely theoretical answer (as good as we feel it to be) is supported by the following very practical consideration. When one is in the middle of a fight (with the adrenaline pumping and reason not quite as accessible, perhaps, as when one is at peace), it's hard to know when to quit, when justice has been served. This is as good a reason as any to have thought it out prior to engaging in the fight (assuming that luxury is granted one by the enemy). Only then can we truly be said to be following Vitoria's Third Canon (which, please note, explicitly emphasizes victory as much as it implicitly emphasizes a just peace):

When victory has been won and the war is over, the victory should be utilized with moderation and Christian humility, and . . . so far as possible should involve the offending state in the least

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value is being protected by continued resistance. We suspect that the answer is that while there may sometimes be a value that justifies prolonging war, most times egos or other psychological factors are the cause.

degree of calamity and misfortune . . . (Vitoria, *De Indis*, III, 60)

### **Jus ad Pacem**

Now, given the following criteria for *jus ad bellum* ...

A war is never undertaken by the ideal state, except in defense of its honor [keeping its promises to its allies] or safety. ... Those wars which are unjust are undertaken without provocation. For only a war waged for revenge or defense can actually be just. ... [Still] no war is considered just unless it has been proclaimed and declared, and unless reparation has first been demanded (Cicero, pp.211-13).

... we can outline in more detail how the questions we should ask in the *jus ad pacem* phase should have already been generally answered during the *jus ad bellum* debates. And we will do this by reviewing the necessary conditions Grotius gives for justifying to use of force.

The first necessary *jus ad bellum* condition that must be satisfied is just cause [Christopher, p.82-83], and here let us equate this somewhat with Augustine's stipulation that war may only be undertaken with the right intention, or a right aim [Christopher, p.88]. This is clearly connected with Clauswitz's concept of a clearly articulated political objective. But if the cause, an unjust state of affairs, precipitates war, it would seem that we must (or should) also know what it is that we are seeking to bring about. That is, we should know what is entailed in a just state of affairs ... which would go a long way towards defining what a just peace should entail.

Grotius' second necessary condition is proportionality [Christopher, p.83-85]. But as we have already seen, this utilitarian calculation also requires a specific political end be held in view in

order to determine what means are justified in achieving that specific end. This not only goes a long way towards defining what a just peace will entail, but it also helps define those states of affairs that will fall short of qualifying for the status of a just peace. (The third necessary condition is that there should be a reasonable chance of successfully achieving the political end sought [Christopher, p.85], but this seems to be, at least somewhat, part of the calculations of proportionality, as well as irrelevant, if we are not only at war already, but in the *jus ad pacem* phase of a war).

The fourth necessary condition Grotius mentions is the demand for publicly declared wars, as opposed to private initiatives, in order to provide “the offending party the opportunity to offer redress in lieu of violence” and to establish “with certainty that [the] war is ... the will of each of the two peoples ...” [Christopher, p.85]. Now while this establishes in part what has to change, that is, the will of at least one of the two peoples, it does not seem to add much more to our understanding of the state of affairs we are attempting to create (though it may say something about the means necessary to accomplish that goal in offering terms of surrender). On the other hand, Grotius’ (and Christopher’s) illuminating remark, that “human life exists under such conditions that complete security is never guaranteed to us” [Christopher, p.85], does serve to remind us that we cannot hope to achieve a perfect peace. The best we can hope for, and then only in the best of circumstances (which is usually not the prevailing state of affairs), is a peace that is neither overly fragile nor ephemeral.

The fifth necessary condition, that only a legitimate authority may declare war, clearly says nothing that would aid us in our understanding of *jus ad pacem* (though it just as clearly seems applicable to the question of who can legitimately offer or accept the terms of truces or surrenders) [Christopher, p.86].

Grotius’ sixth necessary condition asserts that “war must always be a last resort, undertaken only when ... no other means achieves satisfactory resolution” [Christopher, p.87]. On the face, that ‘war should be a last resort’ could be taken to mean that any peace, regardless of the terms offered, is preferable to continued hostilities. Yet it seems apparent (to us at least) that this only appropriates one-half of the concept. Besides, we have already addressed the point that we are limited in what we can accept from an enemy once war has been initiated, so there should be no problem in simply reaffirming that the peace that comes from war should satisfactorily resolve the problems that led to that war in the first place. If it does not do so, then clearly it is not a state of affairs that can really be classified as a just peace.

It therefore seems that we can now conclude that Grotius’ first three necessary *jus ad bellum* conditions, and perhaps the fourth as well, are also the necessary *jus ad pacem* conditions ... with two caveats. First, in order to properly negotiate a just peace, we should take into consideration not merely the necessary *jus ad bellum* considerations, but also our experiences with how our enemy has waged war, from its start up to the point at which peace actually is at hand. Clearly, a defeated enemy who had fought with chivalry and nobility (to use Arthurian terminology) should be offered, and would be deserving of, a better state of affairs than one who had flouted the rules of *jus in bello*. But this merely means that the political ends (the state of affairs that could be called peace) we would have in mind would be distinctly different for these two distinctly different types of enemies.

Furthermore, it also means that the *jus ad pacem* phase, heavily dependent though it may be upon proper, up-front *jus ad bellum* reasoning, is not (we repeat, not) identical with the *jus ad bellum* phase. More clearly, though dependent on *jus ad bellum* (and *jus in bello*) considerations, *jus ad pacem* is again something distinctly different. We

have, therefore, concluded that *jus ad pacem*, though as yet unrecognized as such, is in fact a distinct enterprise in its own right, if for no other reason than that in it the generalizations that should have been made earlier are made specific ... and we believe it deserves to be recognized as such.

### **After Thoughts: No Justice ... No Peace**

Despite these conclusions, we must ask ourselves what happens when some nation, state, or party refuses to act in accord with the universal custom Aristotle described. How does one party respond if its enemy will not cease hostilities (except, perhaps, in some temporary sense, thus allowing it to renew its strength). Peace will never be at hand, thus effectively preventing the move into the *jus ad pacem* phase. What is the proper response to an enemy who, perhaps out of some misplaced ideology, will not or cannot accept just demands (assuming, of course, that this is the case). What is the proper response to an enemy who cares nothing for the opinion of a varying ally (if one exists) or internal strife (perhaps by splitting off as some radical splinter group), who is determined to fight on, no matter how weary he is, or whose fear is exceeded by some other fear (or overcome by some greater courage or faith). What must be done then?<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> As a note, this question is of critical import, not just in war, but in peacekeeping operations world-wide. As an example, consider the Balkans, where none of the parties seemingly want peace with its enemies. If almost 50 years of Tito's peacekeeping efforts (and the resulting economic prosperity that benefited all parties) could not create peace, what chance do the present efforts have to recommend them? Perhaps a better question that still awaits a good answer is this: Are such peacekeeping efforts morally obligatory or merely morally permissible?

In preparing to answer this question, it would be well to contemplate on another of Gibson's thoughts:

The little guys [Vietnam in particular, though it likely applies to terrorist groups such as Al Quaida as well] aren't working on our just war theory, which does believe in finite wars. Their aim of total ideological domination seems to be inherently inconsistent with human history. It also, I think, depends on their power base, and that would go away if some of the poverty and repression were relieved [Gibson].

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# **Operation <Insert Country> Freedom: The Impact of United States Military Operations on Target Regimes**

## **By John Tures**

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### **Introduction**

#### **Why the Issue of Post USMO Regime Type Matters**

As dust settles from Operation Iraqi Freedom and the debate grows over a postwar government, questions begin to mount over the nature of regimes that emerge in the aftermath of United States military forces. Supporters of America's military forces contend that their presence has a liberalizing impact upon the countries they go to. Pessimists contend that a visit by the United States military does little to foster democracy, and may produce the opposite effect.

Such an issue is critical to U.S. foreign policy. America not only boasts of its democratic record at home, but claims it exports democracy abroad (Allison and Beschel, 1992; Lawson and Thacker, 2003).<sup>1</sup> If one supports the democratic peace proposition that no two democracies have warred with each other, the United States would effectively create a "zone of peace" in the world and reduce systemic conflict (Clinton, 1994; Oneal, Russett, and Davis, 1998; Record, 2001). If one accepts that liberal democracies are likely to protect private property and promote free trade, then America can enrich itself by creating trade partners and investment havens worldwide; both

are critical for the American economy (Allison and Beschel, 1992; Peceny,

2000; Record, 2001; Liu, 2003). Furthermore, if one believes that democracies are more likely to align themselves against nondemocracies, then the United States can better ensure its own security against external threats (Record, 2001).

If one rejects these arguments, then the issue is critical as well. For if America adopts a policy of misguided democracy promotion at the expense of creating more secure governments, political instability is likely to ensue (Mallaby, 2002; Barro, 2002; Patten, 2002). Elected governments may not automatically do America's bidding (Forsythe and Rieffer, 2000; Corn, 2003). Democratizing states which fail to conduct the basic functions of government could dissolve.<sup>2</sup> Such failed states could turn into terrorist havens or be replaced by a totalitarian regime hostile to America's interests (Krasner, 2003). Furthermore, the failure of a student of American democracy may well reflect poorly on the teacher. It certainly would weaken American foreign policy credibility if the United States could not deliver on promises of democracy (Haass, 1999: 73; Peceny, 2000).

#### **Why This Study Matters**

This issue is not unknown to scholars, government officials, journalists and others interested in the topic. Scores of publications, articles and editorials have been written which range from opinion to case study observation. A few studies have even sought to back their arguments using statistical research, comparing the qualities of those states targeted by American forces. But after a considerable amount of energy and resources have been devoted to the subject, we still lack a clear idea about whether the presence of the U.S. military promotes or prohibits democracy in the countries which they

operate, as well as the factors associated with those outcomes (Mallaby, 2002; Krasner, 2003; McFaul, 2003).

There may be several reasons for these shortcomings. Some writers conduct their observation only to support a political point of view. Others begin with noble intentions, yet are handicapped by data limitations. These problems include a decided lack of post-Cold War cases, as well as a near-exclusive focus on the most conflictual cases. Both types of incomplete studies ignore a significant pool of cases which are certainly relevant to the question of possible regime changes in the wake of U.S. military actions, as well as their direction. The former fails to capture significant post-Cold War changes. The latter seriously underreport the wide range of international activities conducted by American forces<sup>3</sup>. Are we to assume that we can learn nothing from a case unless there are more than 1,000 battle dead? Should we ignore military training missions, interdictions, rescue operations, brief commando raids and cases of humanitarian relief as irrelevant (Haass, 1999; Peceny, 2000)?<sup>4</sup>

Such studies have an additional handicap: quality of explanatory variables. Those studies tend to focus on the quality of the targeted regime. The variables, which include factors associated with the government quality, nature of the governed, and even some socioeconomic information, represent the “usual suspects” typical of a comparative political analysis. While domestic political characteristics of the target state are certainly important, these variables only tell part of the story. Such research designs seem to act as if the American military forces never arrived!

Shouldn't we pay attention to some aspects of the state deploying the troops, especially if it intends to occupy the target state? Even the routine provision of military advisers and

training can reflect some of the policy demands and concerns of the intervener. Why not pay attention to features of the operation itself, such as the intensity of the conflict? Does the presence of international organizations associated with one or both states matter or not? Do we care about the target's attitude toward American forces (welcoming, hostile, indifferent, etc.)? Even if one rejects these arguments and clings to the notion that “locals only” will decide their own fate, should we at least conduct a study which may show that they do not matter?

Our study accomplishes all of these qualities ignored by others' work. We examine what occurs in a target state after a United States military operation has concluded, focusing on all U.S. military deployments from 1991 to 2000. We also examine the factors associated with changes in the target state's regime, including domestic political considerations in the United States, the reaction of the target state to the American military mission, and the role of international organizations.

## **A Review of the Literature Optimists, Pessimists and Others**

International relations experts have debated whether countries become more democratic after a visit from America's military forces. Optimists contend that the United States exports its liberal values alongside its military personnel. They believe that America can dislodge a foreign autocrat and bring freedom to the people (Nolan, 2003). Even when engaging in operations short of war, the concepts of democracy can be taught in other ways.<sup>5</sup> For example, America has often instructed foreign army commanders to respect elected leaders while teaching civil-military relations.

Pessimists argue that democracy is unlikely to be effectively enforced at gunpoint (Patten, 2002).<sup>6</sup> The use of force is apt to set a bad example for the inhabitants of the target regime; how can America teach norms of freedom,

tolerance and self-governance when it forcibly occupies foreigners (Haass, 1999; Taylor, 2003)? Even in cases short of war, bad lessons can be learned. American military advisers may teach anti-insurgency and antiterrorism tactics that can be replicated by foreign rulers to quash democratic movements. Critics of American foreign policymaking have pointed out that U.S. presidents have a habit of “coddling dictators” (Forsythe and Rieffer, 2000; Carothers, 2003; Roth, 2003).

Not all analysts reach the same conclusion that United States military operations are good or bad for democracy. Some feel that the American presence may only have limited impact, if at all (Peceny, 1999).<sup>7</sup> This group speculates that the effects of America’s military actions are ephemeral, and the country reverts back to its “old ways” once the United States soldier or sailor departs (Carothers, 2003; Ottaway, 2003).

In order to test this argument about what happens to recipients of United States troops, we collect information on the regime type of these countries. We compare the pre-intervention regime to the post-intervention regimes, noting whether any changes have occurred in the government, and whether these alterations produce more democracy or less democracy.

### **Keeping United States Military Operations in the Equation**

As we learn more about whether changes occur or do not occur in countries experiencing a United States military operation (USMO), we may begin to formulate theories about why changes occur (or why they don’t), and the direction of change (less democratic, more democratic). Such a field has been plowed before, but the techniques tend to involve characteristics of the targeted country. These include the presence or absence of a market economy (Allison and Beschel, 1992),

income (Barro, 2002; Krasner, 2003)<sup>8</sup>, education (Barro, 2002; Krasner, 2003) whether the country is an energy exporter (Lawson and Thacker, 2003), experience with democracy (Forsythe and Rieffer, 2000; Krasner, 2003), cultural affinity with the West (Lawson and Thacker, 2003) did the country fight a recent war (Lawson and Thacker, 2003), whether any ethnolinguistic fault lines exist (Forsythe and Rieffer, 2000; Lawson and Thacker, 2003; Ottaway, 2003), is the country an island or not (Lawson and Thacker, 2003), or region, such as the Middle East (Carothers, 2003). Some even go as far as injecting elements such as the presence of a British colonization as pro-democratic and the presences of a significant Muslim population as anti-democratic (Lawson and Thacker, 2003).

At a minimum, these variables ignore the context of the intervention itself. Such factors presuppose that the country will automatically revert to the *status quo ex ante* without a fair test of such an argument. By ignoring elements related to the intervener, the intervention, and international organizations, such equations are incomplete. The point of this study is not to claim that domestic factors of target states are uninteresting or unnecessary. Rather, our purpose is to examine some previously unexplored factors and determine the importance of these external elements.

### **Theoretical Arguments**

Our theory contends that factors external to the target of a United States military operation (USMO) have an impact on the post-operation regime. These factors include the internal politics of the intervener, intervention characteristics, and international organizations. This section is devoted to the specific hypotheses drawn from this theory. In each subsection, we identify the factor associated with post-USMO governments and the nature of the impact upon these regimes.

### **Internal Politics of the Intervener**

Whichever political party controls the White House is likely to have an impact on any post-operation government. The logic behind this argument is that the President of the United States is also the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The Defense Department is also a part of the executive branch cabinet. Therefore, whoever is President can issue orders and directives to the troops which can have an impact on what type of government results in the occupied country (Ostrom and Job, 1986; McFaul, 2003).<sup>9</sup> For example, the President may decide to remove the prior regime and call for elections. The chief executive of America may also shore up an existing autocratic leader, or do little to change the status quo.

America is dominated by two political parties: the Republican Party and the Democratic Party. Both have differing views on regime type preferences in other countries. Some may note that while both nominally support democracy, the Republican Party is more likely to support stability to protect America's strategic interests at the expense of liberal reforms (Record, 2001; Carothers, 2003; Liu, 2003).<sup>10</sup> The Democratic Party is more likely to champion values of freedom and rights in other countries, even when that may involve some instability or an unfavorable election outcome (Clinton, 1994; Forsythe and Rieffer, 2000; Record, 2001).<sup>11</sup>

*Political Party Hypothesis: United States Military Operations commenced when the United States President is from the Democrat Party are more likely to produce democracy in the target regime.*

Whether or not the United States is having an election during the year the United States military operation commences may also likely to affect the character of the post-operation regime (Ostrom and Job, 1986).<sup>12</sup> Regardless of which political party is in office, any USMO is likely to receive more scrutiny, given the fact that elections command

greater attention from candidates, the media and the public, despite voting participation trends (Peceny, 2000).<sup>13</sup> Many from these groups expect that any use of the United States military will support the forces of democracy. Otherwise, why have democracy at home but not abroad? Leaders will be under greater pressure to assure Americans that the actions of United States troops will spread democracy to other countries, and such a value is in our best interests.<sup>14</sup> During non-election years, when attention to political issues wanes in America, leaders do not suffer from the same pro-democratic pressures and have a greater degree of freedom in the post-USMO environment.<sup>15</sup>

*Election Year Hypothesis: United States Military Operations commenced when the United States is experiencing an election are more likely to produce democracy in the target regime.*

### **Intervention Characteristics**

Earlier, we noted that studies of American military interventions tend to focus on the most conflictual cases. We treat "levels of combat" as an explanatory variable, not a case selection method. The question remains whether more combat produces less democracy, as many contend. After all, democracy calls for the peaceful resolution of disputes in methods ranging from tolerance to the use of legal institutions. Wars are likely to set bad examples for future students of democracy abroad, especially when military occupation is the outcome and an illiberal "transition authority" dominates the country (Liu, 2003; Ottaway, 2003).<sup>16</sup>

On the other hand, cases where combat is initiated can also have a positive impact upon democracy. For this argument, we rely upon Mancur Olson's (1982) contentions in *The Rise and Decline of Nations*. Olson notes how domestic groups can control a country's regime, ossifying into an impregnable system. Wars, however,

can dislodge these groups and pave the way for new ideas and leaders (Pollack, 2002). Peceny (1999) argues that a nondemocracy is more likely to become a democracy if the state is demilitarized as a result of the intervention.<sup>17</sup>

A negotiated prewar settlement or limited deployment might leave significant vestiges of the “old order” in place, so that the system is likely to revert to the status quo ante. The continued presence of the old leader may have a dampening effect upon democratic groups seeking change. Furthermore, less combative operations include cases of military aid and training, which can help a leader maintain power, or even extend his or her control over the country.<sup>18</sup>

*Combat Hypothesis: United States Military Operations which involve combat between the United States and group(s) within the target state are more likely to produce democracy in the target regime.*

As many learned during the Vietnam War and the “Black Hawk Down” tragedy in Somalia, Americans are highly sensitive to cases where troops are killed in operations abroad (Haass, 1999: 75; Peceny, 2000).<sup>19</sup> Such cases receive a great deal of media coverage and sympathy for those killed, as well as their families.<sup>20</sup> There is an intense amount of pressure to “do something” about the killings. For American leaders, there tend to be two options: withdraw the troops or redouble American efforts to achieve its objectives. The former may certainly reduce casualties, but leaves some with the impression that these men and women “died in vain,” especially if America’s goals are not met. The latter may not stop the number of deaths. But if the mission succeeds, leaders can say that those who gave their lives did so for a greater purpose (Haass, 1999).<sup>21</sup> One of those “higher objectives” can be the spread of American values abroad: freedom for the people in the targeted country. If

Americans died for an imperialist cause or to prop up a foreign dictator, the public may not respond as kindly.

*US Casualties Hypothesis: United States Military Operations which result in casualties suffered by the United States are more likely to produce democracy in the target regime.*

Another intervention characteristic may involve the reaction of the target government, or groups within the target country. If the targeted state grants permission for the American forces to conduct operations within their home state, this could produce a positive step towards democracy within the country.<sup>22</sup> In fact, countries allowing the presence of American military can learn the value of civil-military relations from our advisers and trainers (Allison and Beschel, 1992).<sup>23</sup>

Given that inviting American military forces to deploy may well produce a loss of sovereignty, as well as some grumbling from locals concerned about the loss of international prestige or becoming an American colony, it would take the presence of a significant threat to prompt a country’s leader to take such a bold step. States may be seeking to expel anti-democratic elements threatening regime stability (Haass, 1999). A breakdown in law and order might hamper any attempts at producing democratic institutions (Mallaby, 2002; Pollack, 2002). The presence of American military forces may not only produce a calming effect, but enable the construction of civil society necessary to enable democracy to take root.

*Consent Hypothesis: United States Military Operations which occur in countries that have granted permission to the operation are more likely to produce democracy in the target regime.*

### **International Organization Factors**

International organizations such as the United Nations and the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization, too, can play a role in the development of post-USMO regimes (Oneal, Russett and Davis, 1998; Matheson, 2001; Mallaby, 2002). Those operations which receive support from international organizations are more likely to enhance democratization for several reasons. First, members of these international organizations are primarily democracies themselves, and may have a vested interest in seeing the democratic world expand (Peceny, 2000). Second, these organizations see themselves as charged with the maintenance of international law (Matheson, 2001). USMOs which do not permit self-determination of the occupied peoples are likely to be challenged by member states in the international organization (Forsythe and Rieffer, 2000; Peceny, 2000; Corn, 2003). Unilateral operations by the United States face none of these constraints (Mallaby, 2002); the American military may not feel compelled to provide democracy without such "international pressure."

*International Organization Hypothesis: United States Military Operations which are supported by an international organization are more likely to produce democracy in the target regime.*

Finally, cases where America sends its forces to an ally may take on different characteristics than USMOs in non-allies. If both countries are aligned, the United States may well feel compelled to enhance democracy within the post-USMO regime. One reason alliances are signed are to forestall conflict between the signatories. Given the evidence that democracies do not war with each other (Clinton, 1994), the United States may desire democracy for the other state to enhance the prospects for peace in that country (Oneal, Russett and Davis, 1998). Alliances are also signed for mutual protection. The United States may well decide that a democracy is worth more to protect than an autocracy, given that

democracies are more likely to foster closer economic ties with each other (Oneal, Russett and Davis, 1998). Alliances also represent shared mutual understandings. When both countries accept the same values, they are more likely to make the alliance "work."

The Bush administration has recently concluded that America's ties with autocratic rulers in the Middle East can be counterproductive (Patten, 2002; Roth, 2003; Taylor, 2003). Locals who resent their own government's repressive tactics have associated the United States as a supporter of those actions, given its cozy relationship with these monarchs and dictators (Patten, 2002). Some have pointed out that many of the terrorists who have participated in events targeting the United States came from Egypt and Saudi Arabia, two countries which have ties to America (Taylor, 2003). This may explain why Bush has pressed for democratic reforms in these regimes, as well as other pro-U.S. emirates in the Persian Gulf (Roth, 2003).

*Alliance Hypothesis: United States Military Operations which are directed at a country aligned with the United States are more likely to produce democracy in the target regime.*

## **Research Design**

### **Dependent Variable**

In this section, we outline how we examine the arguments concerning the regime type of a country experiencing a United States military operation (USMO). USMOs are measured using a data from the Federation of Atomic Scientists, supplemented with information from open source material (Tures et.al., 2002). These cases ranged from low-level operations conducted in a foreign country with regime permission to full-scale military operations designed to topple the opposing government. This data collection effort generated 159 cases between the years 1991 and 2000.

The data for regime type was taken from the Freedom House dataset (Freedom House, 2003). Information on each country's regime type was generated using an extensive checklist of a country's civil liberties and political rights. Countries are rated on a seven-point scale, with a "one" indicating the highest possible respect for rights of the governed, and a "seven" representing governments with little care for the rights of their constituents. In addition, Freedom House provides a trichotomous classification for a country's overall regime designation: Free, Partially Free, and Not Free.

In order to gauge a change in regime type score, we analyze a country's Freedom House score the year before the USMO, as well as the year after the USMO ends. This method is chosen because selecting the year of the intervention as the "before stage" runs the risk of the regime type variable being corrupted by the presence of the USMO (i.e. what if they country's regime score changes in the first year because of the USMO). We look at the year following the conclusion of the USMO because this gives the target regime some time to assert a degree of independence, without operating in the shadow of American forces.

After collecting information on the country's regime type before and after the United States military operation, we then transform the data into a variable with five possible scores. If a country's regime classification is downgraded from Free to Partially Free or Partially Free to Not Free (or Free to Not Free), it receives a score of "-2" and a "Less Free" designation. If a country increases its regime classification from Not Free to Partially Free or Partially Free to Free (or Not Free to Free), it receives a score of "2" and a designation of "More Free." A country can also experience more subtle regime changes in this measure. Should a country receive a lower score between the beginning and the end of the USMO (without changing designation), it receives a score of "-1" and the

designation "Slightly Less Free." If a country, on the other hand, increases its regime type score in the direction of being more free, even if it does not change in classification, it receives a score of "1" and a designation of "Slightly More Free."<sup>24</sup> If a country's regime does not change at all in score, it receives a zero.

### **Independent Variables**

In addition to collecting information about regime changes in targets of United States Military Operations, we gather data about several factors which may explain those changes in government. The first two independent variables concern the nature of the American political system. We look at which political party controls the American executive branch. If the President is a Republican, we score the variable as a one. If a Democrat is in power, the score is a zero. The elections variable is also coded dichotomously; if a Presidential or mid-term election is occurring in America, the variable receive a score of "one." All other cases receive a zero.

The next set of independent variables deals with the level of characteristics of a United States Military Operation. If the USMO involves military combat (as opposed to a training mission or humanitarian rescue), the case receives a score of one. All other cases receive a score of zero. We also construct a dichotomous variable to represent U.S. casualties. If the mission involved any American deaths, it receives a score of one. Otherwise, the case is determined to be a zero. We also gauge whether the target country has given permission for United States forces to send its military. Should the target provide full consent, the case receives a score of two. If no permission is granted, the case is determined to be a zero. All cases of partial consent receive a one score.

Finally, we also look at the role international organizations play in the United States Military Operation. If the

UN or NATO sanctions the American action, the case receives a score of one. If both back the operation, the case receives a score of two. If neither backs the USMO, the case receives a score of zero. We also study whether the target of the USMO shares an alliance with the United States. If it does, it receives a score of one; all other cases are zeroes.

### **Empirical Analysis**

To answer the questions of whether or not a country becomes more democratic after a United States Military Operation, we conduct a series of statistical analyses. The first set of statistics is descriptive in character. Have countries become more democratic, less democratic, or neither? The second set of statistical analyses look at the factors associated with potential changes in the USMO target regime. To examine these, we provide a series of bivariate contingency tables which compare the observed cases to a computer-generated expected model. We also employ a multivariate regression model which examines the combined relationship of all of these explanatory variables upon the dependent variable of target regime change.

### **Results**

#### **Descriptive Analyses**

Statistical analysis of the descriptive data shows that the presence of a United States military operation has only a modest impact upon a country's regime type. In many of these cases, the country's regime score remained static, despite the American military operation. From this, we cannot provide strong evidence for either argument. For critics of America's military policy abroad, barely 30 percent of all cases produced less democracy. An even smaller percentage registered as showing a significant decline in democracy. Yet only about a quarter of all cases after the Cold War improved a regime's democratic credentials. Merely 11 percent of these cases produced dramatic democratization in the occupied country.

An additional table displays information about the regime type of the country before the USMO, and how many countries experienced a change in government. Few discernible trends can be found, other than the observation that "not free" states were nearly twice as likely to democratize as to engage in modest autocratization. Correspondingly, free states were nearly twice as likely to autocratize than provide a modest expansion of freedoms. Partly free states were slightly more likely to become less free than to become more free (by six cases).

**[Editor's Note: all tables are at the end of the paper.]**

#### **Bivariate Contingency Table Results**

##### *Internal Politics of the Intervener*

When we examine the political characteristics of America at the time of the USMO, we find that control of the executive branch does have a significant impact on changes in the target regime. When Republicans are in office, the target regime is more likely to become autocratic. USMOs occurring under the Democratic President were slightly more likely to experience democratization or preservation of the status quo.

Data from election years suggest that this variable does not have a significant statistical relationship with behavior of USMO target governments. One cannot make a consistent conclusion as to whether or not elections make states more democratic or less democratic.

##### *Intervention Characteristics*

When we examine the impact of conflict intensity associated with a USMO, we find that the results are mixed. On one hand, we come to the counterintuitive conclusion that USMOs which involve the use of military combat do have an impact on the target regime. In only one case among the 35 USMOs with combat did the country engage in full autocratization, much less than predicted by the expected model. There were also more "strong democratizations" occurring than

expected. It should be noted that partial autocratizations and democratizations do not differ as much from the expected model, and the results are only significant at the .10 level, tempering our conclusions somewhat. There were also more “no change” cases in the wake of a combat than expected. Overall, the results are statistically significant.

Military fatalities, on the other hand, show little connection with the dependent variable. Whether a country autocratizes, democratizes, or “stands-pat” after a USMO is unaffected by the presence of American casualties. It may be noted, however, that among the five cases where such deaths occur, three produced no change in government, while the other two experienced a democratic transition.

There seems to be little relationship between “target consent” and changes in the target’s government. It does appear that there are more cases where targets gave full consent to the operation and chose to autocratize than expected. But the same can be said of cases where the target gave no permission to the USMO whatsoever. Overall, the variable for consent is not statistically significant.

#### *International Organization Factors*

Both variables representing the impact of international organizations do have a role in altering the target regime of a USMO. Though we hypothesized that international organization support would have a democratizing effect upon a target, the opposite conclusion is reached. USMOs receiving permission from the U.N., NATO, or both are less likely to democratize and more likely to autocratize than expected. Cases conducted without international organization permission are actually more likely to produce democracy in the target state.

In cases where the United States had a military alliance with the USMO target, the operation appears to have a positive effect upon democracy. Targets aligned with the United States are

slightly more likely to partially democratize, and much more likely to fully democratize. The only caveat to note is that there are also a few more cases of ally autocratization than expected. It should be noted that while both international organization variables are statistically significant, they are only significant at the .10 level.

#### **Multivariate Regression Results**

The next step in our analysis is to determine whether the combined presence of the explanatory variables has an impact on the dependent variable: changes in the target regime.<sup>25</sup> The overall regression model is statistically significant. Yet among these explanatory variables, only two are statistically significant. The type of political party controlling the American executive branch does have a significant impact: Democrat Presidents are more likely to produce democratic targets, while Republicans are likely to generate autocratic regimes in the wake of the USMO. The variable representing international organizations is also statistically significant, showing that UN or NATO permission is less likely to produce USMO target democratization. This is quite a change, given that four explanatory variables were statistically significant at the bivariate level. However, it should be pointed out that the combined presence of these factors appears to be affecting our scores.

#### **Conclusion**

At this point, we summarize the findings generated from the statistical analysis. The type of American political administration is likely to have an effect upon the target regime. Clearly, Republican Presidents have helped generate autocratic changes while their democratic counterparts have helped facilitate democracy in the countries where they send military troops. Cases where an international organization supports the USMO are actually less encouraging for democratic changes. There is mixed support for two additional arguments: level of combat and presence of an alliance. Both are

significant at the bivariate level (combat and pre-USMO alliances are more likely to generate democratization), but neither has a strong impact when combined in a multivariate model. Variables capturing the presence of an election year, the target's consent to a USMO, and any casualties suffered by the United States appear to have little impact upon the post-USMO target.

We also examine the characteristics of two important United States military operations which occurred outside the time frame of this analysis: Afghanistan and Iraq. Given that both operations occurred during Republican administrations, this does not bode well for democratization in either case. Neither state was aligned with the United States at the time of the USMO. Yet there are other factors which may help liberalize both regimes. Both USMOs involved high levels of combat, wiping away most of the vestiges of the previous autocratic regimes in both countries. In the case of the former, United Nations and NATO support may well provide to work to the detriment of democratization reforms in Afghanistan. The Iraqi case, which involved little international organization support, may help democracy. Despite the lack of clear signals, we can say that neither is doomed to autocracy or destined to be democratic.<sup>26</sup>

We have learned that American military operations are generally neither pro-democratic nor are they anti-democratic. In most cases, the target regime changes little from before the USMO to its aftermath. Certain factors, such as the type of American political administration and the involvement of international organizations, have some selective impacts upon the presence and direction of regime change after a conflict has been concluded, but these do not paint a clear picture concerning what might happen to Afghanistan and Iraq. Nevertheless, models which only examine the political and socioeconomic characteristics of target regimes alone will not account for what regime type might emerge in the aftermath of conflict. Factors related to the initiator,

as well as to the operation itself should be considered in the equation.

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<sup>1</sup> Haass (1999: 61) links such arguments to the concept of nation-building, which "seeks to bring about political leadership and, more important, procedures and institutions different from those that exist. In the case of the United States, nation-building seeks to encourage and sustain democratic and free market practices."

<sup>2</sup> Barro (2002) calls upon the Bush administration to abandon any postwar democracy plans for Afghanistan and focus on finding "an efficient authoritarian regime that would provide political stability and improve economic conditions."

<sup>3</sup> Corn (2003), for example, cites a study by a US Institute for Peace fellow which covers only 23 cases. Lawson and Thacker analyze 19 cases where the United States occupied a country in order to change its political system in the last half of the century. Peceny (1999) provides an in-depth examination of 12 cases and descriptive statistics on 93 cases since 1898. We look at 159 cases since the end of the Cold War.

<sup>4</sup> Haass (1999: 50) states that "interventions differ in their scale, composition, intensity, etc. They need not involve 'shooting;' on the contrary, shooting is only one way to use military force." Haass identifies several types of military intervention analyzed in our study, including humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peacemaking, interdiction, nation building, and training.

<sup>5</sup> Allison and Beschel (1992) cite the example of the United States aerial operations in the Philippines in 1990 and its support for the democratic regime against a possible military coup.

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<sup>6</sup> Lawson and Thacker (2003) note that democratization success stories of Germany and Japan are countered with cases including Afghanistan, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo and Somalia.

<sup>7</sup> Forsythe and Rieffer (2000) and Carothers (2003) point out that America has been inconsistent in its calls for democracy. In some cases, democracy is pushed; in others, it is ignored.

<sup>8</sup> Krasner (2003) points out that no democracy with a per capita income in excess of \$6,000 ever reverted to autocracy.

<sup>9</sup> Ostrom and Job (1986: 543) contend that the Commander-in-Chief does consider his or her country's own domestic context, including his or her own domestic political standing, relations with Congress, public attention or inattention to foreign policy matters. He or she will take steps to enhance the political fortunes of his or her political party.

<sup>10</sup> Carothers (2003) reminds us, George W. Bush ran his campaign opposing the use of America's military to support nation-building and democracy promotion. After interviewing ex-US Ambassador Joseph Wilson, Corn (2003) comes to the conclusion that the Bush cabinet of Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz are likely to be unhappy with an independent-minded, democratic Iraq, which might ask the U.S. forces to leave, nationalize the oil industry, or link with Iran or the Palestinians.

<sup>11</sup> Forsythe and Rieffer (2000) note Clinton's proclamation that enlarging the democratic community abroad would be a key component of his foreign policy.

<sup>12</sup> Ostrom and Job (1986: 545) argue that Presidents are political leaders concerned with maintaining and enhancing a political resource base, political survival, and the electoral fortunes of his or her political party. The election calendar is likely to impact the President's decisions.

<sup>13</sup> Peceny (2000) documents cases of Haiti and Bosnia where electoral politics and public approval impacted the Clinton administration's policies concerning the target regime.

<sup>14</sup> During an election year, a president is pressured to look "presidential" (Ostrom and Job, 1986).

<sup>15</sup> Stoll (1984) finds a connection between U.S. elections and their impact upon foreign policy.

<sup>16</sup> Ottaway (2003) contends that America cannot "shock and awe" the Iraqis into accepting democracy.

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<sup>17</sup> Levy (1988) also points out that in America, public support for a president increases after a military action (regardless of its success). This may give the chief executive enough political capital to attempt an imposition of democracy over domestic demands for target stability.

<sup>18</sup> Carothers (2003) contends that America's military assistance policy toward existing regimes is assisting undemocratic forces in Central Asia.

<sup>19</sup> Secretary of State Colin Powell has been quoted as saying "the use of force should be restricted to occasions where it can do some good and where the good will outweigh the loss of lives and other costs that will surely ensue" (quoted in Haass, 1999).

<sup>20</sup> Shapiro and Page (1988) confirm that Americans do pay attention to foreign policy events and garner a great deal of their views from the mass media.

<sup>21</sup> Haass (1999: 71) claims "the ability to sustain an intervention is linked directly to the perceived importance of the interests at stake.

<sup>22</sup> Peceny (2000) cites the case of Haiti, and the role Clinton's negotiation team's last minute deal with military dictator Raoul Cedras enabled the elected Aristide to not only return to power, but pave the way for Haiti's democratic election in 1995. Granted, Aristide's second assumption of power prompted a step backward in democracy, but the post-Cedras regime was more democratic than the General's.

<sup>23</sup> Peceny (1999) argues that a nondemocracy is more likely to produce democracy when the United States helps the regime in power.

<sup>24</sup> For example, if Honduras' civil liberties score moves down from a three to a four, even if it remains partially free. If Thailand improves its Freedom House score from two to one (even if it is scored "Free" in both cases by Freedom House), we would score this case as "slightly more free."

<sup>25</sup> In a test of regression assumptions, none of the variables displayed the necessary tolerance threshold to indicate that multicollinearity may be a problem. In testing for heteroscedasticity, we found the possible presence of a relationship between the error term and the dependent variable. Running the Glejser Test, we found that the absolute value of the studentized residuals were statistically related to the explanatory variable representing an alliance between the United States and the target. However, the R-Square for the relationship between the two is only .06. The results are

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similar when we look at the number of deaths, not just the presence of deaths, in the next model.

<sup>26</sup> Lawson and Thacker (2003) also note that while Iraq is unlikely to become democratic the U.S. could take steps to increase such prospects. Carothers (2003) reaches a similar less-than-optimistic conclusion.

TABLES

**FHBEFORE \* CHNGSCOR Crosstabulation**

Count		CHNGSCOR					Total
		-2	-1	0	1	2	
FHBEFORE	0	0	7	38	6	7	58
	1	15	14	21	12	11	73
	2	8	1	14	5	0	28
Total		23	22	73	23	18	159

**1 = GOP, 0 = Dem \* CHNGSCOR Crosstabulation**

		CHNGSCOR					Total	
		-2	-1	0	1	2		
1 = GOP, 0 = Dem	0	Count	13	13	60	19	15	120
		Expected Count	17.4	16.6	55.1	17.4	13.6	120.0
1	Count	10	9	13	4	3	39	
	Expected Count	5.6	5.4	17.9	5.6	4.4	39.0	
Total		Count	23	22	73	23	18	159
		Expected Count	23.0	22.0	73.0	23.0	18.0	159.0

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	10.665 <sup>a</sup>	4	.031
Likelihood Ratio	10.025	4	.040
Linear-by-Linear Association	7.260	1	.007
N of Valid Cases	159		

a. 1 cells (10.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.42.

**1 = combat at any stage, 0 = no combat ever \* CHNGSCOR Crosstabulation**

		CHNGSCOR					Total	
		-2	-1	0	1	2		
1 = combat at any stage, 0 = no combat ever	0	Count	22	18	52	20	12	124
		Expected Count	17.9	17.2	56.9	17.9	14.0	124.0
1	Count	1	4	21	3	6	35	
	Expected Count	5.1	4.8	16.1	5.1	4.0	35.0	
Total		Count	23	22	73	23	18	159
		Expected Count	23.0	22.0	73.0	23.0	18.0	159.0

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	8.730 <sup>a</sup>	4	.068
Likelihood Ratio	10.184	4	.037
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.348	1	.067
N of Valid Cases	159		

a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.96.

**International Organization Approved Intervention (2 = Multiple Organizations Approve, 1 = One International Organization Approves, 0 = No International Organization Approves) \* CHNGSCOR Crosstabulation**

			CHNGSCOR					Total
			-2	-1	0	1	2	
International Organization Approved Intervention (2 = Multiple Organizations Approve, 1 = One International Organization Approves, 0 = No International Organization Approves)	0	Count	10	9	29	14	11	73
		Expected Count	10.6	10.1	33.5	10.6	8.3	73.0
	1	Count	4	6	26	9	5	50
		Expected Count	7.2	6.9	23.0	7.2	5.7	50.0
	2	Count	9	7	18	0	2	36
		Expected Count	5.2	5.0	16.5	5.2	4.1	36.0
Total		Count	23	22	73	23	18	159
		Expected Count	23.0	22.0	73.0	23.0	18.0	159.0

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	15.239 <sup>a</sup>	8	.055
Likelihood Ratio	20.185	8	.010
Linear-by-Linear Association	6.837	1	.009
N of Valid Cases	159		

a. 2 cells (13.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.08.

**Does Country Share an Alliance with the USA? (1 = Yes, 0 = No) \* CHNGSCOR Crosstabulation**

			CHNGSCOR					Total
			-2	-1	0	1	2	
Does Country Share an Alliance with the USA? (1 = Yes, 0 = No)	0	Count	13	14	54	13	7	101
		Expected Count	14.6	14.0	46.4	14.6	11.4	101.0
	1	Count	10	8	19	10	11	58
		Expected Count	8.4	8.0	26.6	8.4	6.6	58.0
Total		Count	23	22	73	23	18	159
		Expected Count	23.0	22.0	73.0	23.0	18.0	159.0

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	9.127 <sup>a</sup>	4	.058
Likelihood Ratio	9.055	4	.060
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.091	1	.296
N of Valid Cases	159		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.57.

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**Coefficients<sup>a</sup>**

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	.420	.263		1.601	.111		
	1 = GOP, 0 = Dem	-.616	.214	-.232	-2.886	.004	.889	1.125
	1 = Election Year (Prez or Mid-Term), 0 = None	-.190	.186	-.080	-1.021	.309	.925	1.081
	1 = combat at any stage, 0 = no combat ever	.332	.234	.120	1.422	.157	.802	1.247
	(2 = Consent Given to Intervention, 1 = Partial Consent Given, 0 = No Consent Given)	-.029	.123	-.022	-.238	.812	.699	1.430
	1 = Deaths, 0 = No Deaths	.852	.540	.130	1.579	.116	.846	1.182
	International Organization Approved Intervention (2 = Multiple Organizations Approve, 1 = One International Organization Approves, 0 = No International Organization Approves)	-.321	.147	-.223	-2.187	.030	.552	1.813
	Does Country Share an Alliance with the USA? (1 = Yes, 0 = No)	-.053	.255	-.022	-.210	.834	.500	2.000

a. Dependent Variable: CHNGSCOR

**ANOVA<sup>b</sup>**

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	28.246	7	4.035	3.380	.002 <sup>a</sup>
	Residual	180.245	151	1.194		
	Total	208.491	158			

a. Predictors: (Constant), Does Country Share an Alliance with the USA? (1 = Yes, 0 = No), 1 = Election Year (Prez or Mid-Term), 0 = None, 1 = Deaths, 0 = No Deaths, 1 = GOP, 0 = Dem, 1 = combat at any stage, 0 = no combat ever, (2 = Consent Given to Intervention, 1 = Partial Consent Given, 0 = No Consent Given), International Organization Approved Intervention (1 = Yes, 0 = No)

b. Dependent Variable: CHNGSCOR

# **Global Fear and Loathing: How the World Really Sees the American Empire**

## **By David Michael Smith**

### **Introduction**

In an address at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio on July 4, 2003, President George W. Bush proclaimed, “Today all who live in tyranny and all who yearn for freedom place their hopes in the United States of America” (Bush, 2003). Bush’s audience cheered enthusiastically—and not just because any protest by active duty military personnel might have been punished. After all, the representation of America as the world’s foremost guardian of freedom has been a staple of bourgeois ideology for two centuries. As Bertrand Russell once said, “It is in the nature of imperialism that citizens of the imperial power are always among the last to know—or care—about circumstances in the colonies” (Russell, 1968).

But in the aftermath of the horrific September 11, 2001 attacks, the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and Bush’s declaration of an endless “War on Terror,” all of us need to face the facts about the U.S. government’s role in the world and how people in other countries see us. As Pakistani journalist Mushahid Hussain has pointed out, “Their deeply ingrained empathy, candor, humor, and hard work endear Americans to all those who interact with them” (2001). Nonetheless, it is time to recognize that many people across the planet consider the U.S. government an enemy of freedom and view Washington with fear and loathing. This essay provides a brief overview of this historic problem.

### **The Rise of the American Empire**

The depiction of America as “the land of the free” has some limited grounding in history. In early America, some colonists found freedom from religious persecution and old-style

European aristocracy. The desire for freedom from British “taxation without representation” led to revolution and independence. The framers of the Constitution rejected monarchy in favor of a republican form of government. And over the next two centuries, collective political action by workers, women, and people of color brought about significant progress. It seems safe to say that freedom has been an aspiration or ideal for many Americans for two centuries.

But people throughout the world have long criticized the savage exploitation of labor, the ruthless conquest of other people’s lands and resources, the support for foreign tyrants, and other human costs associated with the rise of the American Empire. Frederick Douglass exposed America’s most glaring contradictions in an Independence Day address in 1852: “What to the American slave is your Fourth of July? I answer, a day that reveals to him...the gross injustice and cruelty to which he is the constant victim. To him your celebration is a sham; your boasted liberty an unholy license...For revolting barbarity and shameless hypocrisy, America reigns without a rival” (as cited in Foner, 1950).

When the Spanish colonies of Latin America fought for their independence, the U.S. government refused to help them because it wanted to maintain good relations with Spain, because the insurgents opposed slavery, and because many of the insurgents themselves were of mixed ancestry. Moreover, the Monroe Doctrine made clear that the U.S. would henceforth regard the Western Hemisphere as its sphere of influence. As Simón Bolívar later remarked, “The United States seems destined by Providence to spread misery in the name of liberty” (1951).

Certainly, U.S. expansionism in the era of “Manifest Destiny” confirmed Bolivar’s fear. By 1848, the U.S. had taken one-half of Mexico’s territory by force.

During the nineteenth century, the U.S. government rationalized the forced relocation or extermination of indigenous peoples in terms of “the progress of civilization.” But as historian Howard Zinn has pointed out, the human lives lost and suffering incurred in this process will never be adequately measured (1999). In 1811, Shawnee Chief Tecumseh had told his warriors, “Let the white race perish! They seize your land; they corrupt your women; they trample on the ashes of your dead! Back whence they came...they must be driven” (as cited in Zinn, 1999). But by 1854, Suquamish Chief Seattle recognized the terrible truth: “Our people are ebbing away like a rapidly receding tide that will never return...It matters little where we pass the remnant of our days. They will not be many” (2002).

In the decades ahead, the U.S. used or threatened violence against various nations in order to advance capitalist interests. But the peoples oppressed by the American Empire turned out to have very long historical memories. Even today, popular resentment of “gunboat diplomacy” in Caribbean and Latin American countries remains prevalent. Even today, the native people of Hawai‘i continue the struggle to reclaim their national sovereignty. Even today, the knowledge that Sixth U.S. Cavalry troops occupied Beijing in 1900-1901 nourishes anti-American sentiments in China. As Reinhold Niebuhr warned in the early 1930s, the U.S. had become a new kind of empire, and “It is inevitable that men should hate those who hold power over them” (as cited in Ellwood, 2003).

## **U.S. Imperialism in the Twentieth Century**

During most of the twentieth century, U.S. officials claimed that our foreign policy was based on defending freedom and democracy against the threat of communist dictatorship. In truth, Washington was primarily concerned with defending capitalist regimes—no matter how bloodthirsty or brutal—and suppressing popular, democratic, and radical movements against such regimes. U.S. participation in the anti-Communist invasion of Russia in 1918, close U.S. business ties with Nazi Germany and Fascist Japan during the 1930s, the totally unnecessary atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, and the use of violence and subversion to thwart postwar Leftist victories in Greece, Italy, France, and Japan all helped fuel global opposition to U.S. imperialism.

Although the limits of Soviet-style socialism became clear enough, the United States was much more widely reviled and dreaded in the years after the Second World War. After forcing the partition of Korea and installing a right-wing dictator in the southern part of the country, the U.S. fought a war to preserve its little protectorate in the early 1950s—and four million people died as a result. Under similar circumstances, the U.S. waged another war in Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s—and another four million people died. In 1965-1967, the U.S. government gave the green light to the Indonesian Army to arrest and execute one million people suspected of being radicals.

Many people have died at the hands of U.S. invaders in Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Grenada, Panama, Libya, Somalia, and other Third World countries. And many more have died at the hands of dictators and death squads supported by Washington—in Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, Argentina, Chile, Iran, the Congo,

the Philippines, and elsewhere. Before his arrest and imprisonment by the U.S.-supported apartheid regime in South Africa, Nelson Mandela warned that “American imperialism... must be fought and decisively beaten down” (as cited in Tambo, 1983). Before his capture and execution by U.S.-trained troops in Bolivia, Che Guevara concluded that the U.S. government had become “the great enemy of mankind” (1967).

Since the 1990s, U.S. government officials and business owners have portrayed the collapse of the Soviet Union as irrefutable proof of the superiority and inevitability of capitalism. In this historical context, it is both ironic and enlightening that militant anti-imperialists like Nelson Mandela and Che Guevara continue to be among the most widely revered heroes on the planet. Part of the explanation for this has been provided by the famous Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano, who has remarked, “For us, capitalism is not a dream to be made reality, but a nightmare come true” (1991). Certainly, the 1990s witnessed the persistence and exacerbation of this “nightmare” for much of the world’s population.

In 1991, the first Bush Administration used Saddam Hussein’s attack on Kuwait as a pretext for killing two hundred thousand Iraqis, stationing U.S. troops near the holiest Islamic sites in Saudi Arabia, and increasing aid to Israel. In the decade that followed, U.S.-enforced economic sanctions killed more than one million Iraqis and U.S. bombs killed thousands of Yugoslavs. But as the new millennium dawned, widespread opposition to U.S. militarism and corporate-led “globalization” was becoming difficult to ignore, even in the heart of the Empire.

### **“An Abiding Sense of Fear and Loathing”**

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, many Americans sought to

understand how any foreign enemy could inflict such an awful blow against innocent civilians in our country. Countless journalists and professors posed the same question: Why do they hate us so much? Unfortunately, the mainstream media and many analysts rushed to embrace Bush’s claim that the U.S. had been attacked because of our commitment to freedom and democracy. To this day, most Americans still do not know what many people in other countries know—that the heinous attacks by al-Qa’ida might be described as the terror that terror produced.

However, a Pew Research Center opinion survey of political, business, and media leaders in twenty-four nations in late 2001 revealed some interesting things about the way the world views the U.S. Although the poll found substantial sympathy for the American people’s grievous losses, it also found that, “Opinion leaders in most regions say U.S. policies are believed to be a principal cause of the September 11 attack” (2001). Strikingly, respondents in every part of the world agreed that “It is good that Americans now know what it is like to be vulnerable.”

In many nations, sympathy turned to disgust when the U.S. killed thousands of Afghan people in the process of overthrowing the Taliban, installing a friendly client regime, and securing agreements for oil and gas pipelines through the country. Within a year, the largest global anti-war movement in history had developed as people from São Paulo to Seoul marched and rallied against the impending U.S. invasion of Iraq. Throughout most of the world, disgust turned to outrage when the Bush Administration killed thousands of Iraqi people in the process of ousting Saddam Hussein, installing another friendly client regime, and seizing control of the Iraqi oil fields.

More than a few internationally acclaimed critics have warned about the

growing dangers posed by the American Empire. The Indian author Arundhati Roy has pointed out that Bush's ultimatum to the world—"If you're not with us, you're against us"—is "a piece of presumptuous arrogance. It's not a choice that people want to, need to, or should have to make" (2001). British playwright Harold Pinter has said that "The American Administration is now a bloodthirsty wild animal" (2002). And Nelson Mandela recently told an audience in Ireland that President Bush and the U.S. government "are a danger to the world" (2003).

Indeed, world opinion regarding America's role in the world may be at a historic low point today. A Pew Research Center opinion survey of more than thirty-eight thousand people in forty-four countries in 2002 discovered that "Discontent with the United States has grown around the world over the past two years. Images of the U.S. have been tarnished in all types of nations: among longtime N.A.T.O. allies, in developing countries, in Eastern Europe and, most dramatically, in Muslim nations" (2002). Another Pew Research Center survey of more than sixteen thousand persons in twenty countries in May 2003 concluded that, "In most countries, opinions of the U.S. are markedly lower than they were a year ago. The [Iraq] war has widened the rift between Americans and Western Europeans, further inflamed the Muslim world, softened support for the war on terrorism, and significantly weakened global public support for...the U.N. and the North Atlantic alliance" (2003).

As Pew Research Center Director Andrew Kohut has noted, the latest survey results show that "The bottom has fallen out" in Muslim countries (2003). "Very unfavorable" or "somewhat unfavorable" views of the U.S. were expressed this spring by ninety-nine percent of the respondents in Jordan, ninety-eight percent in Palestine, eighty-three percent in Turkey, eighty-three percent in Indonesia, eighty-one

percent in Pakistan, seventy-one percent in Lebanon, and sixty-six percent in Morocco. As Kohut concluded, "Anti-Americanism has deepened, but it has also widened...People see America as a real threat. They think we're going to invade them."

Global fear and loathing concerning the American Empire has also taken root in countries which have historically been close allies. In the most recent Pew Research Center survey, "very unfavorable" or "somewhat unfavorable" views of the U.S. were expressed by fifty-seven percent of the respondents in France, fifty-six percent in Spain, fifty-four percent in Germany, and fifty percent in South Korea (2003). As Glenn Frankel reported in the Washington Post on February 11, 2003, "Anti-Americanism, West-European style, is widespread [and] rising...The immediate focus might be U.S. policy toward Iraq, but the larger emerging theme is an abiding sense of fear and loathing of American power, policies, and motives" (2003).

Other recent international polls confirm the growing negative perception of the United States. A Gallup International Association survey of public opinion in forty-five countries, released in May 2003, documented massive global opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. This survey also found that, in more than two-thirds of the countries, more people thought U.S. foreign policy had a negative effect on their nation. In addition, the survey found that, apart from the U.S. itself, Albania, and Kosovo, "Majorities in all other countries think that as a result of recent military action in Afghanistan and Iraq, the world is a more dangerous place" (2003).

A British Broadcasting Corporation survey of public opinion in eleven countries, released in June 2003, was hardly more flattering to the U.S. Sixty-five percent of all respondents described the U.S. as "arrogant," and

sixty percent expressed a “very unfavorable” or “fairly unfavorable” view of President Bush (2003). The majority of respondents expressed the view that the U.S. is a greater threat to world peace than Iran or North Korea. Remarkably, even in South Korea, forty-eight percent of the respondents stated that the U.S. is a greater threat than North Korea.

### **Conclusion**

The people of the United States should be deeply concerned about the growing fear and loathing our government is fostering around the world. Notwithstanding the mixed history of our country, millions of Americans genuinely support the expansion of freedom and democracy—not exploitation and empire—at home and abroad. Many of us also realize that the persistence of U.S. imperialism precludes the genuine international solidarity and cooperation which is needed to uproot transnational problems like poverty, racism, violence, and environmental destruction.

Moreover, if the U.S. power elite continues to subjugate and pillage the planet, our country will undoubtedly suffer new, possibly catastrophic terrorist attacks in the coming years. The prospect of aggrieved foreign groups unleashing chemical or biological agents against major population centers is no longer inconceivable. Such attacks might lead not only to the grievous loss of life, but also new kinds of “national security” measures which could further erode our already precarious rights and liberties. From this perspective, then, collective political action to begin to dismantle the American Empire is not quixotic or utopian, but imperative for our survival.

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# Practical Pacifism after the War in Iraq

## By Andrew Fiala

Ordinary citizens of democracies should be committed to a form of practical pacifism. The sort of practical pacifism I will defend here is a form of “just war pacifism.” Just war pacifism is an anti-war position that is derived from the basic principles of just war theory.<sup>i</sup> Pacifistic interpretations of just war theory developed in recent decades from the question of whether modern warfare can be just in light of the fact that it employs weapons of mass destruction that result in indiscriminate killing despite the best intention of the military not to deliberately target non-combatants. This view began as a reaction to the mechanized killing of the First World War. It gained adherents in the last few decades amid concerns about the morality of nuclear deterrence strategy, which involves deliberate targeting of population centers. Although moral concern about nuclear deterrent strategy is not entirely irrelevant today, recent uses of military force by the U.S.—in Kuwait, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq—have not been nuclear. Rather, these conflicts have used conventional means as a response to aggression, in the name of humanitarian intervention, or as a strategy of preventive or preemptive war. Despite the use of merely conventional means in these conflicts, they have been criticized both in terms of the justness of their various causes and in terms of the proportionality and discrimination of their means.<sup>ii</sup>

My own approach to just war pacifism focuses on the use of military force in such conventional conflicts. My basic thesis is that even if we admit that such wars could be justified in principle, citizens usually do not (and often cannot) know whether they are in fact justified. Practical pacifism on the part of ordinary citizens follows from

recognition of human fallibility and alienation within political institutions: if we do not know that a war is justified, we should resist it.<sup>iii</sup>

I will discuss two related arguments here: a specific argument about practical pacifism with regard to war and a more general argument about practical pacifism and violence in general. The basic outline of the specific argument is as follows.

### Specific Argument of Practical Pacifism with Regard to War

**Premise 1:** Citizens of democracies usually do not know whether the wars fought in their names are justified.

**Premise 2:** Citizens who do not know that a war is justified, should resist war.

**Conclusion:** Citizens of democracies should, for the most part, resist war. This argument parallels an argument in favor of a more far-reaching sort of pacifism. This general argument is as follows.

### General Argument for General Practical Pacifism

**Premise 1:** We do not often know in advance that proposed uses of violence are justifiable.

**Premise 2:** When we do not know that violence is justifiable, we should avoid using it.

**Conclusion:** In general, people should avoid using violence.

It is important to note that the conclusions of both arguments are generalizations that admit exceptions. The point here is that it is possible that some wars or some uses of violence may be better justified than others. I shall argue, however, that for the most part, we do not know when violence or war is justified, leaving open the possibility that occasionally we can be fairly certain about the justification (or lack

thereof) of proposed uses of violence. In other words, these arguments do not reach absolute conclusions. Rather, they begin from empirical generalizations about the status of our knowledge about the justification of violence; and they argue toward a general rule of thumb about resisting violence.

The first premise of each of these arguments is based upon an empirical claim about what we usually do or do not know. To support these premises, we must generalize from specific cases in order to claim that we often or usually do not know that violence or war are justifiable. In what follows, I will argue in favor of such a claim by providing examples, such as the lack of knowledge on the part of citizens that we saw before the war in Iraq. The second set of premises in these arguments are normative: they claim that we should refrain from supporting violence and war when we do not know that violence or war is justified. I will argue that if this normative premise is plausible in the general case, then it is even more plausible in the specific case of war. While discussing these arguments, I will distinguish the general and the specific cases.

### **Democracy, Just War, and the War in Iraq**

Before turning to the detailed consideration of these arguments, I want to clarify the implications of my specific argument and locate it in the contemporary world. The specific argument focuses, in part, on the duties of democratic citizenship and the relation between these duties and a theory of justice in war. In general, if ordinary citizens do not know that proposed uses of military force are justified, they should not support the wars that are fought in their names.

I call the view I defend here “practical pacifism” to distinguish from more absolute forms of pacifism that deny that violence can ever be justified. I accept that sometimes violence can be

justified. In the next section, I shall argue for the justification of violence in self-defense. Moreover, I acknowledge that the just war theory does a good job of establishing criteria for deciding when and where violence can in fact be justified. However, the problem is that even if we admit that self-defense, for example, is an acceptable use of violence, the burden of proof for the justification of violence used in self-defense remains quite high. The burden of proof for the justification of violence in light of the principles of just war theory is even higher. Moreover, when properly understood, just war theory cannot be adequately applied by most citizens because citizens do not have the requisite knowledge, experience, or expertise to apply just war criteria in the real world.

This conclusion is supported by recent events, including especially the 2003 war in Iraq. The arguments that were made to justify this war by the Bush administration show us the problem. Ordinary citizens had no way of knowing whether Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction or whether Saddam Hussein’s regime posed a serious threat to our security. And, in retrospect, we have discovered that the arguments made in favor of the war were exaggerated and based upon faulty intelligence. This problem applies, whether we focus on arguments made about preemptive war or we consider arguments about humanitarian intervention. The justification of preemptive war suffers from the epistemological problem because the justification of a preemptive attack must be based upon speculation about merely potential dangers. The justification of humanitarian intervention is equally as difficult, as it requires us to understand a complex set of claims about history, politics, and the possibility of success. The case of Iraq shows us the difficulty of justifying both preemptive and humanitarian war. While assessments of the threat posed by Iraq were misleading, citizens were also misled by claims about the ease

with which the humanitarian mission would be accomplished.

From the war in Iraq, we should learn that citizens were unable to adequately judge the arguments about the justification of the war in Iraq. We should also recall that this is not the first example of governments exaggerating or obfuscating when arguing for war (the 1968 Tonkin Bay resolution provides another important example). With this in mind, citizens should realize that they often simply do not know enough to admit that a war is justified, in part because they cannot trust the information provided by the government as it argues for the need for war.

My general thesis is that even though it might be possible to come up with a theory of justified violence, in the real world it is quite difficult (but not impossible) to say that any given act of violence is justifiable. This general thesis could apply to a variety of instances of violence and could result in a far-reaching form of practical pacifism. I will defend this general critique of violence in the next section. But my interest here is, specifically, the sort of violence that is found in war. The general thesis—that it is very difficult to justify violence in general because of our lack of certainty about the causes and consequences of violence—is more difficult to support. The more specific thesis—that it is very difficult for citizens of democracies to know that any given war is justified—is, I shall argue, much easier to support. Thus, if the more general thesis of general practical pacifism is at all plausible, the more specific thesis of practical pacifism with regard to war should, *a fortiori*, be even more plausible.

### **The General Thesis: Ordinary Violence and the Case of Self-Defense**

The general argument for practical pacifism is based upon doubts about our ability to control violence and our ability to predict the outcome of

violence. The basic assumption I make is that violence is *prima facie* evil and that we should thus avoid it if possible. This assumption grounds the second premise of the argument: we should avoid using violence unless there is some justified reason for employing it. This does not mean that we should avoid violence at all costs. Indeed, some forms of violence may, in fact, be justifiable. The point is that an argument is needed before we can say that violence was justified. The obvious example of justified violence is the case of violence used in self-defense. This example is something of a paradigm for other forms of justifiable violence.<sup>iv</sup> But it should be obvious that, as Judith Jarvis Thomson concludes, “not just anything goes in self-defense.”<sup>v</sup> Rather, there are important limits to the idea that violence can be used in self-defense.

The basis of the justification of violence used in self-defense is the right not to suffer violence. The argument about self-defense usually focuses on the use of lethal violence as a result of a threat to one’s life. It is important to note that there are many types of violence short of lethal violence. But violence often escalates, so the risk of using non-lethal violence is that it may inadvertently become lethal. The general justification of violence in self-defense assumes that an aggressor who threatens my right to life, thereby forfeits his own. This is the extreme case that sets the precedent for the justification of non-lethal violence. For present purposes, we can define violence as anything that both causes physical harm to and violates the autonomy of the victim. This definition precludes cases such as dentistry and sadomasochism in which physical harms are voluntarily accepted. And this definition ignores cases of non-physical violence. While not claiming that such cases do not exist, I do maintain that the existence of non-physical harms is much more difficult to establish with certainty. The general idea behind the justification of violence

used in self-defense is that the one defending himself does not voluntarily accept the harm that is to be done. This eliminates any confusion that might arise with regard to euthanasia, for example. In general, my right not to be killed against my will justifies me in using lethal force to protect my life.

Thus, at certain times, appropriately limited violence can be justified. Self-defense is only the most obvious case. We can also imagine further justifications of violence, such as violence used to defend someone who is unable to defend himself. We might also imagine that the right to self-defense leads to a justification of violence used in punishment. This idea is found, for example, in the founding thinkers of modern moral and political philosophy. Locke, for example, emphasizes that in the state of nature there is a right of self-defense. He goes on to argue that this right can be extended to include a right to retaliation, which is derived from the right of self-defense. However, such rights are obviously limited: under the social contract, the right to retaliate is transferred to the government.

There are four general principles that limit the justification of violence used in self-defense. These factors parallel the criteria established by the just war theory, to which I will turn in the next section.

1. There must be a good reason to resort to violence. That is, the threat of violence must be tangible and the violence threatened must be imminent. The threatened person must be fairly certain that violence will be committed before s/he is justified in resorting to violence.
2. The threatened violence must be unavoidable, so that violence used in self-defense is used only as a last resort.
3. Violence used in self-defense must be constrained so that violence is used only against the aggressor

and only to avoid the violence that is threatened.

4. The violence used in self-defense must be proportional to the violence threatened.

The idea behind the third and fourth constraints is that the threatened person is not entitled, for example, to preempt the threat of a minor physical harm by killing his or her aggressor. And the threatened person is not justified in using violence that will harm innocent bystanders (setting off a bomb, for example, that will kill innocents). Nor is s/he entitled to use violence if he or she could simply walk away from the potential conflict without suffering any harm, or if s/he could use less than lethal force to incapacitate his or her aggressor. We might also want to consider issues about the culpability of the aggressor. We might want to claim that violence in self-defense would be justifiable only if the aggressor were fully responsible for his or her aggression, although this idea seems to lead us beyond what is ordinarily thought about self-defense.<sup>vi</sup> And finally, we would probably agree that the threatened individual is not justified in torturing or raping the aggressor as part of his retaliation; nor would s/he be justified in mutilating the corpse of her or his aggressor once s/he had killed him.

Even with these constraints, it is easy to imagine cases in which self-defense would in fact be justified. However, in the concrete emergency, one wonders exactly how certain one would have to be that one's use of violence in self-defense is justified. We can construct some examples in which it is obvious that the use of violence in self-defense is justifiable. For example, imagine someone holding a gun to your head and threatening to pull the trigger. It is also easy to imagine cases where violence would be justifiable in defense of another. Change the example slightly to one where the gun is being held to the head of a family member. These cases are obvious at first. But, on

reflection, there are important questions that must be asked before we could say in such cases that lethal violence would be justified. Although I am not arguing that the use of violence in self-defense in such cases would not be justified, I do want to point out that even in such cases there are crucial questions to be asked. For example, one might wonder exactly how certain the victim is of the threat. It is possible to construct other examples, where even though the gun is held to one's head, one is fairly certain that the aggressor will not pull the trigger. For example, as happens often in Hollywood movies, the "aggressor" may be so distraught and fearful that it is obvious that they have no intention of going through with their weak threat. Moreover, the intentions of the aggressor appear to be relevant. If the aggressor merely wants your wallet, it seems that you should first offer the wallet before resorting to lethal violence. Not only is this prudent but the idea that violence should be a last resort seems to require it. We seem to have a moral obligation to defuse violence, where possible, without causing further violence.

With these sorts of considerations in mind, it should be clear that a fairly high burden of proof must be established before we are willing to say that violence is justified. There are many questions that might be asked about the justification of any given act of violence. In court cases involving self-defense, the jury must determine whether the defendant's belief that self-defense was necessary was reasonable and it must also determine whether the amount of force used in self-defense was reasonable. This implies that there may be unreasonable claims to the right of self-defense, as, for example, when the amount of force employed exceeds what was necessary to neutralize a threat. The sorts of factors discussed above help us to determine what is reasonable in such cases.

The important point to notice here is that our legal system and our ordinary moral sensibility make it quite clear that the justification of violence in self-defense is a rare thing. We tend to think—and our legal system shares this intuition—that people will resort to violence when such violence is not justifiable. The self-defense justification is a rare occurrence that should not lead us to ignore that in most cases violence is not justifiable. For example, resort to violence is not justifiable as a redress for an insult, it is not justifiable in order to make one's life easy or to obtain some good, and it is not justifiable as an expression of one's aggressive instincts. Thus, you cannot shoot someone who threatens you with words only. You cannot punch someone in order to get them out of your way as you wait in line. And you cannot hurt others simply because it feels good.

Violence is *prima facie* immoral, and justified violence is a rare exception to this general principle. In other words, the burden of proof rests on the one using violence. The one who uses violence is assumed to be guilty until he is able to prove that the violence was justified. The difficulty exposed here forms the first premise of the general argument for practical pacifism: it is difficult to know, in the concrete emergency, whether violence in self-defense is justified in advance, whether violence is really the last resort, or whether violence will escalate or miss its target. The sort of certainty we can obtain through retrospective analysis is, unfortunately, not available in advance. We might excuse someone for being mistaken about the justification of violence if we imagine that under conditions of uncertainty the person took due care to avoid unjustified violence. However, such an excuse, while forgivable, is not the same thing as a justification of violence. We might forgive someone who shoots a gun at a robber who threatens him or her and kills both the robber (who is latter discovered to be "armed" only with a toy

gun) and an innocent bystander. But we should not properly say that the bystander's death was justified.

The questions we might ask about violence employed in self-defense show us why it is important to be careful with the idea of self-defense. Since it is difficult to know with certainty that violence is justified, people should, in general, avoid it. This should seem obvious. And most of us will nod in agreement at this point. But I point out this obvious fact in order to indicate the problem that arises when we move beyond personal violence and consider the case of war.

### **The Specific Thesis: War and the Just War Theory**

If we acknowledge the difficulty of knowing when a threat is real and when violence in self-defense is justified, as described in the general case above, we should acknowledge that this epistemological problem is far worse in the case of war. It is difficult to know that a threat is imminent, that violence is the only resort, and that there will be no collateral damage, as in the case of the robber described above. The "fog of war" exacerbates such difficulties for judgment.

Although I am assuming that there is an analogy between the case of general self-defense and the justification of war, I should note that the justification of war has not always been made by analogy with self-defense. The traditional Christian approach to just war theory does not begin from the assumption that one is entitled to use violence in self-defense. The Christian idea of just war emphasizes the fact that war is to be justified as a form of neighbor love.<sup>vii</sup> That is, war is justified not in terms of self-defense but in terms of defense of the other. This is so because from the perspective of Augustine, for example, individuals were not entitled to kill in self-defense because this expressed a form of self-love. From this perspective, wars should be fought only in defense of

innocent members of the nation. Or, in the case of humanitarian intervention, war can be used in defense of innocents who are suffering injustice abroad. This makes the original Christian idea of just war quite complicated, however, because soldiers clearly need to defend themselves so that they might accomplish the duty of defending the innocent. Other versions of just war theory, as found in Michael Walzer or James Turner Johnson, allow for the use of war explicitly in self-defense. My approach to just war theory is more closely tied to Walzer and Johnson than to the traditional Christian approach.

The just war theory provides a set of criteria that also provides a useful model to describe the general justification of violence discussed above. The criteria of just war theories usually include the following, which roughly parallel the sorts of intuitive considerations of the justification of self-defense mentioned above.

Jus ad bellum (criteria for deciding whether to go to war)

- a. Just cause (to resist aggression, self-defense, protect human rights)
- b. Right intention (only to do these things—not for expansion, power, etc.)
- c. Proper authority (only a just government can go to war)
- d. Last resort (other means have failed)
- e. Probable success (vs. futility)
- f. Proportionality (total benefits outweigh the harms)

Jus in bello (criteria for actions within the war)

- g. Discrimination (non-combatant immunity)
- h. Proportionality (only what is proportional to the end)

- i. No intrinsically bad actions (no rapes, torture, etc.)

We can use these ideas as follows. When deciding whether a nation is justified in going to war one must ask whether the nation has a just cause, as well as whether it has the right intention and the proper authority to engage the war. One must also consider whether all other reasonable methods of negotiation have failed, what the probable success of the war might be, and whether the possible benefits of the proposed violence are proportional to the harms that will be caused. Within the conduct of war, just war theory emphasizes non-combatant immunity and the principle of proportionality with regard to means and ends. And just war theory condemns certain actions (such as rape, enslavement, and genocide) as bad in themselves and always to be avoided. These ideas were developed with regard to the specific context of war. However, they are linked to a more general idea about the justified use of violence in other contexts, as discussed above.

My thesis about just war theory is that it is quite difficult for ordinary citizens to know that any given war is just because citizens lack the expertise to apply these principles. As mentioned in the previous section, it is quite difficult to know in advance that violence is justified. The judgments required when we consider war are much more complex. And the division of labor in society makes such judgments even more difficult for ordinary citizens. The division of labor is such that there are experts with specialized and often secret knowledge who control the war system. Ordinary citizens lack access to relevant information and lack expertise about how to interpret the information they do possess. How, for example, would an ordinary citizen know that the *in bello* principles of discrimination and proportionality were being upheld? Moreover, citizens often don't know—

especially in the sorts of preemptive and humanitarian wars that we have recently fought—that there is a just cause for war or that war is a last resort. The case of Iraq makes this clear: citizens were in fact deceived—whether intentionally or not—about the cause for war.

It is odd, then, that so many citizens are content to trust the government's arguments in favor of war. This is odd because in the case of ordinary self-defense as described above, we recognize that it is important to be skeptical of those who claim that violence is justified. Thus, either we apply different standards of justification in the two different cases (as may be the case if we are realists about international affairs, even if we think that violence is immoral in the domestic case) or we simply trust that the government knows what it is doing and that it is concerned to apply the principles of the just war theory.

My thesis is that the same principles of justification should hold in both cases. Thus, I reject the realist view of international affairs, as do most defenders of the just war theory. If it makes sense to speak of justice in war, then it is clear that there are moral principles which ought to regulate the violence of warfare. Indeed, it is clear that those who have proposed all of our recent wars accept this fact: they have made arguments that appeal to the notion of just cause and other ideas found in the just war theory. Indeed, the Bush administration's National Security Strategy—despite its dangerous new emphasis on preemptive war—still speaks the language of justification found in just war thinking.

I further claim that it is more difficult for citizens to know that violence is justified in the case of war than it is for us to know about the justification of violence in our ordinary lives. The same sorts of skeptical questions that we might ask in the case of ordinary self-defense apply when we

consider war. These sorts of questions lead us to the general conclusion that violence used in self-defense will only be justified in rare cases. However, with war the stakes are significantly higher and the epistemological problems for ordinary citizens are greater. Finally, history—both recent and not so recent—shows us that we should not trust our government’s arguments for war without first asking serious and sustained questions about the rationale for war. Thus, if we are skeptical about ordinary self-defense, and if we recognize the tendency of governments to obfuscate, we should be even more skeptical about the justification of war.

### **Objection and Reply**

The basic outline of the specific argument of just war practical pacifism as presented above can be summarized simply as follows:

**Premise 1:** Citizens usually do not know whether war is justified.

**Premise 2:** Those who do not know that war is justified, should resist war.

**Conclusion:** Citizens should resist war.

The case of Iraq should convince us of premise 1. It would be hard to deny that there was pervasive ignorance and deception about the justification of the war in Iraq, its causes, and its prosecution. This example can be generalized by appealing to other historical examples and by bearing in mind the military necessity of secrecy. Thus, the most plausible objection to my conclusion must challenge premise 2. A rival premise might come from a quite different perspective on skepticism and the question of trust in the context of war. An alternative to premise 2 might be something like the following:

**Premise 2.1:** Those who don’t know that war is justified, should trust the government and the military to make the right decisions about war.

Those who would support such a perspective might believe that the use of military force in pursuit of justice is so important that we should not let skepticism deter us from doing what is needed and justified by the just war theory. An adherent of premise 2.1 might however sound as if s/he is defending a sort of unreflective patriotism that holds that the authorities should always be trusted. Such a view runs counter to the spirit of liberalism, which is founded upon a healthy dose of suspicion toward authority. Indeed, the case of Iraq gives us reasons not to trust the government. To make Premise 2.1 more palatable, the objector might appeal to some other supporting premise.

**Premise 2.2:** The government should be trusted because it usually does what is in the best interest of the people.

Or, the objector might be more explicit about the fact that citizens who lack information about the justification of war should not worry about war.

**Premise 2.3:** Only those who are in the know need to worry about whether wars are justified.

These claims might appeal to some Platonic view of political life. Our leaders know what is good for us. Even though they may lie to us, these lies are ultimately for our own good. Such deception is acceptable because, for the most part citizens do not know what is good for them.

Both of these premises should be troubling to those of us who value democracy and personal responsibility. The Platonic interpretation of Premise 2.2 is, in fact, anti-democratic. Premise 2.3 asks us to abdicate responsibility. Both of these run counter to what citizens of democracies should believe: that the government is a fiduciary institution that has to earn our trust and that we—the citizens—are

ultimately responsible for the actions of our government.

The case of Iraq gives us good reason to doubt both of these premises. One of the outstanding questions about the war in Iraq is whether the government's actions were really in our best interest. It might be the case that the war has damaged our interests insofar as it stimulated an anti-American movement both among our enemies and among our allies. And since—in the age of global terrorism—it is in all of our interests to see peace in the Middle East and a world united against terrorism, each of us should be personally invested in the question of whether this war was just. Finally, the basic principle here is that each of us should be interested in the justness of wars because individual moral responsibility is not diffused by membership in a group. We are each responsible for wars that are fought in our names. Thus, we should reject the sorts of alternative premises discussed here and acknowledge the original formulation of Premise 2: that citizens who do not know that a war is justified, should resist war. This should thus lead us to the conclusion that citizens of democracies should, for the most part, resist war.

### **Conclusion**

It is surprising that most of us seem to think that the analogy between general and specific versions of practical pacifism works the other way. Thus, people tend to think that in considering the personal use of violence, the burden of proof for its justification should be quite high. Nonetheless, the same people who are skeptical that personal violence can be justified lower the burden of proof when it comes to war. This is why people who might never resort to violence in their own personal interactions with others—indeed individuals who may be unable to conceive of themselves as ever using violence against another—may nonetheless support war and the use of military force.

One explanation of this cognitive dissonance is that while people recognize that the burden of proof that would justify violence in their ordinary lives is quite high, they are willing to shift the burden of proof at the level of political violence. One reason for this, as discussed above, may come from an anti-democratic view of political responsibility. There are at least two other reasons for this. The first is the problem of diffusion of responsibility. While we may be fastidious about avoiding violence in our personal lives, we may not feel the same sort of compunction about political violence that is committed in our names because our personal responsibility is diffused when we join up with the collective will of the nation.

The second reason has to do with the way we conceive of international relations. Although we may be committed to nonviolence in our personal interactions with our neighbors, we may feel that such nonviolence is only justified or made possible by the domestic social contract, in which our right to self-defense is transferred to a third party. But we may think that the same sort of foundation for nonviolence does not exist in the international arena and so we might adopt a “realist” view of international relations. Citizens who normally would resist the use of violence in their personal lives because they think that violence is only justified in exceptional circumstance may thus think that violence is a “just” resort in the anarchic world of international affairs more often than it is in ordinary life. It should be noted, however, that the realist view of international relations is not actually committed to an idea of justice in war. Thus my version of just war pacifism will not be persuasive for such a realist because my approach assumes that war is susceptible to moral judgment.

In general, I fear that we tend to confuse the question of the burden of proof for the justification of violence.

Since the violence of war is much worse than the violence of ordinary life, and since skeptical questions about the justification of war are more difficult to answer than are the skeptical questions about the justification of ordinary violence, the burden of proof for the justification of war should be much higher than it is for the justification of ordinary violence. Moreover, those who easily acquiesce to the government's arguments for war misunderstand the nature of personal responsibility in a democracy. War requires a much higher burden of proof than the burden of proof that is appropriate in ordinary cases of interpersonal violence; and the division of labor and the alienation of information in democracies require that citizens be skeptical of the justification of war.

To adopt a skeptical attitude toward the question of whether a given war is just is not, however, to argue that the war is, in fact, unjust. My first premise is only that we often do not know whether a given war is just. This premise has been supported by appealing to the division of labor in society and by discussing events such as the war in Iraq. It may turn out that some wars are just. The difficulty is that ordinary citizens will have a difficult time knowing this in advance. My second premise is that under conditions of uncertainty, citizens should resist war. My support for this premise comes from the horror of war. War is a horrible thing that should be avoided, unless there is a very good reason to wage war. In the absence of such good reasons, we should resist. Those who are willing to lower the burden of proof for the justification of war may thus not fully grasp the long-term negative consequences of war for combatants and non-combatants, for family members of combatants, for the environment, and indeed for democracy itself. This is not the place to go into these horrors. I assume that a reader who has followed me this far will be concerned about them.

My hope, in conclusion, is that if more citizens understood the argument of practical pacifism, we might have fewer wars. Of course, my argument is focused on a certain sort of democratic citizenship, so this hope must be accompanied by a hope for the spread of democracy around the globe. This larger perspective shares a hope for peace that was expressed by Immanuel Kant over two centuries ago, that with the advent of liberal governments, war would decrease. Kant claimed that liberal states would not go to war with one another—a point that has been re-emphasized by Michael Doyle and John Rawls.<sup>viii</sup> This idea is an important reason to work for the spread of democracy (through non-violent means): as democracy spreads, war should become more infrequent. My emphasis here is on the fact that if citizens of democracies understood their personal responsibility for the violence that is committed in their names and if they understood how difficult it is to actually justify war, they would exercise their duty to resist and question the use of military force, thus resulting in fewer wars. While this hope is utopian, the ideal expressed here can clarify the sorts of responsibilities that we—the citizens of the United States and other democracies—have in the real world.

## NOTES

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<sup>i</sup> See, for example, Stanley Hauerwas, Should War be Eliminated? (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1984). In the background of this discussion is The U.S. Catholic Bishops' pastoral letter of 1983, "The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response" (available online: <http://www.osjspm.org/cst/cp.htm>). Also see Richard Wasserstrom, "On the Morality of War" Stanford Law Review, 21: 1627-1656, reprinted in James Rachels, ed., Moral Problems (New York: Harper and Row, 1971); Martin Benjamin, "Pacifism for Pragmatists" Ethics, 83: 3 (1973), 196-213; Robert L. Holmes, On War and Morality

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(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). For a recent reply to just war pacifism see George Weigel, "The Just War Tradition and the World after September 11" Logos, 5: 3 (Summer 2002), 13-44.

ii For a critical discussion of the means employed in the first Gulf War and Kosovo see, for example, Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Just War and Humanitarian Intervention" Ideas (from the National Humanities Center) 8: 2 (2001), 2-21. Elshtain updates her views about the war on terrorism Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just War Against Terrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2003).

iii I have defended practical pacifism elsewhere [references omitted for blind review]. I should note that this thesis has affinities with a position defended recently by Paul Griffiths (Paul J. Griffiths, "Just War: An Exchange" (with a reply by George Weigel) in First Things, no. 122 (April 2002), pp. 31-36).

iv David Wasserman notes that self-defense is also a paradigm for other sorts of legal defense (David Wasserman, "Justifying Self-Defense" Philosophy and Public Affairs, 16: 4 (1987), 357).

v Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Self-Defense" Philosophy and Public Affairs, 20:4 (1991), 307.

vi This last condition is considered and rejected by Thomson in "Self-Defense." Also see Philip Montague, "The Morality of Self-Defense: A Reply to Wasserman" Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18: 1 (1989), 83.

vii Such an approach is found in Augustine. The Christian view is updated by Paul Ramsey in The Just War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968). For a more contemporary discussion see Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just War Against Terror.

viii Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace in Kant: Political Writings (Nisbet trans., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) and Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Part 1 of the Metaphysics of Morals (Ladd trans., New York: Macmillan, 1965), §§ 53-62. Also see Michael Doyle's interpretation of Kant's

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view in Ways of War and Peace (New York: Norton, 1997). Doyle's view is in turn adopted by John Rawls in The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

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# **Civil War in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: An Analysis of Conflict and International Intervention for Peace**

## **By Brent Pearson**

### **Introduction**

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a country in central Africa with a land mass close to one-fourth the size of the United States of America. The DRC shares its borders with nine countries: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. The DRC is a country of vast ethnic diversity. Peoples of over two hundred different ethnic groups reside in the DRC. The majority of these groups are of Bantu origins; the other different ethnic groups are comprised of Hamitic, Nilotic and other origins<sup>i</sup>.

Since its independence from Belgium on June 30, 1960, the DRC has been plagued with instability, tyrannical regimes, and civil conflict. The current civil war that has engulfed the DRC, along with several other African states, has claimed the lives of an estimated 3.1 million people, not only from the violence, but from famine and diseases that the conflict has allowed to spiral out of control<sup>ii</sup>. Despite the efforts of the United Nations Observer Mission for Congo (MONUC) to enforce peace in the areas most affected, the conflict continues, and MONUC has found itself being accused of inaction and even bias by the various warring factions<sup>iii</sup>.

The roots of conflict run deep between the various ethnic factions that have taken up arms and the state governments that directly and/or indirectly support them. The purpose of this paper is to not only shed light on the roots and complexity of the war in the DRC, but to also give an analysis as to how intervention can promote social stability and economic development within the DRC by incorporating existing frameworks from the World Bank and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. By combining

and bringing into force these frameworks intervention can not only promote alleviation from conflict, but also enhance the integrity of the state and promote sustainable human development.

In order to understand the civil war in the DRC, one must first have a clear understanding of the effects of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide on the DRC.

### **The Rwandan Roots**

The 1994 Rwandan Genocide was a result of tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups. What first must be understood is that the Hutus are of Bantu origin while the Tutsi are of Nilotic origin<sup>iv</sup>. The tension between the two ethnic groups had been prominent since the colonial occupation by Belgium when the Tutsi minority were given high status and profited more from Belgian colonization than the Hutus had<sup>v</sup>. After Rwanda's independence in 1962, the Hutu majority dominated the political scene for three decades. Extremist elements of the Hutu pushed for policies of discrimination that sometimes resulted in killing sprees in order to ethnically cleanse their country of the Tutsis.

In 1990, an exiled Tutsi army known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda from its northern border with Uganda. The RPF was able to gain ground against the Rwandan Hutu military, and in 1993, Tanzania, with the backing of the international community, negotiated peace talks between the RPF and the Rwandan government. The peace talks became known as the Arusha Accords, which laid out terms for Rwanda to include Tutsi minority parties and Hutu opposition parties in its government. Despite the peaceful intentions of the Arusha Accords, Hutu extremists within the government, along with Hutu militias, began stockpiling weapons and plotting against the Tutsi<sup>vi</sup>. In

February of 1993, the RPF again invaded Rwanda, this time from Burundi where they had been given sanctuary. The invasion caused a massive uproar amongst extremist Hutu politicians calling for action to eliminate the Tutsi. The United Nations mission in Rwanda made several attempts to alert the international community of the impending violence, but no significant actions were taken<sup>vii</sup>.

On April 6, 1994, the moderate Hutu president of Rwanda, Juvenal Habyarimana's, private plane was shot down; also on board was Cyprien Ntaryamira, the president of Burundi<sup>viii</sup>. The ethnic tensions that had been manifesting since 1990 within the ranks of extremist Hutus in the government and the extremist Hutu militia groups known as the Interhamwe had been at a boiling point. The death of Juvenal Habyarimana was the event they needed for the tensions to spill over. What followed after April 6, 1994 was nearly one hundred days of slaughter that turned out to be the fastest and most effective acts of genocidal killings of the twentieth century. From April through July of 1994, 800,000 ethnic Tutsi and moderate Hutu were systematically murdered<sup>ix</sup>.

The genocide that began in April of 1994 was brought to an end after the Tutsi dominated exiled army of the RPF, led by Paul Kagame, was able to mobilize from their safe haven in Uganda and defeat the Rwandan Hutu militias in July that same year. After the defeat of the Hutu militias, an estimated 1.5 million of them fled Rwanda and went into the Kivu region in the eastern part of the DRC<sup>x</sup>. The refugees were not only Hutus fearing retribution, along with members of the Interhamwe and extremist elements of the recently toppled Hutu government, but many were Rwandan citizens herded out of their country by the Interhamwe as an attempt to leave the victorious RPF a country without a people to help run it<sup>xi</sup>.

### **Rwandan Refugees, Ethnic Tensions, and Destabilization**

The fleeing Hutu refugees from Rwanda into eastern Zaire (now the DRC)

managed to offset the ethnic balances and destabilize Zaire's eastern provinces. An ethnic group known as the Banyamulenge, who are related to the Tutsi living in the Congo, inhabited the eastern provinces. During the April 1994 Rwandan genocide, Banyamulenges also fell victim to the atrocities committed by Hutu militias, especially after the Interhamwe were forced into eastern Zaire by the RPF<sup>xii</sup>.

The president of Zaire at this time was Mobutu Sese Seko. Mobutu was of Bantu origin, related to the Hutus, and had labeled the Banyamulenge as Rwandans and did not grant them citizenship<sup>xiii</sup>. From July 1994 through late 1996, atrocities were committed against Banyamulenge by the extremist elements of the Hutu refugees and their allies within the Zairean security forces. Anti-Tutsi fervor had been prevalent throughout Zaire and spun out of control in 1996. The atrocities and persecution of the Banyamulenge were fully realized in October 1996 when the Zairean regional administration ordered that all Banyamulenge were to leave within one week or be forcefully expelled or face internment. The next month, the 453-member Zairean parliament known as the High Council of the Republic (HRC) recommended that all people of Tutsi origin be expelled from Zairean territory<sup>xiv</sup>. This action by the Zairean government under Mobutu Sese Seko was what eventually led to the collapse of the state and Mobutu's downfall.

### **Mobilization and Civil War**

The order of expulsion for the Banyamulenge prompted their mobilization and creation of alliances with other anti-Mobutu elements within other ethnic groups. In late October 1996, the Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire, or the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (AFDL), was formed<sup>xv</sup>. The AFDL was led by Laurent Kabila and supported by Paul Kagame's Tutsi dominated government of Rwanda, and the government of Burundi. In order to prevent the Hutu refugees in Kivu from mobilizing and launching attacks into Rwanda, the new Rwandan Tutsi led-government

clandestinely armed the Banyamulengues of Kivu to offset and disrupt the Interhamwe<sup>xvi</sup>.

In late 1996 and early 1997, the AFDL had managed several military victories and made territorial gains throughout the country. In May of 1997 the (ADFL) led by Laurent Kabila marched their forces into Kinshasa and brought an end to the reign of Mobutu<sup>xvii</sup>.

The orchestrated installation of Laurent Kabila in 1997 by Rwanda with help from Uganda was intended for a friendly government to be in control of the DRC and assist them in sweeping the jungles in eastern Congo and clearing them of the extremist Hutu elements in the refugee camps, especially the Interhamwe. The Rwandan and Ugandan plan backfired. Laurent Kabila ignored Rwandan interests and worked towards building his own regime that would not be a puppet of Kigali. The collapse of the state left no public services, a diminished rule of law, and no government apparatuses to ensure state security. During his reign, Mobutu was more concerned with building his own fortunes and the fortunes of those closest to him than developing his country. After Mobutu's government fell to Laurent Kabila's forces, it was impossible for Kabila to implement any kind of administrative control due to the fact that Mobutu left no means for any successor to administer the country or meet the needs of the people. On May 26, 1997, Kabila banned all political parties and public demonstrations. Two days later, a constitutional decree was issued giving the president full legislative authority. The next day Kabila was sworn in as president of the government of the new Democratic Republic of Congo<sup>xviii</sup>. He still did not have control of the ethnic conflict between Hutus, Tutsis, and other groups in the eastern provinces. Along with the growing ethnic strife in the eastern provinces, security arrangements and relations between the DRC and its neighbors were breaking down. The attempts by Laurent Kabila to strengthen his new government and enforce his state's sovereignty soured relations between him and the Tutsi dominated government of

Rwanda, who cared not for the DRC's state sovereignty, but only to extend their anti-Hutu campaign across the Rwandan-Congolese border. In the summer of 1998, Kabila expelled the Rwandans from the DRC and opened himself for the reprisals that would push the DRC further into civil war.

These reprisals first came in the form of an alliance between Banyamulengue military units within the Congolese army and the Rwandan military. The product of this alliance was the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD); it was intended to appear as an internal movement within the DRC to overthrow Kabila<sup>xix</sup>. All states and parties concerned in the region were able to see through the Rwandan attempt that resulted in other state actors becoming involved in the conflict. As Rwandan and Ugandan backed forces began to close in on Kinshasa, Kabila requested assistance from other African countries. Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola all sent troops to aid Kabila<sup>xx</sup>. Shortly thereafter, Chad and Sudan entered the conflict.

### **From a Civil War to an Inter-State War and the Ever Changing Conflict Dynamics**

The civil war in the DRC represents a kind of conflict not seen before in Africa. The current conflict is, in fact, an interstate war. Interstate war is not only relatively new to Africa but Africa is incapable of addressing the problem. The Organization of African Unity, which was intended to be a mechanism to maintain the colonial borders and uphold state sovereignty, was effective in these two goals for three decades, despite lack of enforcement measures<sup>xxi</sup>. The interstate war in the DRC involves up to eight different military actors and is changing political and social dynamics of Africa as a whole<sup>xxii</sup>. States in Africa that inherited borders containing rival ethnic groups have greatly contributed to division and social instability within African states. The Rwandan armies marching on the DRC were not necessarily an action of the Rwandan State verses the State of the DRC, but an extension of the Tutsi-Hutu civil conflict crossing state lines.

Another factor that has contributed to African conflict is the efforts of states to strengthen themselves as governing entities and secure their borders in spite of ethnic makeup and their neighboring states. Political, ethnic, and religious ambitions all play a significant role in exacerbating conflicts throughout Africa. The situation gets even more confusing when analyzing Uganda's interests for becoming actively involved in the conflict. Uganda's president, Yoweri Museveni, is of the Hema ethnicity and shares ethnic ties with the Tutsi government of Rwanda; however, his interests in having a puppet government in the DRC along with the Rwandans was for political reasons, and not just for ethnic loyalties. Museveni is critical of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) operating in the mountains on Ugandan-Congolese border, and launches attacks on his government from there. The ADF are being supported by the Islamic government in Khartoum, Sudan, in reprisal for Uganda's support for rebel groups in southern Sudan fighting the Islamic government in Khartoum. Ethnic and political ambitions are blurred with Uganda's involvement in the conflict<sup>xxiii</sup>. Sudan's ambitions are political and religious, as well as racial and ethnic.

The government in Angola's capital of Luanda is interested in preventing the rebel group National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) from getting strategic advantages in their civil war. UNITA was led by the late Jonas Savimbi against the Angolan government since its independence in 1975 and received backing by Mobutu Sese Seko and aided UNITA in the smuggling of illicit diamonds and weapons out from Mobutu's Zaire Congo. Upon Kabila's rise to power, UNITA no longer had Mobutu's governmental support and their smuggling routes were cut off. The Angolan government led by president Jose Eduardo Dos Santos was fearful of UNITA's smuggling routes reopening and that group's loyal to Mobutu, which have maintained close ties to UNITA, would regain influence in the DRC and reestablish the flow of illicit diamonds and arms that are UNITA's main source of profit. Angola's

political and national security interests in the DRC and against UNITA resulted in Angola playing a significant military role in beating back the initial assault on Kinshasa by the Congolese Rally for Democracy in August of 1998<sup>xxiv</sup>.

Another one of the significant changes in the conflict is the issue of state and non-state actors becoming involved in the conflicts of other states, not for ethnic loyalties, but for purely economic reasons. The current government of Zimbabwe led by president Robert Mugabe is the prime example of this in the DRC. The way that Mugabe changes the conflict dynamic is that, although the war is unpopular in Zimbabwe, almost half of Zimbabwe's active military have served in the Congolese war, and Zimbabwe does not even share a common border with the DRC. The Zimbabwean troops arrived there after spearheading a force of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to assist Kabila's forces and beating back the Rwandan and Ugandan advances in the fall of 1998. Since the fall of 1998 and until recently, the Zimbabwean military has taken control of vital Congolese mining towns and maintained a presence in Kinshasa<sup>xxv</sup>.

### **Lusaka: The Ignored Framework for Peace**

The conflict in the DRC persisted through 1998 and well into 1999. There was, however, a glimmer of hope in July 1999 when the Lusaka Peace Accord was signed. The governments of the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe all signed the accord. By September of 1999, the rebel groups of the RCD and their splinter group, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), also signed the accord. The basic agreement was for governments to stop sponsoring rebel movements and disarm the "genocidal forces." The governments of the DRC and Zimbabwe were tasked with turning over leaders of the Hutu dominated Interhamwe and ex-Rwandan military officers responsible for the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and the exacerbation of the civil war in the DRC. The accord was also meant to establish a national army for the DRC ninety days after

the accord was signed. Agreement on a Joint Military Commission was signed by six member states involved in the accord, along with a political committee to oversee all ceasefire agreements. The United Nations Security Council also agreed to send in an observer mission to the DRC (what is now MONUC) to oversee and assist in the implementation of the accord<sup>xxvi</sup>.

Although well intentioned, the Lusaka Accord never took flight. There was a definite unwillingness by parties involved to adhere to the agreements and tasks assigned to them, but there were also several logistical reasons as to why the agreement never took hold. How could the existing military forces of the DRC be expected to seek out and find all members of the Interhamwe and Rwandan military forces, disarm and demobilize them? Laurent Kabila had never gained full control of the eastern provinces of the DRC where the Interhamwe had established themselves and with no adequate infrastructure or ability for rapid deployment, there was no enforcing body that could outmaneuver and force the various warring parties to disarm and adhere to the accord. Also, by 1999, the RCD had broken into separate factions due to political differences of Rwanda and Uganda, whom had created it. The two factions were the RCD-ML, which was backed by Uganda, and RCD-Goma, which was backed by Rwanda<sup>xxvii</sup>. The separate factions became more concerned with plundering what resources they could in the eastern provinces and even engaged in combat against each other over access to these resources<sup>xxviii</sup>. Also, the original MONUC mandate merely called for oversight and had no “teeth” to force any signatory of the Lusaka Accords to uphold their obligations.

### **The New Kabila and a Slow Realization of Peace**

The ignoring of the Lusaka Accords and the continued fighting and instability finally got the best of Laurent Kabila on January 16, 2001. There is still much

speculation as to the conditions and details of exactly what happened that day; what is known is that Laurent Kabila was shot at his residence and eventually died of his wounds. His son, Joseph Kabila, who was sworn in as president on January 26<sup>th</sup>, 2001, succeeded him.<sup>xxix</sup> Joseph Kabila, unlike his father, made comprehensive efforts in working toward the peace plans that were rejected or ignored by his father.

As president, Joseph Kabila was able to implement a ceasefire and allow the UN to police some areas and observe the withdrawing of foreign troops in the DRC. Troops from Zimbabwe, however, were invited to stay by Kabila as a means of protecting him from the Rwandans that still maintain a presence in the DRC<sup>xxx</sup>. The Rwandan government is still committed to ensuring that any potential threat posed by the Interhamwe and other extremist Hutu elements in the DRC are neutralized.

Although massive killing still continues in the DRC, there have been numerous negotiations, mostly mediated by the government of South Africa, to reach a final settlement and fully realize peace in the DRC. On July 31, 2002, Joseph Kabila and Rwandan president, Paul Kagame, signed a bilateral accord to remove Rwandan troops from the eastern provinces, while Kabila’s government in Kinshasa has committed to disarming Hutu militia that were responsible for the 1994 Rwandan Genocide<sup>xxxi</sup>. In December of 2002, an accord was signed between the DRC and the rebel groups. A power sharing agreement was reached between Kabila and the MLC. The RCD-Goma had initially rejected the peace deals, but then signed on two weeks after the Kabila-MLC agreement was signed<sup>xxxii</sup>. The new agreement, known as the “All Inclusive Agreement,” signed in Pretoria, South Africa on December 17, 2002, endorsed by the UN to be enforced by MONUC, has created a framework for a power sharing government and a process toward democracy in twenty-four months. President Kabila will remain the head of State along with the position as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. There will also be four vice-presidents who will hold offices in various governmental

offices. A Political Commission will be headed by a representative of the RCD-Goma; the new Economic and Finance Commission will be headed up by a representative from the MLC; a representative from the government of the DRC will be head of the new Reconstruction and Development Commission; there will also be a Cultural Commission that will be headed by an opposition party within the DRC<sup>xxxiii</sup>.

#### **MONUC:**

The role of MONUC in this new peace process will be that of monitoring ceasefires and investigating human rights violations and violations of existing agreements. Much of this monitoring and investigating will take place in the eastern provinces where some the worst ethnic conflict, has taken place. The biggest challenge MONUC will face is not necessarily the aspects of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict but the issue of other ethnic conflicts that have emerged as a result of the Congolese Civil War, especially in the eastern provinces. MONUC is currently investigating violations of ceasefire agreements between the RCD-ML and the MLC, along with atrocities committed against an ethnic group known as the Nande in and around the town of Beni in the northeast of the country near the Ugandan border<sup>xxxiv</sup>. Also in the northeast in the Ituri region near the Ugandan border is the town of Bunia. RCD splinter groups backed by Rwanda have been fighting rebel groups backed by Uganda. What complicates matters even more is the escalation of fighting between the Lende and Hema ethnic groups. What had been a minor rivalry between the cattle-herding Hema and the subsistence farming Lendu in the Ituri has turned into a savage ethnic conflict. Uganda had originally allied with the Hema and created the Hema based Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) last year as a means of partnering with the Hema in Ituri for securing Ugandan business ventures in regards to mining the minerals there. In response to their land being exploited by Uganda, the UPC formed an alliance with Rwanda<sup>xxxv</sup>. Uganda retaliated by taking Lendu militia groups in allegiance with the RCD-ML and creating

an RCD-ML Lendu group to combat the UPC<sup>xxxvi</sup>.

The difficult situation that MONUC is in is that the Lendu Group of the RCD-ML and the UPC are not party to any ceasefire agreements within MONUC's mandate. In March of 2003, MONUC negotiated for Ugandan military forces to stay in Ituri for another month despite the fact that MONUC was to oversee the withdrawal of Ugandan forces from Ituri<sup>xxxvii</sup>. Since April of 2003, the Ugandan forces have officially withdrawn, leaving MONUC on its own in maintaining peace in the Ituri province.

In the northern and southern areas of the Kivu province on the DRC-Rwanda-Burundian border, Banyamulenge forces had mutinied against the Tutsi dominated Rwandan armies early in 2002. Some of these Banyamulenge forces have allied with Mayi-Mayi ethnic group against the Rwandan backed RCD-Goma. Hutu enclaves are also prominent in the Kivu province and only complicate the security situation in which MONUC must operate<sup>xxxviii</sup>.

#### **Current Inadequate Policy and a New Method for Intervention**

In order to bring lasting peace to the people of the DRC, the new government, along with the help of the international community, must use the variety of mineral and other natural resources with which DRC is endowed to promote the development of its people. The help that is required of the international community must go beyond the current scope of the limited mandates in which UN peacekeepers have to operate. If all peacekeepers can do is monitor adherence to the current accords and provide limited protection for civilians and aid projects, while the warring factions are able to continue to plunder resources and finance their activities, no one can expect a resolution to conflicts anytime soon. The only solution is a massive undertaking by the international community with flexible mandates to conduct operations in which they can seize control of the DRC's resources and redirect their usage toward

the human development of the people of the DRC. The problem with the above scenario is that the international community, acting through the United Nations, does not have a clear mandate within current legal frameworks to virtually invade the DRC and forcefully take control of the natural resources away from those who are using them to keep the conflicts alive. Although Article 1 of the United Nations Charter clearly explains the intentions of the UN to “take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression and other breaches of the peace;<sup>xxxix</sup>” it was mainly referring to threats and acts of aggression that would violate the sovereignty of a member state and not necessarily those threats brought on by civil wars in a post-colonial era. Nowhere do the words *intervention*, *civil conflicts*, or *peacekeeping*, appear in the UN Charter. The peacekeeping that has become the norm within the United Nations system has been utilized not to intervene or halt ongoing conflicts, but to maintain a security presence for the purpose of furthering negotiations and/or election monitoring after secession of a conflict<sup>xl</sup>.

The ethnic conflicts that go beyond the Rwandan Hutu-Tutsi conflict have made the task of bringing peace to the DRC only more difficult. Given its ethnic make-up, central geographical location, and surrounding by nine other African States, stability in the DRC is crucial for peace throughout the continent as well as success towards African regional integration. The DRC is potentially Africa’s greatest source of mineral wealth and hydroelectricity<sup>xli</sup>. These key areas must come under the control of a regional body with financial and logistical support of the international community.

The regional body that has the mandate to seize control of these resource sites is the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. Under the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, a flexible mandate is given to the regional body as to the manner in which they can address conflict. An African Standby Force

can intervene in situations of “grave circumstances” as determined by the Peace and Security Council or at the request of a member state. The Protocol also allows for the Peace and Security Council to dictate the rules of engagement or *modus operandi* on a case-by-case basis, given the nature of the intervention<sup>xlii</sup>. What makes the African Standby Force of the Peace and Security Council different from UN peacekeeping missions is a mandate which enables them to actively enforce peace as opposed to just monitoring and maintaining presence. However, the Protocol for the Peace and Security Council is new and the African Standby Force has yet to become operational. Their effectiveness cannot be achieved without direct financial and logistical support from the international community i.e. the United Nations system.

#### **African Muscle and World Bank Financing to Combat Civil Conflict**

The role for the international community, most notably the World Bank, in the operations of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union should be that of financial and logistical support for the operational undertakings of African Union peacekeeping missions and post conflict reconstruction initiatives. Chapter XIII of the United Nations Charter gives the Security Council the authority to utilize regional bodies for “enforcement action<sup>xliii</sup>.” Upon Security Council authorization, existing frameworks of the World Bank and all other relevant United Nations institutions for post-conflict reconstruction must be fully financed and work side-by-side with the African Union to ensure their successes. A well-equipped and well-financed African Standby Force must be prepared to enforce peace, and, if necessary, kill those who plunder the Congo’s resources. The World Bank and other relevant United Nations institutions can then securely take control of the resources and use them to finance reconstruction initiatives and social programs. The internal stability of the DRC will improve when the various factions have no source of illicit funds to purchase their weapons. If the weapons are rendered useless, then the combatants will only be more inclined to give them up and seek

assistance from the various reintegration programs offered by the UN and World Bank while keeping an African face on the process<sup>xliiv</sup>. The nature of these programs and disarmament initiatives should also have representation from the government of the DRC as a means of promoting the integrity of the state in the eyes of people and thereby begin the process of forging a national identity and creating a democratic society.

A similar process is already underway in the Republic of Chad. The World Bank has been financing a deal for Chad's oil resources to be developed with strict conditions as to how the revenues can be spent. Ten percent of royalties and dividends will be set aside in a trust for future generations; five percent will be dedicated to regional development in the oil producing area; eighty percent will be for education, health and social services, rural development, infrastructure and water management<sup>xliiv</sup>. The program in Chad is an ideal example of how resources should be used to assist a developing nation. The international community was able to negotiate with the government of a sovereign country as to how resources would be exploited and the manner in which the state's revenue would be used to promote the sustainable human development of its people.

### Conclusion

The tragedy of the DRC is that the state and international community do not have control of the resources. The resources are now in the hands of rebels and criminals who use the revenue to fill their pockets and victimize those who get in their way. Most people in the world understand that war, and especially civil war, is an ugly business. What the world now must come to realize is that maintaining peace and promoting development can be as equally ugly. Those who continue to commit destabilizing acts of violence must be faced with viable threats to their access to resources, as well as their lives. For the international community to use the DRC as a model for intervention and peace enforcement will not only help end Africa's most horrific conflict,

it will send a message that Africa and the international community as a whole will no longer tolerate the use of the world's resources for destructive purposes.

<sup>i</sup> CIA-The World Fact Book 2002, Congo, Democratic Republic of, [www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/cg.html](http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/cg.html)

<sup>ii</sup> The Economist *Congo's War: Waiting to be Rescued* May 17<sup>th</sup>-23<sup>rd</sup> 2003, p40.

<sup>iii</sup> The Economist *Peacekeeping in the Eastern Congo: High Expectations* September 6<sup>th</sup>-12<sup>th</sup> 2003 p42-43

<sup>iv</sup> Murdock, George Peter *Africa: Its Peoples and Their Culture History* McGraw-Hill Book Company New York, New York 1959 p350

<sup>v</sup> Taras, Raymond C. & Ganguly, Rajat *Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International Dimension* Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc. 2002 p228

<sup>vi</sup> Power, Samantha "A Problem From Hell" *America and the Age of Genocide* Basic Books, New York, New York 2002 p336

<sup>vii</sup> Gourevitch, Philip *We Wish To Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories From Rwanda* Farrar Straus and Giroux New York, New York 1998 p99-100.

<sup>viii</sup> Power, Samantha p329

<sup>ix</sup> Ibid p334

<sup>x</sup> Weinstein, Jeremy M. *Africa's Scramble for Africa': Lessons of a Continental War* World Policy Journal Summer 2000, vol. 17 issue 2 p11,

<sup>xi</sup> Orogun, Paul S. *Crisis of Government, Ethnic Schisms, Civil War, and Regional Destabilization of the Democratic Republic of Congo* World Affairs, Summer 2002, vol 165 issue 1, p26

<sup>xii</sup> Weinstein, Jeremy M. p3

<sup>xiii</sup> Orogun, Paul S. p27

<sup>xiv</sup> Europa p1183

<sup>xv</sup> Ibid p1183

<sup>xvi</sup> Weinstein, Jeremy p5

<sup>xvii</sup> Ibid p6

<sup>xviii</sup> Europa p1183

<sup>xix</sup> Orogun, Paul S. p31

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<sup>xxii</sup> Rotberg, Robert I. & Albaugh Ericka A. p.73.

<sup>xxiii</sup> Weinstein, Jeremy p4

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xxvii Europa p1184

xxviii New York Times *Congo Tires of War but the End is Not in Sight* July 7, 2002

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xxxi New York Times *Rwanda and Congo Sign Accord to End War* July 31, 2002

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xxxiii Thirteenth report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2003/211 sec II par 2

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xxxv The Economist March 29, 2003 *Peace, they say, but the killing goes on* pp41-42

xxxvi S/2003/211: *Report of the Secretary General* sec II par 9

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xxxviii The Economist July 6, 2002 pp43-45

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# **The United States' War on Cocaine and Prospects for Peace and Prosperity in the Andes**

**by Matthew Rhody**

## **Prelude**

The cocaine trade has plagued our hemisphere for three decades. It has fed mafia violence and revolutionary bloodshed in Latin America. The United States has also suffered from the crimes of the cocaine industry and the high rate of cocaine addicts. Out of concern for its drug problem, the United States has attacked cocaine production at its base: destroying coca fields and cocaine labs. Yet, while cocaine has done a lot of social damage to both producer countries and consumer countries, the coca leaf, from which cocaine is derived, has also provided an economic basis for many rural farmers in South America. In its efforts to eliminate cocaine production, the U.S. has provoked a lot of bitterness from the impoverished farmers who depend on coca for their income.

The past policies of the United States toward cocaine supplying countries have had limited success. At times, seemingly great achievements have later proven to simply displace the problem rather than eliminate it. The decrease of coca production in Bolivia led to new coca plantations springing up in Colombia. If the U.S. is to continue its campaign against cocaine, it is important to examine its tactics and consider whether the outcome is worth the cost, both for the United States and for the Andean countries.

## **The coca leaf**

In the United States, the mention of the coca plant implies cocaine. However, the use of coca is not restricted to cocaine, nor is the

cultivation of coca new to the world. Inhabitants of the Andes Mountains have chewed coca leaves for millennia. Coca chewing is still a traditional social

interaction among Andean people today. For people living at high altitudes, coca also serves as a mild stimulant that helps them deal with their harsh lifestyle. Just as workers in the United States are known to take coffee breaks or cigarette breaks, it is common for Andean workers to take breaks to chew coca for energy. Coca also serves to assuage hunger, thirst, and cold (Pacini et al., 8).

Coca is used for many medicinal folk remedies. Taken in several ways, it is said to be helpful for dysentery, stomach aches, indigestion, diarrhea, altitude sickness, headaches, toothaches, and many other ailments. Because of its close association with cocaine, however, Western scientists have not closely studied its medicinal properties. (Pacini et al., 8)

Indeed, it is coca's close association with cocaine that has brought a lot of frustration to *cocaleros* (coca farmers), as pressure has been placed on Andean countries to cut down on the traditional consumption and production of coca. In 1950, the UN began pressuring Andean countries to "limit the production of coca leaf to control its distribution and eradicate the practice of chewing it" (Pacini et al, 35). The UN wanted traditional coca chewing to be phased out by 1989 (Pacini et al, 35). However, not only have the governments of these countries not been effective in reducing coca chewing, but they have also had little success in the reduction of coca over-production.

## **Drug addiction in the U.S.**

The United States has been a major drug market since the 1980s. Most of the drugs produced in the Andean countries come into the United States. In 1999, 132,000 kilograms of cocaine were seized in the United States, and in 2000, the government seized 104,000 kilograms. The DEA

estimated that in 2002, almost 11 percent of the US population (over 24 million people) used illicit drugs. More than two thirds of the drug users were between the ages of 12 and 35. Today, cocaine's high availability renders it the biggest drug threat to the United States. There are over 3.3 million heavy cocaine users and almost 2.2 million light users in the country ("DEA national drug").

### **The U.S.'s reaction to the cocaine problem**

By the early 1980s, the United States was becoming aware of the cocaine problem. The government reacted by developing a political policy of "zero tolerance." The principle strategy was to focus on the countries where cocaine was produced, pressuring the armies (or the police, as in the case of Colombia) of those countries to crack down on production. The United States also demanded that criminals for drug-related offenses be extradited to the U.S. for trial. (Safford et al., 339-340) These policies, although clearly in the best interest of the United States, prompted resentment towards the U.S. and intensified the violence in Colombia as drug lords demonstrated their outrage.

Under the pressure of foreign powers, Andean countries have carried out coca eradication. Eradication has been achieved in two ways: by manually chopping the fields and by spraying herbicides from the air. Eradication by hand is dangerous because guerrillas defend the crops (in exchange for a protection tax, which they impose on the farmers). The U.S. has therefore encouraged and financed aerial spraying, which is a much safer method, at least for the eradicators. (Lee, 91) The use of herbicide, however, has been severely criticized for its deleterious effects on human health.

The demand for extradition of drug traffickers to the U.S. for trial was another unpopular policy that the U.S. adopted in the war on drugs. This policy provoked anti-U.S. nationalism, which drug-traffickers and guerrillas

have used as a lever ever since it was first implemented. Terrorists in Colombia went on a rampage at the threat of extradition, killing hundreds of witnesses, judges, and journalists. The murder only slowed down when extradition was prohibited in 1991. However, extradition reappeared in 1997 due to pressure from the U.S. (Safford et al., 340).

Many Andeans criticize the U.S. for being imperialistic in its anti-drug policies. They feel that the U.S. is blaming them for its own overindulgent nature. Also, Andean people believe that since the U.S. is the chief consumer of their drugs, the U.S. ought to be the one paying to fight the drug industry. U.S. aid to Andean countries is pivoted around the war on drugs. If those countries do not actively limit the drug market as the U.S. demands, the aid may be retracted, thus there is heavy pressure on those governments to seriously diminish drug production.

### **The coca lobby**

Although Andean nations try to comply with U.S. demands to curtail coca production, there is internal opposition that makes it difficult to do so. There is a strong coca lobby in Peru and Bolivia where coca chewing has been a tradition for millennia. Bolivia allows 12,000 hectares of coca to be grown legally for domestic use. In Peru, it is illegal to plant coca in new areas or revive abandoned coca fields, but existing coca plantations are permitted to be kept ("Peru coca survey," 6). *Cocaleros* in these countries are represented politically by labor unions and representatives from coca-growing regions (Lee, 55). Coca growing is not politically defended in Colombia, however, because with the exception of scattered Indian tribes, coca is not used traditionally. Therefore, since the 1970s, coca growing has been illegal in Colombia (Lee, 56). Nevertheless, guerrillas and paramilitary groups, both of which are financially based on coca production, make eradication a dangerous enterprise. Also, the methods of eradication have provoked

strong opposition that the government is forced to consider.

### **The coca lobby in Bolivia**

In Bolivia as of late, coca farmers have had a very large influence in politics. Evo Morales, the *cocaleros'* champion, came near to winning the presidential election in 2003 (Reed). "The coca leaf," Morales had said, "is our new national flag" (Padgett 2002). Due to successful eradication programs between 1997 and 2001, Bolivian coca production dropped from 33,800 hectares to 7,900 hectares ("UNODC," 1). It has been a prime example to Washington of the effectiveness of coca eradication. However, with the *cocaleros'* newly found voice, the ground gained may again be lost.

Although Morales lost the election, he is still a powerful figure. As President Carlos Mesa took office, Morales gave him stern warning that there had better be improvement in the plight of the coca farmers: "Within a month, he has to start giving some clear signs. If not, once again, the people will take to the streets" (Arrington). The issue of coca policies was partially involved in the chaos that forced President Gonzalo Sanchez to resign<sup>1</sup> after massive protests and 65 people were killed (Arrington).

Although coca is obviously used to make cocaine in Bolivia, the coca supporters claim that it is not drugs that they are fighting for. Morales even offered to create an anti-drug alliance, but he differentiates between coca and cocaine: "coca is not a drug within the Aymara and Quechua [indigenous] cultures." He insists that authorities should not target the *cocaleros*, but the big

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<sup>1</sup> Although the major issue that provoked protests was not coca, but the extraction of natural gas, the politics revolve around the concern that the rural poor are exploited. Evo Morales is the champion of the *cocaleros*, who feel ignored by the government. Thus the threat to oust a president on the basis of his coca policies is not to be taken lightly.

cocaine chiefs, some of whom are supposedly in Bolivia's Congress. Not only does Morales oppose eradication, but he says that Bolivia should work to increase the production for licit purposes like toothpaste, shampoo, and gum (Arrington). Even though the United States may threaten Bolivia with removing aid, the Bolivian government has little influence over the large number of coca growers, who set up road blocks and protest ("Bolivia may legalize").

### **The coca lobby in Peru**

In Peru, as in Bolivia, *cocaleros* have become very vocal in politics over the past two years. Fifteen-thousand coca farmers marched on Lima in 2003 to protest eradication. When police arrested one of the coca leaders for alleged terrorist connections in February, 2003, farmers saw it as an attempt to crack down on protests ("Peru arrests leader"). The people responded with an eighteen-day march on their capital to demand his release and an end to eradication. "We're not defending trafficking," said Nancy Obergon, the national leader of *cocaleros*, "we're defending our cultural heritage." Obergon admits that coca is used largely for cocaine, but she insists that to the rural poor of Peru, there are much larger problems. "We feel very badly about it because we don't like to see people destroyed by cocaine," she said, "But we also need opportunities to survive" ("Peruvian anger").

An opinion poll was recently conducted by the Peruvian newspaper *El Comercio* on whether coca cultivation should be stopped. Of those polled in the major cities, over 50 percent were in favor of a halt to coca farming. Forty-one point four percent agreed that coca should be combated with force, and 10.7 percent more thought it should be phased out by substitution of other crops. As to the use of cocaine, 54.3 percent felt that coca was used mostly to produce cocaine, but 23.9 percent believed that coca was employed for medicinal and traditional uses. When the poll was conducted in coca growing

regions, 55.7 percent were in favor of crop substitution, but only 15.4 percent felt that coca should be eradicated. A slight majority of urban dwellers may be against coca farming and rural people may seem willing to compromise, but the country overall is heavily divided on the issue (“Más de 50”).

### **The U.S. and the guerrillas**

Because coca farms and cocaine labs are often hidden deep in guerrilla territory, the U.S. is in danger of getting heavily involved in the guerrilla conflict. Guerrillas attack U.S. trained anti-narcotics battalions, whose objective is to eradicate crops and destroy laboratories, for “intruding.” Beyond threatening the guerrillas’ domain, anti-narcotics battalions destroy their source of income. Therefore, these units that are trained for the explicit purpose of fighting the drug war, also have to fight insurgents. Control over drug production can only come from gaining control over the producing regions. As a result, the U.S. is unable to separate the drug war from the guerrilla war; funding for anti-narcotics units is inevitably used to fight insurgents. (Robinson) [cf. Table I at end.]

### **Eradication in Bolivia**

Over the last seven years, the United States has invested \$1.3 billion<sup>2</sup> to eradicate illegal coca cultivation in Bolivia (“Bolivia may legalize”). With this support from the U.S., the Bolivian government had succeeded in destroying over 70 percent of the nation’s coca crop (Reed). However, as the political influence of the coca lobby grows, the U.S. fears that the years of effort will be wasted and Bolivia may become a major coca producer once again (“Bolivia may legalize”). Bolivia, which is considering altering its coca policy, risks losing part of \$159 million of aid that it receives annually from the US. The US also threatened to disallow Bolivia’s membership from the planned Free Trade Area of the Americas, an extension of NAFTA scheduled to be

completed in 2005 (“Bolivia may legalize”).

The main dispute centers on coca eradication in the Chapare region. Under U.S. pressure to limit coca production, Bolivia passed a law in 1988 that allowed no more than 12,000 hectares of coca cultivation in the region of Los Yungas and banned all coca growing in the Chapare region. The U.S. believes that all coca grown in Chapare is grown purely for the production of cocaine. These leaves have a higher alkaloid content which makes them more bitter than Los Yungas leaves. Therefore the US. claims that they are not “suitable for traditional use” (Reed). According to *cocalero* leaders, however, this assumption is completely false. Chapare leaves are sold throughout Bolivia, usually alongside Los Yungas coca, they say, because their lower quality makes them 40 percent cheaper. Chapare coca is an alternative that is bought widely by the poor (Reed).

Another fallacy that the U.S. is accused of is the claim that coca is not a viable export for Bolivia. The CIA, however, reported in 1999 that between 35 and 55 tons of coca are consumed annually in a traditional fashion in Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, and Argentina. Nevertheless, critics accuse the U.S. of denying this licit consumption (especially in Argentina) in order to justify its eradication policies (Reed).

The U.S. eradication effort, though seemingly successful, has aroused the *cocaleros*’ anger. Firefights often break out between the *cocaleros* and the U.S.-trained soldiers who carry out the eradication. The eradication unit has created a lot of bitterness towards the U.S., as the unit has been accused of killing *cocalero* leaders and depriving farmers of their means of existence. Due to the rising tension, the Bolivian government has said that it will no longer spray small coca farms, but only industrial-sized plantations. However, the U.S. is concerned that if the eradication effort fails in Bolivia, it

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<sup>2</sup> All dollar amounts are measured in U.S. currency.

may cause eradication failure elsewhere as well (Padgett 2002).

### **Eradication in Peru**

In Peru, the government continues to eradicate coca to fulfill its international obligations. The *cocaleros*, however, demand compensation. There are currently alternative development programs that are meant to allow *cocaleros* to turn from coca cultivation, but such programs will take time and money. Because of the deleterious effects of fumigation, coca eradication in Peru is carried out by manually uprooting the crops (Muller).

### **Eradication in Colombia**

Although the U.S. has had a great deal of success in eradication in Bolivia, such success has led to a steep increase of coca production in Colombia. As coca is eradicated in territory under government control, coca moves deeper into guerrilla territory (LaFranchi 2000). Hence, after a decade of eradication, the overall effect has merely been to move coca plantations into dangerous territory ("The United States and Colombia").

### **Problems with eradication**

Until the implementation of aerial spraying, eradication was carried out manually. It is a very big task to manually destroy fields of coca that are tucked away in the jungle. Hundreds of hired hands have to be flown in to uproot and destroy the plants. Because the coca fields are often protected by insurgent groups and angry *cocaleros*, the eradicators also need police protection. It is an expensive and dangerous process. Eradicating coca by airplane seems like a much safer and cost-efficient technique, but there is a reverse side to the coin ("Peruvian anger," "Country Profile Peru," 29-30). Although crop spraying is a safer method for the eradicators, it is harmful to the farmers. When the herbicide is sprayed from the air, about 41 percent misses its target (in strong winds, as much as 85 percent can miss). As a result, crop sprayers not only kill coca, but also whatever food crops are in the

vicinity. Fr. Alfonso Palacios, an apostolic vicar of Putumayo (a coca-growing region), said, "[Eradicators] sprayed 30,000 hectares, but no more than 10 percent of that was planted in coca." Farmers who had food crops sprayed reported an estimated loss of up to 90 percent. Moreover, according to Palacios and Catholic bishops, coca farmers protected their coca against the herbicide by covering it with tents and spraying it with molasses (Saavedra).

Crop sprayers use the herbicide Roundup Ultra, which has proven to be harmful to humans. Biologist Elsa Nivia, executive director of Rapalmira Colombia (a branch of the international Pesticide Action Network) concluded that the high toxicity of the herbicide makes it hazardous to health in a concentration of one percent (as is common in the U.S.). In Colombia, eradicators spray a concentration of 26 percent. In Putumayo, police reported that the herbicide affected 4,289 people, 178,377 animals and 7,252 hectares of crops (licit and illicit) in 2001. People suffered from chemical poisoning, rashes, vomiting, headaches, and diarrhea (Saavedra).

In 2001, a complaint was filed by the Organization of Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon over crop spraying's deleterious effects on health and the environment. The Civil Court Judge ordered a stop to drug crop spraying at their request. However, after the U.S. ambassador threatened to repeal U.S. aid, the spraying was resumed only two and a half weeks after its cessation (Saavedra).

In June, 2003, the administrative tribunal of Cundinamarca ordered a halt to crop spraying in order to study its effects on health and the environment. However, the government said it would appeal the ruling. President Alvaro Uribe had said that he would increase the spraying of drug crops over this year in his effort to decrease the financial basis of the guerrilla factions. Until the Colombian government has a chance to appeal,

they plan to continue spraying. “We respect the ruling,” said Agriculture Minister Carlos Gustavo, “but we don’t agree with it” (“Court halts”).

Abelardo Saez, a leader of the farmers in Sucumbios, Colombia, who had been exposed to the herbicide, complained that nobody is willing to listen to their problems: “Neither the Health Ministry nor the Agriculture Ministry nor the military has wanted to listen.” Their problem is serious, though, and they want the government to make amends. “I want reparation for the damages and harm this has caused us,” Saez said, “for our children’s illnesses, for our burned crops, for our dead animals. We don’t want [the government] to improve our income; we just want it to let us survive. We don’t want to pay for something we haven’t done” (Saavedra).

The U.S., however, remains skeptical about the complaints, and continues to encourage crop spraying. The U.S. State Department said, “We believe that the illegal armed forces are the source of many of the complaints [having to do with health effects of the spraying]” (Saavedra). Since those groups make money from protecting the illegal crops, it seems logical to the U.S. that they would incite the people to oppose the spraying. Roger Noriega, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere affairs, insisted that *cocalero* anger against the United States is misdirected:

It's very clear to me that farmers of coca, both in Peru and Bolivia, are manipulated by others who have a broader ideological agenda - and just as importantly, by those who have greed as a motive ... These people want to use these *cocalero* farmers as shock troops to sow chaos in a country so they can continue to carry out their deadly criminal enterprises. (“Peruvian anger”)

Nevertheless, Roger Noriega acknowledged the plight of the poor farmers:

Most Peruvian farmers don't want to be on the wrong side of the law ... Their interests are to generate enough income to feed their families. We just need frankly to do a better job - both the Peruvian and U.S.

Government - in helping farmers find a legal way to make a living (“Peruvian anger”).

### **Poverty**

My father recently visited a small village high in mountains of Peru. Being in such a remote area, the people get most of what they need by trading with each other, but even in those isolated parts it is extremely difficult to live without a source of monetary income. However, their options are limited when it comes to making money. “The people plant a field of potatoes,” one *campesino* told my father, “and no one comes to buy them. They plant corn, and they cannot take it to market. But if they plant coca, the buyers come, not only with cash, but with American dollars.”

The main problem with coca eradication programs is that coca is the basis of subsistence for many rural poor in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. Evo Morales argues that the eradication programs in Bolivia have left thousands without a source of income (Arrington). “Without the coca,” said one *cocalera*, “we can’t have a life here” (Padgett 1999). Farmers grow coca out of economic necessity; it is by far the most profitable crop. Because coca can be harvested up to four times per year, has a light weight that renders transportation easy, and has a high market value, coca can bring them as much as ten times more profit than alternate crops (Reed). To people who are already very poor, giving up a profitable crop for a less profitable crop is asking too much.

The United States has tried to provide alternate crops like bananas and coffee, but as of late these markets have been depressed (Padgett 2002). In Colombia, falling coffee prices have driven thousands of farmers into coca farming ("The United States and Colombia"). The main reason that coca is so valuable is because it goes primarily for the production of cocaine, even in Bolivia and Peru where there are licit purposes for coca as well. Nevertheless, the drug war is not a top priority for the rural poor. "We're aware that the scourge of the world is narco-trafficking," said Nancy Obergon, "But for us the scourge is hunger" ("Peruvian anger").

Poverty in Colombian urban centers has also been affected by the drug-trade. In Medellin, Colombia, where decline in manufacturing increased unemployment, many impoverished people took jobs in the drug-trade (Safford et al., 361-362). Poverty was further aggravated in Colombian cities as drug lords brought in large amounts of money, raising land prices and widening the gap between the rich and the poor (Safford et al., 316).

### **Effects on the economy**

#### **In Colombia**

The international drug trade has greatly affected the economies of the Andean countries. It is estimated that between 1980 and 1995, illicit drugs brought \$36 billion into Colombia, bringing in more income than coffee or oil (Safford et al., 315). But illegal markets do not make economies thrive. There has been a lot of uncertainty as to exactly how intertwined Colombia's economy is with the international drug trade. In order to distinguish fact from fiction, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime conducted a study a few years ago. The study showed that as of 1998, 93,000 hectares were currently under cultivation for the production of illicit crops in Colombia (including coca, marijuana, and opium poppy). The drug-trade provided an estimated

69,000 jobs, which amounted to 2 percent of all agrarian employment. About 4.4 million hectares of land (worth \$2.4 billion) are owned by narco-traffickers, who have repatriated \$23 billion between 1982 and 1998 (Rocha).

The amount of money that drug traffickers have repatriated averages out to about 3 percent of the GDP. In years past, the contribution of narco-dollars has equaled up to over 6 percent of the annual GDP, but as of 1998 it was leveling off at 2.3 percent of the GDP. Nevertheless, drug money has done little to promote economic prosperity in Colombia because most of the money is lavishly spent by the traffickers (Rocha).

Narco-dollars have kept down the cost of the U.S. dollar to the Colombian peso. At first this may seem good for the Colombian economy, but the lowered price of the dollar increases the amounts of foreign imports which weakens Colombian industries. The laundering of drug money, which is commonly accomplished through contraband imports, also hurts domestic industry (Safford et al., 315).

#### **In Peru**

In Peru, as in Colombia, it is difficult to measure the effect that the drug-trade has on the economy, but it is estimated that drugs have brought in between \$300-\$600 million. 200,000 people are employed in cultivation, refinement, and distribution of illegal cocaine. The swamping of banks with narco-dollars contributes to the higher exchange rate of the *sol* (Peruvian currency), thereby creating opportunities for money laundering. ("Economy of Peru")

#### **In Bolivia**

The cocaine industry has had an enormous impact on the economy in Bolivia. At its height in 1988, coca and cocaine were worth the equivalent of 9.2 percent of the GDP (\$461 million) and represented 87.3 percent compared to legal exports. With the fight against drugs that Bolivia has implemented, cocaine dropped to 3.9 percent of the

GDP in 1997, and in 2001 it was down to 1.1 percent and represented only 3 percent of the legal exports. Before 1997, 67,000 people were employed in the coca/cocaine industry, but by 2002, only 40,000 people were involved. ("Country Profile Bolivia," 10) Although the effect of cocaine on the Bolivian economy may be decreasing, it is by no means a negligible part of the economy.

### **The Andean Regional Initiative**

The concerns of the Andean countries must be dealt with in order to combat the drug trade and promote international stability. Therefore, the U.S. annually sends money in what is called the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) to seven Andean countries to counter drug traffic and guerrillas, and improve social and economic conditions. Between 2000 and 2003, the U.S. has sent over \$3 billion under the ARI to Colombia, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Because the stability of Colombia affects the entire region, almost half of the money goes to neighboring countries that experience spillover effects (Storrs et al., ii).

For FY 2004, the Administration of the United States has requested a total of \$990.7 million in foreign aid to the seven countries of the Andean region. Most of this money (\$860.8 million) would go to Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, the biggest drug producers in South America. Over half (\$573 million) is requested for Colombia. The money given to Colombia is divided between improving the military and police force and providing alternative development for *cocaleros*. \$423 million is given to Colombia to provide aviation support for eradicators, fund the counter-drug brigade, improve the military, and fund national police programs. \$150 million of the allotted money is meant to support democracy, encourage alternative development, promote human rights, improve the justice system, increase government presence in areas of conflict, and assist vulnerable groups (Storrs et al., 41).

The Administration has requested \$159 million for Peru, which is also broken up between alternative development and eradication programs. \$50 million is to promote alternative development. Interdiction and military-strengthening programs are to be given \$68 million. The rest (\$41 million) will go towards development, child survival and health programs, and economic support (Storrs et al., 41).

In Bolivia, the United States is planning to invest \$128.8 million to create a more stable country. \$53 million is budgeted to suppress the drug production and improve the military. \$42 million will be used to assist farmers in alternative production. The remainder (\$33.8 million) will fund economic development and health programs (Storrs et al., 41).

Although these figures show that the United States is concerned about improving the situation of the poor in these countries, the bulk of the aid goes towards actively fighting the drug war. [Cf. Table II at end.]

### **What is Next?**

The Andean nations are in great need of more stable economies and more developed infrastructures. The U.S. has not forgotten this, and sends a large amount of money every year to improve social conditions in these countries. However, the U.S. still focuses primarily on the police aspect of the drug war. As history demonstrates, where there is poverty and suppression, there will be crime. Therefore, the U.S. should spend less on military goals and focus more on promoting stable societies.

If the U.S. focuses only on curtailing drug production, the effort will be wasted. As long as there is a market for cocaine in the United States, cocaine laboratories and coca farms will spring up in Latin America. To suppress them in one spot will only force the coca plantations to move. If, however, the United States remembers the importance of promoting democracy

and improving social conditions, then its efforts will not be in vain, even if drug production does not decline (“Uncle Sam”). Even if cocaine continues to slip through U.S. borders, creating stronger economies in South America will lessen their dependence on drug production, thereby reducing the number of poor turning to coca farming.

Another issue that must be addressed is that coca eradication may be doing more damage than good. By spraying crops, the Colombian and Bolivian governments (with U.S. support) are harming many of their citizens economically. This is counterproductive for countries that desperately need to improve their rural economies. In spite of the difficulty in carrying out manual eradication, it is preferable to aerial spraying. At least there would be discrimination as to what crops are destroyed and who is affected (“Uncle Sam”). In its policies with these countries, the U.S. should not emphasize eradicating coca above health and reducing poverty.

The drug war is especially complicated in Colombia. The various terrorist organizations threaten to divide the nation, and thereby destabilize the entire region. While such an extreme scenario may not be imminent, the lack of stability in Colombia still has adverse effects on its neighboring countries. Guerrillas and paramilitaries penetrate the borders into neighboring countries where they kidnap people for ransom, exchange fire with the militaries, and smuggle drugs and arms. As a result, relations between Colombia and its neighbors are often strained. Left unchecked, Colombian insurgents could cause a regional destabilization. A conclusion to the drug war in Colombia and an end to the Colombian civil war both depend on Colombia gaining control over its territory.

The importance of the military should not be underestimated. Securing guerrilla-controlled territory could come about either through negotiation or through military

strength. Achieving an agreement with the guerrillas is by no means simple. Former President Pastrana created an area of sanctuary for the guerrilla organization FARC (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in hopes that it would cause them to be more willing to negotiate. FARC, however, responded by intensifying its activities when the government forces were removed. Pastrana ordered the military to retake the area and the peace talks were terminated. President Uribe, who came after Pastrana, declared that he would only negotiate with armed groups who agreed to “give up terrorism and agree to a cease-fire;” thus provoking a violent rampage from FARC (Storrs et al., 9-10). If FARC will not compromise for anything less than power over the region, as they have indicated, then they must be weakened to a point where they are forced to negotiate (Robinson). However, to overthrow an insurgency that has been entrenched for thirty years will take an enormous amount of military power. Unless foreign countries are willing to contribute a lot of money and troops, negotiation has a better chance of seeing results than military might.

Terrorism is also a threat in Peru. Although the power of the guerrillas was broken during Fujimori’s crackdown, propaganda and symbolic acts of violence let people know that they are still there. The Sendero Luminoso gained some rural support in coca-growing regions during the political turmoil in 2001 and 2002. For this reason, the issue of coca farming must be handled with caution. If the needs of the *cocaleros* are overlooked, their frustration could fuel another conflict.

Unfortunately, there is no cheap and easy solution to the cocaine dilemma. Improving one thing worsens another. Destroying coca hurts poor farmers. Increasing development funding detracts from the military. The United States must remember to prioritize when it fights the drug war abroad. To the coca farmers in the

Andes, the greater evil is poverty and hunger, and these needs cannot be

ignored for the sake of reducing cocaine addiction in the U.S.

Table I

**Coca Eradication**

<i>Coca Eradication (in hectares)</i>								
<b>Year</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>
<b>Bolivia</b>	5,493	7,512	7,026	11,621	16,999	7,953	9,435	11,848
<b>Peru</b>	-	-	1,300	3,500	7,800	14,700	6,200	6,400
<b>Colombia</b>	23,915	18,519	41,861	66,029	43,111	58,073	94,153	130,364


Source: "Country Profile Bolivia," 12; "Country Profile Peru," 12 and 14; "Country Profile Colombia," 13

Table II

<i>FY2004 Request for the Andean Regional Initiative (in millions of dollars)</i>			
<b>Country</b>	<b>Economic/ Social/ Governance</b>	<b>Counter-narcotics/ Security</b>	<b>Total FY2004 Request</b>
<b>Colombia</b>	150.0	423.0	573.0
<b>Peru</b>	91.0	68.0	128.8
<b>Bolivia</b>	75.8	53.0	159.0
<b>Total (for 7 Andean countries)</b>	383.2	602.5	990.7

Source: Storrs et al., 41

**Destination of Coca Produced in Peru**



Source: "Más de 50%"



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**Matthew Rhody is a student at Ripon College in Wisconsin.**

**PALESTINIAN-AMERICAN JOURNAL**  
**By Lisa Saleh**

**Jethro the Arab**

Jethro the Arab,  
a tall man  
with a bushy  
moustache  
and a  
Stetson hat.

His father born  
in the city where  
a star appeared  
above a manger.

Jethro's son  
was delivered  
next door, to the  
Rodeo Hall of Fame.

He was born Jamal.  
They changed his name  
when he came over here.

Jethro drives  
a Bronco  
worry beads  
hang from  
the rear view mirror.

Cowboy boots to work  
sandals at his house  
favorite meal  
hummus spiced  
with jalapenos.

"Jethro, man  
where are you from?"

"Palestine."  
And he is.

**Rana**

Brown eyes,  
black braid to her waist.  
Opposite of the Scandinavian  
Inger, Olga, and Heidi.

Fleeing her home land,

for security  
freedom  
and education.

Growing up in a Moslem Nation.  
No beer, no whiskey, no wine.  
Arriving in the frozen tundra,  
ice fishing shacks stocked  
with cold beer and  
warm Packer fans

She drank for the first time.  
She had sex for the first time.  
She became a living oxymoron.

Pregnant Palestinian girl.  
Her father in the homeland was never  
told.

Her mother cried for weeks,  
her uncle no longer talked,  
he no longer smiled,  
her cousins avoided her.

When labor began,  
her uncle got up and held her.  
He guided her to the car.  
Her baby girl screamed,  
Her mother wailed.  
There were no gifts for the baby,  
no last name given and  
no visits.

Rana returned to college,  
her baby stayed behind.

**Half Breed**

Always a half,  
never a whole.  
Always a part,  
never an entire  
...thing.

Questioning,  
worth,  
place,  
ethnicity  
...culture.

Children born to bring a  
family closer  
separate them even more.

What language do they speak?

Neither.

What name do they bear?

Neither.

Who do they look like?

Neither.

Where does a half-breed belong?

No where.

You'd think this child has two cultures,

But, they believe they have none.

Trying to fit in,  
at school,  
at home,  
with friends,  
with themselves,  
...any where.

So desperately trying to survive their  
childhood,  
they create a cumbersome cocoon.  
Metamorphosing,  
into their own  
distinctive  
...self.

Patience and discovery  
crack away at a  
casing  
spreading wings  
of fortitude and  
...strength.

A combination of  
values,  
ethnicity,  
cuisine,  
and  
... love.

Cherished,  
by both sides.  
Learning to stir  
spices from  
half of this  
to half of that  
to  
create  
an

entire  
whole  
unique  
...being.

### **The Olive Seed**

The Olive Seed,  
both potent and durable  
strengthens through its  
smoldering heat  
crushed seed,  
heats the taboo  
Taita Nour's black office  
four walls lined with benches  
women sit and chat  
loaves of bread dough  
carried in on their heads  
now, resting on the floor  
gossiping, cheering, and trading  
they cook as they talk freely  
mornings are made for women  
above the entrance are my Father's  
initials  
he built this space for his Mother  
now his daughters cook  
there with her  
dough coated in zait and zatar  
onions  
cooked on  
rocks  
covering a heated resin  
an ancient cooking tool  
Taita tosses the dough  
she says to be free you must be fed  
to feed an Arab you need only  
a rock,  
dough,  
and of course, an  
olive seed  
she knows this to be true,  
she's tested it thoroughly  
Turks,  
Englishmen,  
now Jews  
all who have come and said this land is  
theirs  
but here in this place  
she knows  
this spot  
is hers.

### **With An Eagle's Strength**

Arabic has never been the language of  
my dreams  
my skin and hair drained of their olive  
skin origin  
taking my first steps into my Father's  
homeland  
I carry with me only his name,  
and a passport embossed in pride of the  
soaring eagle

My journey begins at a bridge  
I'm separated  
my eagle caged  
alone, with an enemy I have never met  
experiencing for the first time  
someone else's hands on my naked  
body

She holds a gun  
our eyes lock  
exchanging the hatred of our ancestors  
I yearn to spit my objections into her  
face  
she senses this

Sneering,  
she knocks my knees apart with the  
butt of her rifle  
I think of my Taita  
a living photograph who awaits me  
behind the guarded door  
I keep silent  
endure

Awakened by a single loud knock  
two military trucks  
outside our door  
soldiers enter  
yelling in a language that  
I alone cannot understand

Chaos  
Guns

Moussa, my age  
dragged across the floor  
his Mother runs to him  
kisses him  
begs  
take me  
he's just a boy  
A black-laced boot  
ends her cries

silencing the room  
eagle is knocked out of the sky  
tossed aside  
and ground into the floor

A fortnight passes  
my journey's end is near  
Moussa  
beaten, swollen, bruised  
collapses in the street  
he says the talons of my nation  
have shred his hopes

I take his hand,  
together we travel back over the bridge  
leaving my Father's land

A tethered bird perched upon my soul  
part of me is ashamed  
remaining still, and claim it as my own  
knowing that now,  
it too, carries my Father's name.

### **Accidental Genocide**

Israeli,  
we think it means  
chosen people.  
But, it really means  
Warrior of God.

Are we not all warriors of God?  
Are we not all then Israelis?  
The Armenians, Christians,  
Moslems, and Jews.  
Aren't they one in the same,  
by the simple definition of the  
title?

Palestinian flag,  
Believe to be a terrorist symbol.  
Not so. Those who believe this  
do not know that its colors are well  
chosen.  
Green for the valleys.  
Black for the wars.  
Red for all the unnecessary death,  
and white for peace.  
That must come.

Silent,  
naked,  
Side by side.  
No one can tell

the enemies apart.  
The Olive skin,  
black hair,  
or their pride.

Both fight.  
For land,  
their God,  
each says they fight for truth.

The struggle is over  
And the terror has begun.  
The abused child,  
is now the violent parent.

Striking,  
venomously, planned  
and at random.  
Leaving the other  
weak,  
wounded,  
cries unheard.

Buildings fall.  
Children die.  
Terror reigns,  
in all domains.

Who will be left?  
After the struggle,  
To crawl out from  
under the rubble.

A choking hold  
is killing  
an entire culture.  
The media  
are exploiting  
the demise of an entire race.

No longer are there weddings,  
backgammon games are gone.  
Olive trees bulldozed under.  
A search for food,  
for heat,  
a daily struggle  
To find one meal.  
To feed,  
to nourish,  
enough  
to leave.

Fleeing to other lands,  
children born into foreign hands.  
Languages lost,

homeland forgotten,  
fewer and fewer,  
wish to stay.  
The cause is now to just  
get away.

The damage that is being done;  
The deaths, the innocents dying,  
the terror and the fear,  
In the end, whose God  
will have won?

Are we prepared?  
For when the dust is settled,  
the last bullet fired,  
and building crumbled.  
When we go to tally up  
the Palestinians  
to find  
that no one  
remains.

### **When We Had Peace**

When we had peace,  
the symbols of two  
great religions  
both made of  
stone  
stood side by side  
and neither group  
questioned the other's  
location  
or  
existence.

When we had peace,  
we ate the same meals  
shared the same villages  
walked all streets  
together,  
in stride.

When we had peace,  
we both agreed  
on certain values  
and that on some occasions  
we each had to step aside.

When we had peace,  
we spoke at wells together,  
shared some schools,  
and agreed to follow  
basic rules.

When we had peace,  
we both wanted it  
and we never questioned  
that we could exist  
in any other way.

**Lisa Nora Saleh was born during the first Earth Day celebration in Boston, Massachusetts on April 22, 1970 to an Irish mother and a liberal Palestinian father. The influence of these two culturally diverse role models added much humor and depth to her life. She grew up in Wisconsin. After studying social and political theory at colleges and universities in the United States and Europe, she worked as a sheepherder, a magician's assistant, and a wine maker. When she's not traveling, she resides in Ashland, Oregon.**

## POETRY

### **Operation Uphold Democracy—The Court Martial of Capt. Lawrence Rockwood By Jean Maria Arrigo & John Fielding Crigler, III**

I.

"Returning democracy to Haiti  
is not worth one American life."  
The broadcast of Senator Dole  
is the last word he hears  
as he boards the plane to Haiti  
in September of '94.  
*One gate closes.*

The CIA people had started  
an anti-Aristide movement  
that turned into death squads.  
We have already gone too far  
to become innocent in this place.  
*Another gate closes.*

We have racism here,  
even among U.S. soldiers  
of African descent  
because these people  
are The Other.  
*Another gate closes.*

Capt. Lawrence Rockwood,  
head of counterintelligence,  
his Haitian informants murdered....  
His superior officer,  
staff command chaplain,  
Judge Advocate's Office,  
Inspector General,  
police escort, all decline to become  
involved in Haitian-on-Haitian violence.  
"It's on my plate," he says.  
*Now all gates close.*

II.

*One gate opens,*  
from the mind of Capt. Rockwood direct  
to political prisoners squeezed into cells—  
persons identical to himself—  
in the National Penitentiary,  
standing in their feces,  
until their feet rot off.

Rifle in hand,

he arrives alone,  
asks the warden for names,  
is rebuffed, is delayed,  
is taken away  
by a U.S. military attaché.

In the middle of the night,  
his subordinates arrayed:  
"This officer is being arrested;  
this officer is not to be obeyed."  
Captain Lawrence Rockwood,  
fourth generation U.S. Army,  
court martialed and convicted  
for insubordination.  
*The gate closes hard.*

III.

*He storms the gate.*  
"It's not that they are bad human rights  
abusers.  
It's that they are bad soldiers!"—Yet  
he says he fails as staff officer,  
and his march to the prison saves no one.  
*The gate holds strong.*

*It opens a crack!*

He has a dream, at least once a week:  
"They decide to let me come back  
as a private. I'm mopping the floors.  
I accept the deal. I'm content."

IV.

*Rockwood looks back  
at the Gates of Haiti.*  
"The day that I went to the prison—  
meditation, fire puja, action—  
the day that I went to the prison  
I was a better Buddhist  
than I am now."

**Jean Maria Arrigo**, Ph.D., is a social psychologist whose research focuses on ethics of political and military intelligence. In January, 2004, she presented case histories of spiritually devastated covert operators to the U.S. Army TRADOC Chaplain Service School Instructor Training Workshop. Her "Utilitarian Argument

against Torture Interrogation of Terrorists" is available at the web site of the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics [<http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE03/Arrigo03.html>]. "Operation Uphold Democracy" derives from her recent interviews with Capt. Lawrence Rockwood and is published with his permission.

**John Fielding Crigler, III**, graduated from Berkeley College of Music with a major in music composition. In recent years he has composed and performed music and song for theater events at academic conferences and universities, including Arrigo's *Redemption from Black Operations* at the University of Virginia and Carnegie Mellon University in 2001, and for modern dance performances, including *The Docent* at the Museum of Modern Art in Los Angeles in 2003. The present poem serves as text for his "Lament for Capt. Rockwood," which he performed at the May 2004 meeting of the Southwest Oral History Association in San Diego, CA.

**Why We Fight: Practices for Lasting Peace by Pandit Rajmani Tigunait, Ph.D., Himalayan Institute Press, 1999, 2003, 97 pages**

**Reviewed by Michael A. Ketterhagen**

According to the tradition of yoga, the cause of war is within.

"At the collective level we are addicted to wars, riots, political upheavals, and religious crusades," says Pandit Rajmani Tigunait, Ph.D., in his revised edition of Yoga on War and Peace, now retitled as Why We Fight: Practices for Lasting Peace.

Although we are addicted as a society to war, the real causes "lie rooted in the unwillingness to listen to the voice of the heart, the inner conscience." We have learned the practice of "killing the conscience," Tigunait says, which is detailed in the yogic scriptures, the Bhagavad Gita, The Yoga Sutras, and the Upanishads. Tigunait explains in this short, clearly-written book how violence originates with the basic unit of society.

We have forgotten or moved away from understanding the true self called the *atman*. This true self is divine, infinite, and perfect. We are caught up in the trivial sense of the ego's "I-am-ness." We are stuck in the idea of "I am good," "I am bad," "I am Christian," "I am American," "I am Jewish," "I am Palestinian." All of these identifications with the superficial self create poverty, vanity, and a sense of emptiness that makes us greedy, fearful, and desirous of fame, wealth, and power. These desires, catapulted by the perceived need for self-preservation push us to fight any idea, nation, people who threaten that identity and its sense of security.

Tigunait critically analyzes our present state of affairs, and offers the wisdom of yoga as the solution to the present problem, the division between our physical and spiritual selves. We must transform ourselves into people of compassion, love, and nonviolence. Tigunait offers us a way to prepare for this transformation by asserting that

nonviolence is the only way to true peace in the world. This method of nonviolence, called *ahimsa* in Sanskrit, moves the individual to a spiritual state that enables each individual to bring the world to a state of peace and justice.

However, nonviolence demands preparation. According to yoga, "it requires the proper mental state, for it is impossible to practice nonviolence with a disturbed mind." Tigunait says that contemplating eight steps will bring the disturbed mind to calm and peace. Those eight steps--right thought, right resolve, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right meditation--are also the basis of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism. "This eightfold path of contemplation, which culminates in meditation on Truth, makes the mind one-pointed and purifies the heart, filling it with love and compassion." It follows then that when the individual becomes rooted in the principle of nonviolence, society will no longer be governed by fear and greed.

This meditative practice prepares the mind for the real contemplation of *ahimsa*, which is defined as "non-hurting, non-killing, non-damaging." *Ahimsa* means non-harmfulness at every level of existence. Tigunait explores, in detail, the roots of this antidote to war by explaining nine contemplative practices which uproot the four subtle causes of fear and worry. The four animal urges of self-preservation, food, sleep, and sex lie within the human and drive the human to act in non-human ways. The process of taming and training the animal within the human is the practice of nonviolence. This practice alleviates the fear of death within the human by moving the human beyond attachment and aversion.

These nine contemplative practices are:

1. **Nurture your conscience.**  
When we do things we do not want to do and postpone the things we do want to do, we kill our conscience. This process sets up an internal battle, creating much confusion on the subtle and eventually the external level.
2. **Cultivate tolerance.**  
Condemning the lifestyle and practices of another person creates separations and mistrust among people. Judging others by our standards and cultural mores is a mistake.
3. **Be nonjudgmental, refrain from labeling others.**  
"Violence has its roots in prejudice and the habit of creating labels," Tigunait says. When one group dehumanizes another with demeaning labels, war is close at hand.
4. **Remember the lessons from past events, not the horrors.**  
When we concentrate on the negative events of history and remember the past injustices, we often desire to get even, and make things "right" again. This starts of the cycle of violence all over again.
5. **Cultivate the higher values of love, compassion and nonviolence.**  
Every culture values love, compassion, and nonviolence. They are universal and supersede all the others. Focusing on one's likes and dislikes, one's attractions and aversions obscure these higher values.
6. **Remember that all entities are interdependent.**  
"All beings, including all humans, are interconnected at one level or another." Even though we experience ourselves as independent, there is a deeper interdependence that supports all life.
7. **Remember there is only one life force.**  
"All sentient beings need food, air, water, light, and heat, but these elements have no preferences about whom they nourish." They simply serve as the common vehicles of life energy, creating a subtle bond among all forms of life.
8. **Know that hurting anyone means hurting God.**

All religious traditions teach that humans are children of God. They also teach that hurting a child of God is hurting the creator.

9. **Honor divine law.**

"Most of our troubles arise when we believe that the performance of our duty requires us to interfere with others who are also performing their duties."

This is very difficult to work through and often needs the higher wisdom of the Divinity within to sort out the proper selfless, compassionate action.

After mentioning what we need to do to prevent war, Tigunait outlines the yogic answer to the situation when war is inevitable. After stating International Law's consensus regarding the principles of a just war, namely, declared as a last resort by a legitimate authority and only supporting a just cause, he retells the conversation between Arjuna and Krishna in the Bhagavad Gita. This conversation is the classic answer of performing one's duty to preserve the freedom and dignity of the human race by engaging in all out destruction of the enemy. Tigunait deals with the paradox of this entire argument and follows it up with the tasks and responsibilities of the winner after the fighting ceases.

The book closes with an extensive collection of prayers and sayings from numerous religious and spiritual traditions. These are enlightening, uplifting, and very concrete affirmations of the necessary thought patterns for the existence of lasting peace. This little book offers much material for every person concerned about violence. The reader will be challenged and pleased.

**Michael A. Ketterhagen is Associate Professor of Theology at Marian College and founder of the Fond du Lac Center for Spirituality and Healing in Fond du Lac, Wisconsin.**

**Full Spectrum Dominance: U.S. Power in Iraq and Beyond  
by Rahul Mahajan, Seven Stories Press, New York, 2003,  
\$9.95, Paperback.**

**Reviewed by David Michael Smith**

This book provides a critical analysis of the Bush Administration's "war on terrorism" and invasion of Iraq. In his first book, The New Crusade, Mahajan challenged the U.S. war against Afghanistan, the expansion of the U.S. military presence in Central Asia, and the official rationale for a wide-ranging "war on terrorism." In Full Spectrum Dominance, the author develops a compelling case for the proposition that the Bush Administration is exploiting the tragedy of September 11, 2001 in order to legitimize a new era of U.S. imperialism. The author also presents a persuasive critique of the conquest of Iraq and the lies and distortions used to justify this pre-emptive war to the U.S. people.

Mahajan acknowledges that U.S. imperialism has a very long history, and he observes that the Clinton Administration "prefigured" the new imperialism through increased military spending, the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the attack on Iraq in 1998, and the war on Yugoslavia in 1999 (pp.181-182). But the author argues here, as he did in his first book, that "The world changed on September 11" (p.31). In his view, a "fundamental shift in world events" has begun to occur since then, not so much because of the horrendous attacks on that day but because of "the response launched by the U.S. government—the so-called 'war on terrorism'" (p.31).

As Mahajan sees it, "The 'war on terrorism' is not a war on terrorism" (p.32). By this, he means that the Bush Administration's resort to military action in Afghanistan, Iraq, and possibly other countries in the future is likely to exacerbate, not reduce, the threat of violence against the U.S. and allied countries. The author criticizes

the President and his subordinates for eschewing diplomatic efforts to bring Osama Bin Laden to trial, for causing widespread civilian deaths in the Afghanistan war, for waging a campaign of repression against Muslims in the U.S., and for not significantly improving airport security here.

Mahajan marshals considerable evidence to show that the Administration's talk about the "war on terrorism" is primarily a "rhetorical justification for militaristic solutions" (p.41). The author traces the origins of President George W. Bush's emerging foreign policy to the "Defense Planning Guidance" document written by then-Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and his colleague Lewis Libby during the first Bush Administration in 1992. This document argued explicitly for what Mahajan calls "unilateral military domination" of world affairs by the U.S. (p.45). Although this document did not become official government policy at the time, its key ideas were resurrected and refined in a report titled "Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces, and Resources for a New Century" and published by the Project for the New American Century in 2000.

As Mahajan observes, the Project for the New American Century is a neoconservative think-tank "concerned with maintaining and extending world dominance" (pp.45-46). Wolfowitz, Libby, and other neoconservatives helped produce "Rebuilding America's Defenses," which asserts that the U.S. must take advantage of the current, post-Cold War "unipolar moment" and ensure that it develops "a globally preeminent military capacity both today and in the future" (cited on p.47). This report urges massive increases in

military spending, the development of ever more lethal military technology, and the willingness to use military force to preserve U.S. dominance in a wide variety of settings.

Mahajan goes on to explain how the Bush Administration's National Security Strategy document, issued in September 2002, builds on these ideas. Although the N.S.S. document mentions that terrorists pose a new kind of threat to the U.S., Mahajan notes that there is very little discussion of this. Instead, Mahajan notes, the N.S.S. document calls for extending U.S. military dominance, relying on military force to promote "U.S. interests," and recognizing that "Our military must...dissuade future military competition" (cited on p.47). The document titled "Joint Vision 2020," issued by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff a few months before the N.S.S. document, explicitly calls for "Full spectrum dominance—the ability of U.S. forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with...partners, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the full range of military operations" (cited on p.9). With these two documents, the Bush Administration has laid the basis for claiming the right to unilateral, even pre-emptive military strikes against other countries.

In Mahajan's view, the Bush Administration was anxious to promote a more militaristic approach to foreign policy from the time it took office. But advocates realized that there would be substantial public opposition to significant increases in military expenditures, the dramatic expansion of U.S. troops and bases abroad, a new missile defense program, and more aggressive behavior toward unfriendly regimes. In fact, the Project for the New American Century had warned in 2000 that its vision for "Rebuilding America's Defenses" would probably be impossible to realize "absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event—like a new Pearl Harbor" (cited on p.48). Tragically,

September 11, 2001, was such an event.

As Mahajan explains, technological transformation of the U.S. military, the establishment of "forward operating bases" in new countries and regions, and "regime change" are not the only guiding principles of post-September 11 foreign policy (pp. 49-50). Although "maximal control over the production and transportation of oil" is "left conspicuously out of these documents," this vital economic objective also figures prominently in the Bush Administration's more militaristic foreign policy (p.50). As the author points out, "Actually, it has never been a secret that U.S. Middle East policy revolves around oil" (p.164). After briefly summarizing the history of U.S. oil interests in the region, Mahajan explores the material benefits and strategic advantages obtained through the U.S. conquest of Iraq and control of its oil fields.

The author emphasizes that the U.S. economy does not depend on access to Iraqi oil. But he explains how the newly established U.S. dominance over the world's second largest proven oil reserves will lead to handsome profits for the giant energy corporations and facilitate the growing investment of petrodollars in arms sales and other sectors of the U.S. economy. Yet Mahajan views growing U.S. control of Middle East oil more as "a component of empire" than as "a component of the venality of Dick Cheney, Halliburton, and the U.S. oil majors" (p.180). Washington's military occupation of Iraq may increase the pressure on Iran to come into "the U.S. sphere" (p.174). Even more important, growing U.S. control of Middle East oil promises powerful economic and strategic advantages over the European Union, Japan, and China, "competitors or potential competitors" which are

dependent on Middle East oil. The author also suggests that U.S. dominance over Iraqi oil may help weaken the power of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Companies over the world oil market and thwart any international trend toward denominating oil sales in euros.

As Mahajan demonstrates, the Bush Administration's war against Iraq was not about eliminating weapons of mass destruction, combating terrorism, or enforcing international law. Drawing on research from United Nations investigators, the International Atomic Energy Agency, former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter, and other analysts, the author makes clear that the Bush Administration deceived the people of the U.S. about the ostensible threat from the Saddam Hussein regime. Similarly, the author marshals compelling evidence from U.S., British, French, and Australian experts to show that no link between Iraq and al-Qa'ida has ever been established. Mahajan also points out that there was no international legal basis for military action against Iraq and that Washington's unilateral, pre-emptive attack on that country was "a clear case of aggression" and "a crime against peace" (pp.146-147).

For Mahajan, then, the war on Iraq must be understood in the context of the new era of imperialism fostered by the U.S. government after the tragedy of September 11, 2001. The author suggests that the "colonial re-appropriation of the Middle East's energy reserves" is neatly rationalized by "the grand ideological visions of the neoconservatives" in the Bush Administration (p.180). And the author warns of the growing peril faced not only by the inhabitants of the Middle East, but also by the peoples of the world. In Mahajan's view, the global movement against the U.S. invasion of Iraq has been impressive and heartening but needs to be expanded into an enduring global

anti-imperialist movement. As the author concludes, the U.S. might yet turn out to contribute "something unique to the world's history: an empire brought down and transformed by the force of the moral vision of its citizens" (p.194).

Full Spectrum Dominance is a well-written, well-documented critique of the "war on terrorism" and the invasion of Iraq. The author succeeds in conveying a considerable amount of information without making the reader feel overwhelmed. In addition, the analysis in this book is cogent, and the writing is clear. More might have been said about the neoconservative perspective on foreign policy, the U.S. government's violation of international law, the global anti-war movement, or other topics. But these subjects will be explored in more detail in other books and articles. Full Spectrum Dominance provides an excellent introduction to the deeply disturbing realities of resurgent U.S. imperialism and the war in Iraq.

**David Michael Smith is a professor in the Social and Behavioral Sciences Team at the College of the Mainland, Texas City, Texas. His writings have appeared in Peace Review, Nature, Society, and Thought, Socialism and Democracy, and other publications.**

**Ian Harris and Mary Lee Morrison, Peace Education, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition  
(MacFarland & Co: Jefferson, NC, 2003)  
Editor's Review**

This is a long-awaited and much needed update of the 1988 edition. It is a comprehensive, perhaps the most comprehensive, overview of the field of peace education/peace studies. As the world has changed dramatically since 1988, so too has the study and teaching of peace seen important developments. This work contains much new material and the perspectives of a second author. Chapter one begins from the question, "What is peace education?" and provides an overview of the concepts of peace and peace education that are being used and debated in the U.S. and elsewhere. One of the things I like about this book is that, while it gives the traditional "peace studies" answers to many of the questions it raises, it also provides the counter-arguments and addresses them. Whether discussing peace through strength or pacifism, as they do in this chapter, they objectively raise the problems with the various approaches to peace. At the same time, they are committed to peace education being effective, as medical education is effective, in bringing about real improvements in the world. Peace education, they point out, is both a philosophy and a set of learned skills and strategies for social change. Here the authors provide ten main goals of peace education.

Chapter two is an overview of some religious and historical conceptions of war and peace and peace education. The authors extract the major relevant ideas from the Old Testament, the Koran, the Tao Te Ching, the Bhagavad Gita, and the teachings of Buddha, as well as Tolstoy, Maria Montessori, Teilhard de Chardin, and others, making an excellent capsule summary of this material. Chapter three discusses the various types of peace education under the headings: human rights education, development education, environmental education, international education, and peace education for adults.

The role of the United Nations in carrying on peace education is also covered. In this chapter they also distinguish between peace studies, which they see as primarily an academic discipline with heavy emphasis on international conflict, and the more broadly defined peace education which can include such topics not usually found in university peace studies curricula such as domestic violence.

Chapter four raises issues of empowerment education and takes a critical look at the hidden curriculum in our schools, which the authors contend, disempowers children, citing the "violence inherent in traditional American education." (p. 87) By contrast, the pedagogy of peace education is designed to empower students of all ages. Chapter five is "Getting Started, First Steps in Peace Education." Stressing two key themes, finding good resources and connecting with others, they show how to get started in schools, churches, colleges, and community settings. Chapter six focuses on a number of key concepts in peace education such as world order models, defense establishments, NGOs, creative conflict resolution, etc.

Chapter seven looks at developmental issues and includes material on feminist pedagogy as well. Peace education, they point out, is "essentially moral education." (p. 7) Chapter eight discusses the controversies that have sometimes been provoked in certain quarters by peace education, such as the issue of emotions and the controversial nature of language. Following in this vein, Chapter nine evaluates the barriers that sometimes face people teaching peace education in classrooms and communities. Chapter ten covers pedagogy and what the authors consider optimal practices. The final chapter explores links between hopeful visions of the future and peace education, stressing the need to imagine peaceful futures and then put them into practice. Finally, there is a helpful list of peace

education resources, a sample curriculum, a bibliography and an index.

Having taught peace studies for fifteen years, I can say forthrightly that this is an extremely valuable book. It is certainly required reading for anyone who is thinking about peace studies as a vocation, who wants to teach some or any facet of peace in our schools, in church, synagogue, mosque or community settings. If I were I still teaching I would certainly use it as the primary text in my introductory courses. It will also serve as a secondary text in more advanced courses for those not yet familiar with it. It would be a wonderful thing if all teacher education students, whatever field they are preparing for, would read it. Finally, I would recommend this book to all peace activists. Its breadth and depth provide a superb conceptual context for a life of peace work.

**Joseph E. Schwartzberg, Revitalizing the United Nations: Reform Through Weighted Voting (New York and The Hague: Institute for Global Policy, World Federalist Movement, 2004), 75 pp. quarto, paperback  
Editor's Review**

How does the world replace the rule of brute military and economic force with the democratic rule of law that would lead to a more just and peaceful world? Certainly the role of the United Nations is crucial in answering this question, but as Schwartzberg contends, the UN is badly flawed. The General Assembly, which operates according to the rubric of one nation-one vote, is so powerless as to be wholly ineffectual, an object, even, of derision. The Security Council, which does have power, is "an anachronistic legacy of World War II"<sup>i</sup> and, as such, is viewed with suspicion by many of the world's people. Flawed by its composition and by the veto power, the Security Council is often unable to act. The problem, according to the author, is that neither body reflects the true distribution of power and importance in the world. As a result, both institutions face a crisis of legitimacy. Moreover, we are at a crisis point in history when the shape of the world for the long-term to come is in balance. On the one hand, there is the possibility of a world of law based on democratic principles and governance undergirded by a functional UN. On the other hand, according to William Pace (who wrote the introduction to this work), "The UN Charter's vision of international cooperation and multilateralism is to be marginalized and replaced by USA-led 'coalitions of the willing,' preventative wars, wars against terrorism and 'evil' governments, and wars to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Disarmament and non-proliferation, however, would be dealt with selectively."<sup>ii</sup> That is, the U.S. and its allies would be allowed to possess war-making capability and the preponderant power of weapons of mass destruction, but no one else would. In short, the new world system will either be based on democracy and peace, or it will be created by special

interests and pursued by violence, human rights abuses, and warfare. How, then, can the UN be reformed so that it can become influential and effective in creating the former?

If the UN is to be successful and respected, it must change the way it votes so as to become both more democratic and to more realistically reflect the true power balances in the world. The one-nation, one-vote system of the General Assembly bears "no relationship to the actual distribution of power in the world. Hence, GA decisions are only recommendatory."<sup>iii</sup> Powerful nations scorn the attempt of microstates who, they say, merely posture in the Assembly. The voting in the Assembly does not reflect the true realities of power in the world. Neither does the allocation of seats in the Security Council and, furthermore, its legitimacy is hampered by both the institution of permanent seats and by the veto power. Schwartzberg's study analyzes the shortcomings of both bodies and how they have become less effective over time, and points out ways these can be corrected, providing specific wording for two Charter amendments.

For example, in the Assembly, scores of states with populations of less than a million and contributions of only 0.001% of the UN budget, have votes that count as much as that of China or the U.S. What the author suggests is that the voting be weighted by a simple formula that takes into account three factors: its share of world population, of the total financial contribution to the UN, and its share of total UN membership (i.e. 1/191). He writes, "This formula embodies three fundamental principles: democratic/demographic, economic, and legal (the sovereign equality of nations)."<sup>iv</sup> Such a system would give the U.S. a vote in

the Assembly of 9.1%, China 7.7%, India 6.0%, France 2.6% and a number of microstates a vote of .17% each. Then, the Charter could be amended to give the Assembly binding power over certain issues. It would cease to be no more than a forum for the release of hot air. The small states, which presently have 83% of the votes in the Assembly, would end up with 38%, but as the author points out, 38% of something (real power) is better than 83% of nothing.

The Security Council is a somewhat more complex problem. The author suggests abolishing permanent seats since they no longer reflect the realities of world power. He would replace the present system with three-year terms based on the same weighted voting formula where any nation having a combined weight of 4%, or any self-formed caucus of like-minded nations with a weight of 4%, would be entitled to a seat up to 17 seats on an 18 seat Council. Under this system, at present, the U.S., China, Japan, and India would qualify for these seats. One can anticipate the formation of several caucuses, such as the European Union for example; to fill most of the remaining seats and any left over would be elected by the General Assembly. A Council made up in this way would reflect the will of 90% of the world's peoples, a much more democratic arrangement than is the case at present. Finally, the veto power of the Council would be abolished, making it far more functional as well as more democratic.

Schwartzberg is one of those rare scholars who is able to make exhaustive and meticulous research serve the big picture view of international relations. His proposals for UN reform are illustrated by appendices with carefully drawn maps, useful charts, and tables. What is more, unlike many scholars who, while suggesting reforms ignore the real political problems of how to get them implemented, Schwartzberg has included a final section titled "Steering a Course toward Reform," which addresses not only the mechanics, but also how to generate the will for change.

Professor Schwartzberg is a geographer and cartographer with a long-standing interest in world order issues and the United Nations. The book is the result of decades of reflection and discussions.

Revitalizing the United Nations is a highly useful book for any course on the United Nations or, more broadly, courses in international governance, peace studies, or world order systems. It is also an important work for those in general public who wish the UN well but do not know how it can be successfully reformed.

**Joseph E. Schwartzberg is a professor at the University of Minnesota. Among other works, he is the author of the award winning Historical Atlas of South Asia. He has also been heavily involved in world policy issues on the ground, founding the Kashmir Study Group, which has worked to resolve that difficult dispute, and has authored The Kashmir Dispute at Fifty: Charting New Paths to Peace. He has been a leader in the World Federalist Movement, now renamed Citizens For Global Solutions. A veteran of the Korean War, he has traveled extensively, taught, and lived abroad.**

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<sup>i</sup> p. xiv

<sup>ii</sup> p. xi. William Pace is Executive Director of the World Federalist Movement and was instrumental in the birth of the newly established International Criminal Court, which tries cases of genocide.

<sup>iii</sup> Executive Summary

<sup>iv</sup> ibid.

## **DRAFT**

### **THE WISCONSIN INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES: A CHRONOLOGY OF THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS**

**Prepared by Kent D. Shifferd**

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#### **Reflections on the Founding of the Wisconsin Institute: a Personal Note**

In 1983/84 I was teaching at Northland College and administering a year-long program on issues surrounding nuclear war. We were also in process of establishing a major in peace studies. In those years the possibility of an all-out nuclear war, indeed the probability as we saw it in those days, was a very real motivator. Ronald Reagan was president of the United States. He was a hard-nosed Cold Warrior and was baiting the Soviet Union, unbalancing the balance of terror that was MAD by introducing cruise missiles and Pershing missiles into the equation, weapons that could be used for a "grand decapitating first strike" against the Russians; and bankrupting the country with unprecedented increases in the military budget. Reagan also seemed not to understand these weapons as he once was quoted as saying that an ICBM could be recalled after it was launched. Additionally, he was making jokes about launching the missiles. Around the same time some scholars were arguing in influential journals that a nuclear war could be "won." It was also the time of the escalating violence in Central America when the U.S. provided covert and overt support for the Contras, a right wing counterrevolutionary group attempting to overthrow the government of Nicaragua, and for the landowner's regime in El Salvador which turned a blind eye to the death squads that were murdering progressive nuns and priests, and for the reactionary government of Guatemala that was carrying out a near-genocide against the Indians.

It was during this time that I heard about a conference on these issues to be held at the University of Wisconsin, Green Bay, and I went. At that conference I learned about the initiative to start a consortium of public and private institutions of higher learning to focus the academy on issues of war and peace. I was fortunate to play a small role in helping to organize the Institute. These were exciting times when, in response to the threat of nuclear chaos being unleashed either on purpose or accidentally, the American peace movement coalesced. The Nuclear Freeze campaign was only one such national movement. I felt that the establishment of an Institute to study and educate on these issues was part of a larger movement introducing the voice of reason into the national and global debate and that it would be beneficial for the Northland College students in our new peace studies program, as indeed, it turned out to be for the next twenty years. What is more, the Institute has proved to be beneficial for faculty and students at more than 25 colleges and universities in the state, and has attracted scholars for its conferences and its journal from all over the United States and many other countries.

What makes the Institute unique is both its public-private composition and its rigid insistence on balanced views of these controversial subjects. Thus it turns out that the Institute is home to scholars who are "pacifists" and scholars who are "realists."

Many people were instrumental in the founding of the Institute. Chief among these was Professor Dick Ringler (UW/Madison) and the others whose names are listed in the Charter which is printed below. And in the first seventeen years, Sharon Roberts as Executive Secretary was the organizational heart of the Institute. Many more, new and dedicated people (too numerous to list here but their names occur frequently in this chronology) have come to be a part of the Institute over its first twenty years.

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#### **THE CHRONOLOGY**

## 1984

- **September 17<sup>th</sup>, Conference at UW/Green Bay**, "Nuclear Age Education" with the stated aim of "Toward Establishing Cooperative Programs on War, Peace and Global Security in Institutions of Higher Learning. Welcomes by Thomas Loftus, Speaker of the Wisconsin Assembly; Ben Lawton, President of the UW Board of Regents; Robert O'Neil, President of the University of Wisconsin System; and Closing Remarks by Malcolm McLean, President of Northland College; with Special Interest Sessions on Nuclear Weapons and Political Purpose, Modern War Preparations, Psychological Resistances to Confronting Nuclear War, Peace Studies, What About the Russians?, Education Versus Indoctrination, Religious and Ethical Dilemmas. The Conference ended with an "Open Forum to Discuss Cooperative Strategies and to Establish a Statewide Committee" moderated by Professor Joe Elder.

## 1985

- **February 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1985, Informal Founding the Wisconsin Institute** by a declaration reading "The WISCONSIN INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR, PEACE AND GLOBAL COOPERATION is an association of participating institutions from among Wisconsin's public and independent colleges and universities. It is organized as a non-profit, non-stock corporation.... We the undersigned representatives from Wisconsin's colleges and universities do hereby establish the WISCONSIN INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR, PEACE AND GLOBAL COOPERATION in order to encourage and legitimize research and teaching on the roots of organized violence, on security issues, and on the factors necessary for a just global peace, to develop and maintain a resource base for peace studies, and thereby to increase the probability of the survival and enhancement of life in the nuclear age." Signatories were: Robert Classen, UW/Extension; Rose Daitsman, UW/Milwaukee; Dan DiDomizio, Marian College; Milton Feder, Beloit College; Leonard Gambrell, UW/Eau Claire; Richard Gillespie, Carroll College; Lincoln Graf, UW Centers; John Harbeson, UW/Parkside; Joyce Heil, Viterbo College; Vincent Kavaloski, UW Centers/Richland; Edward Linenthal, UW/Oshkosh; Agate Nesaule, UW/Whitewater; Douglas Northrup, Ripon College; Nikitas Petrokopoulos, UW/Green Bay; Jane Ragsdale, UW/Madison; Dick Ringler, UW/Madison; Robert Rosenberg, Lawrence University; Charles Rumsey, UW/Stevens Point; Kent Shifferd, Northland College; James Sulton, UW System Administration.

A Charter Committee composed of Bob Fitts, Marquette University; Lincoln Graf, UW Centers; Doug Northrup, Ripon College; Nik Petrakopoulos, UW/Green Bay; Dick Ringler, UW/Madison; and Kent Shifferd, Northland College, was designated to draw up a complete charter.

The Institute was to be governed by an Executive Council selected by the Presidents and/or Chancellors of each Institution and by up to 4 (later revised to 6) at-large members elected by the Council. Officers were to be Executive Director, Associate Director, Director of Planning and Development, and Executive Secretary.

- **April 27, 1985, FORMAL FOUNDING OF THE INSTITUTE, Charter unanimously adopted in Madison by representatives from 20 colleges and universities.**
- **July, 1985, Central Office Established at UW/Stevens Point** and the UWSP Foundation agrees to act as fiscal agent.
- **Sept. 13, First Meeting of the Executive Council** of the Wisconsin Institute for the Study of War, Peace and Global Cooperation, at Stevens Point. Chaired by Dick Ringler, Executive Director, UW/Madison. Associate Director, Kent Shifferd, Northland College and Kathy Smith, Executive Secretary. Central Office to be at Stevens Point.
- **First Speakers Program** set up with four lecturers: sample topics included: "Evolution of U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Strategy;" "Nonviolent National Defense;" "The

Nuclear Age;" "The Causes of Peace;" "Star Wars and Its Cultural Consequences;" "Nuclear Language;" and "What Art, Literature and Music Have to Teach About War and Nuclear War;" by Leonard Gambrell, Kent Shifferd, Edward Linenthal and Dick Ringler.

- **Sharon Roberts** appointed as Executive Secretary.
- **Dick Ringler (UW/Madison) Executive Director;** Kent Shifferd (Northland College) Associate Director. 21 Institutions belong to the Institute.

## 1986

- **April 19<sup>th</sup>, 1986, first Annual Conference,** "Tensions and Common Ground Between 'Security' and 'Peace' in the Nuclear Age, at UW/Parkside; Keynote by Randall Forsberg and Keith Payne with a panel of David Garnham, Ed Linenthal, Kent Shifferd. Luncheon Speaker Congressman Les Aspin; workshops on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, the Strategic Defense Initiative, Nonviolent National Defense, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Central America.
- The "OPTIONS" Program launched by the Institute in four Wisconsin Communities, focusing citizen discussion on national policy.
- **"Hellfire" Dissemination Grant** awarded by Wisconsin Humanities Committee
- Institute co-sponsors a World Hunger Conference at UW Centers/Fond du Lac.
- Executive Director, Dick Ringler (UW/Madison); Associate Director (Kent Shifferd (Northland); Executive Secretary, Sharon Roberts.
- **21 Institutions** belong to the Institute

## 1987

- **April 11, 1987, Second Annual Conference,** "Is Nuclear Disarmament Possible? Or Desirable?," at Lawrence University including Senator William Proxmire; Col. Stephen Fought, Naval War College; Randall Forsberg, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies; John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago, and a representative of the Soviet government. Professor Robert Rosenberg, Coordinator.
- **April 24<sup>th</sup>, 1987, First Student Conference,** "Critical Issues in the Global Village," at UW/Eau Claire. Keynote Address Dr. Don Reeder (UW/Madison) "Strategic Defense Initiative: The Illusion of Security."
- **April 25<sup>th</sup>, 1987** Seven Council Members present papers at the Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts and Letters meeting at Ripon College.
- **Spring, 1987, Campus Visitors Program** including Paul Anderson (Lawrence); Paul Boyer (UW/Madison); Willie Curtis (Parkside); Jack Dukes (Carroll); Ian Harris (Milwaukee); Joel Lazinger (La Crosse); James Lorence (Centers); Thomas Noer (Carthage); Farouk Sankari (Oshkosh); Lloyd Steffen (Northland) and Roger Wall (Centers) and covered such topics as Middle Eastern Terrorism, Star Wars, Religious Ethics and War, Male Violence, Global Hunger, Revolution and Social Change in Central America, etc.
- **October 10, 1987,** The Institute **co-sponsored with UW Center/Fond du Lac, the conference, "Central America: War or Peace?"** at UW Centers/Fond du Lac; included speakers from the U.S. State Department, the Nicaraguan Embassy and academic experts. Professor Roger Wall, coordinator.
- Executive Director, Dick Ringler (UW/Madison); Associate Director, Kent Shifferd (Northland); Executive Secretary, Sharon Roberts.
- **24 member institutions.**

## 1988

- **January 17<sup>th</sup>--April 24<sup>th</sup>, 1988, Statewide Radio Course,** "War or Peace: Confronting the Challenge," a 3 credit, 15 part radio course broadcast on Wisconsin Public Radio, Prof. Dick Ringler, presiding. The course attracted the highest enrollment in the history of Wisconsin Public Radio's University of the Air courses.
- **April 15<sup>th</sup>, 1988, Annual Student Conference,** "Wisconsin Students Look at World Issues," at UW/Stevens Point, Professor William Skelton, Coordinator. Student

- Award Winners Nancy Flasher (UW/Eau Claire); James Alvey (UW/Stevens Point); Donna Hicks-Bresnick (UW/Madison); Karen Walch (UW/Madison); Jody Petrykowski (UW/Parkside) and Lisa Lietz (UW/Stevens Point).
- **September, 1988, Vol. 1 No. 1 edition of the *Bulletin of the Wisconsin Institute* published.**
  - **Campus Visitors Program for Academic Year 1988/89** included Dan Di Domizio, Leonard Gambrell, Fred Lokken, Don Manley, Nik Petrokopoulos, Dick Ringler, Kent Shifferd, Bill Skelton, and Robert Vandenberg and such topics as Arms Proliferation in the Third World, Justice vs. Peace, the Vietnam War's impact on U.S. policy, Arms Treaty Verification, Economic Effects of War Preparation, Art and the Bikini Atoll Tests, The Military Mind, and Ethics and War.
  - **November 5<sup>th</sup>, 1988**, Annual Conference, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: Where Do We Go From here?" at Carroll College including James Cracraft (U. of Illinois at Chicago); Martha Mauer (U.S. State Department); Doug Nicoll (Beloit); and Vladimir Pechatnov (Soviet Embassy in Washington); C. David Twining (U.S. Army War College). Prof. Jack Dukes, Coordinator.
  - Executive Director, Dick Ringler (UW/Madison); **Associate Director, Patricia Bonnet-Brunnich** (Lakeland); Executive Secretary, Sharon Roberts).
  - 25 member institutions

## 1989

- **February, 1989 Vol. 1, No. 2 of the Institute's *Bulletin***
- **April 7<sup>th</sup>, 1989, Third Annual Student Conference**, "We Are In the World: Issues of World Citizenship," at Lakeland College in Sheboygan. Keynote Speaker, Rev. Theodore Hessburgh, (President Emeritus of Notre Dame University). Professor Pat Bonnet-Brunich, Coordinator.
- **November 3<sup>rd</sup>, Charter Revised** at a meeting in Eau Claire.
- **November 4<sup>th</sup>, 1989, Annual Conference**, "Nonviolent Sanctions: Their Use in Conflict and Defense," at UW/Eau Claire; Principal Presenters and discussants: Dr. Gary Guertner (U.S. Army War College); and Dr. Christopher Kruegler (Harvard Program on Nonviolent Sanctions); Dr. Vincent Kavaloski (UW Centers/Richland); Col. David Hansen (U.S. Army War College); Dr. Leonard Gambrell (UW/Eau Claire). Conference Coordinator, Dr. Gambrell.
- **Campus Visitors Program** includes Leslie Bessant (Ripon) on Aids, Africa and the World; Mary Blewett (Cardinal Stritch) on WWI Poets; Deborah Buffton (UW/La Cross) on Visions of War; William Katra (La Crosse) on Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s; Vincent Kavaloski (UW/Platteville) on Transnational Citizen Cooperation; and Khalil Khavari (UW/Milwaukee) on Psychological Barriers to World Peace.
- **Resource Library**: includes film, *Hellfire*; PBS Series *War*, and videos of conferences as well as access to IGCC films and videotapes.
- **Institute's Radio Series Wins the Prestigious Ohio State Award** for excellence, presented at the National Press Club in Washington.
- **Edward Tabor Linenthal (UW/Oshkosh) Executive Director**; Patricia Bonnet-Brunnich (Lakeland College) Associate Director; Sharon Roberts Executive Secretary.
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## 1990

- **April 6<sup>th</sup>, 1990 Fourth Annual Student Conference**, "Global Perspectives on Technology, Culture and Politics," at UW/Milwaukee. Keynote address by former Governor of Ohio, John Gilligan and current Director of the Notre Dame Institute for International Peace Studies.
- **Spring, 1990, Publication of *Bulletin*, Vol. 2, No. 2.**

- **Fall, 1990, Publication of *Bulletin*, Vol. 3, No. 1.**
- **November 19<sup>th</sup>, 1990 Annual Conference** "Religion, Racism and Violence" at UW/Oshkosh: principal presenters Professor David Chidestor (University of Capetown, South Africa) and film maker Sharon Soper, director of award winning film "Witness to Apartheid."
- **Campus Visitors program for 1990-91** includes: Mary Blewett (Cardinal Stritch), Paul Boyer (UW/Madison), Deborah Buffton (UW/La Crosse), Jack Dukes (Carroll), Brad Hall (UW/Milwaukee), Abbas Hamdani (UW/Milwaukee), Ian Harris (UW/Milwaukee), Vincent Kavaloski (Edgewood), Edward Linenthal (UW/Oshkosh), Fred Lokken (UW/La Crosse), Farouk Sankari (UW/Oshkosh), Brian Smith (Ripon), Sheldon Smith (UW/La Crosse), James Sulton (UW System Administration), Raju Thomas (Marquette), and Greg Wegner (UW/La Crosse). Topics included nuclear war, the Middle East, Male Violence, German Unification, The Bible and the Apocalypse--Nuclear War in Evangelical Belief, the New Soviet Union, the Growth of Indian Military Power, et al.
- **Annenberg Foundation, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, and the MacArthur Foundation fund the development of the Distance Learning Course, *Dilemmas of War and Peace*** by the under the auspices of the Institute; national faculty team led by Dick Ringler (UW/Madison) and including Leonard Gambrell (UW/Eau Claire), Kent Shifferd (Northland), David Hansen (U.S. Army War College), Patricia Mische (Global Education Associates), Gwynne Dyer (noted columnist on international affairs).
- **Ian Harris (UW/Milwaukee) is First Recipient of the Wisconsin Institute Distinguished Faculty Award.**
- Executive Director, Ed Linenthal (UW/Oshkosh); **Associate Director, Joe Hatcher** (Ripon); Executive Secretary, Sharon Roberts.
- 29 member colleges and universities

## 1991

- **Spring and Fall 1991, Institute Bulletins Vol. 3, No. 2 and Vol. 4, No. 1.**
- **April 5<sup>th</sup>, 1991 Annual Student Conference** "Searching for a Peaceful World Order" at Cardinal Stritch College, Keynote Address by Jacqueline Haessly, Director of the Milwaukee Peace Education Resource Center.
- **April 7, 1991 Name change** from The Wisconsin Institute for the Study of War, Peace and Global Cooperation to The Wisconsin Institute: A Consortium for the Study of War, Peace and Global Cooperation.
- **Fall, 1991 Vol. 1 of the Institute's New Journal, *Viewpoints* (edited by Kent Shifferd)** includes such articles as "The Garden and the Sword: Visions of Peace in History" (Kavaloski); "Prospects for Conflict Management in the 1990s" (Kainz); "The Emergence of Eastern Europe" (Haupt); "Are Humans Too Aggressive for World Peace?" (the Khavaris); and "Cain and Abel and the Origins of War?" (Ringler), et al.
- **October 17<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup>, Annual Conference** "Peacemaking in the Post Cold-War Era: The Middle East" at Carroll College, Waukesha. Principal Presenters David Shipler (NYT Correspondent and author of *Arab and Jew: Wounded Spirits in the Promised Land*); Emile Sahliyah (North Texas State University); Mark Tessler (UW/Milwaukee); Asher Susser (Tel Aviv University). Conference Coordinator Jack Dukes. Cosponsors Carroll College, UW/Milwaukee and Marquette University).
- **Speakers Program for 1991-92** includes Dan Ihara (Ripon) "Conflict or Cooperation over Global Climate Change?"; Deborah Buffton (UW/La Crosse) "War and Propaganda?"; William Katra (UW/Eau Claire) "Liberation Theology;" David Garnham (UW/Milwaukee) "The U.S. and Western Europe After the Cold War;" Bron Taylor (UW/Oshkosh) "Ecowarriors and the Global Apocalypse," et al.
- **Paul Boyer (UW/Madison) Receives the Dick Ringler Distinguished Peace Educator Award for 1991**

- **Christine Schlegel (St. Norbert College) receives the Wisconsin Institute Distinguished Student Achievement Award.**
- **Joe Hatcher (Ripon College), Executive Director, William B. Skelton (UW/Stevens Point) Associate Director, Sharon Roberts, Executive Secretary.**
- **28 member institutions**

## 1992

- **April 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1992 Annual Student Conference** "Worlds Apart/World's Together" at Ripon College. Keynote Address, Rev. Eva Jensen (Lincoln Park Lutheran Church, Milwaukee), "Global Peace, Justice and Community: Hope Worthy of a Whole Life Commitment."
- **October 9<sup>th</sup>, 1992 Annual Conference** "Dilemmas of War and Peace" at UW/Madison: keynote address by Gwynne Dyer (former senior lecturer at the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, England, internationally syndicated columnist, creator of *War*, a book and a 7-part PBS documentary television series); "Turning Point: the North, the South and the Environment;" sample presenters Haskell Fain (UW/Madison--"Was the Cold War Rational?"); Leonard Gambrell (UW/Eau Claire--"Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and World Peace"); Joe Hatcher (Ripon--"The Psychology of War and Peace"); Kent Shifferd (Northland--"War, Peace and the Environment"); David Garnham (UW/Milwaukee--"Is War Becoming Obsolete?"); et al.
- **Fall, 1992 Broadcast over Wisconsin Public Radio of 13 Half Hour Programs on War and Peace** including: "The Bombing of Dresden," "The Incident at Melos," "Propaganda Battlefields," "Just Wars and the Persian Gulf," "Movements of Peace," "Nuclear Terror," "Central America: Security at Risk," "Nonviolent Revolution in Eastern Europe," et al. These programs represent the audio component of the Annenberg/CPB *Dilemmas of War and Peace* course.
- **Fall**, publication of **Vol. 2 of Viewpoints** (editor, Kent Shifferd) including such articles as "Inner Peace in Time of War" (Michael Piechowski); "Daily Life in World War I" (Deborah Buffton); "The Decline in Relevance of Extended Deterrence" (Willie Curtis); "Caciquismo (Political Bossism) and Environmental Issues in Puebla, Mexico (Sheldon Smith) and "Sidelights on Interlanguage: The Case of Volapuk" (Dick Ringler), et alia.
- **Speakers Program for 1992/93** includes: Deborah Buffton (UW/La Crosse, "Women's Thoughts on War"); Nancy Burrell (UW/Milwaukee, "Interpersonal Confrontation: Framing Conflict Metaphorically"); Jack Dukes (Carroll, "The Impact of Internal Change in the Commonwealth of Independent States and World Stability"); Leonard Gambrell (UW/Eau Claire), "Shaking the Vietnam Syndrome"); Adrienne Ahlgrhren Haeuser (UW/Milwaukee, "Spare the Rod for Peace: Cross National Progress in Ending Physical Punishment in Childrearing"); William Katra (UW/Eau Claire, "Nicaragua: Lessons in Development"); Edward Linenthal (UW/Oshkosh, "Contested Memories: The Holocaust Museum"); Dick Ringler (UW/Madison, "The Bombing of Dresden"); Joe Hatcher (Ripon, "Psychology and Peace Studies"); et al.
- **Deborah Buffton receives the 1992 Dick Ringler Distinguished Peace Educator Award.**
- Executive Director, Joe Hatcher (Ripon); Associate Director, Bill Skelton (UW/Stevens Point); Executive Secretary, Sharon Roberts.
- **28 member institutions.**

## 1993

- **January, 1993, Publication of *Dilemmas of War and Peace***, an Annenberg/Corporation for Public Broadcasting distance learning curriculum; senior editor Dick Ringler, with Kent Shifferd, Leonard Gambrell, Col. David

Hanson, Patricia Mische: a 1500 page print and 13 half hour audio tape collection covering war and peace from earliest times to the present.

- **April 16<sup>th</sup>, 1993, Annual Student Conference**, "New Times, New Worlds" at UW/Fond du Lac, Keynote Speaker Dr. Douglas La Follette (Secretary of State for Wisconsin, founder of the Environmental Decade) on "Planet Earth: One World--Two Views."
- **Fall**, Publication of **vol. 3 of Viewpoints**, Editor Gary J. Boelhower (Marian College) including such articles as: "Ecological Factors in War, Peace and Global Security" (Patricia Mische, Global Education Associates); "Replacing War With a General Peace System" (Kent Shifferd, Northland); "Civil Liberties and the Citizen" (David Luce, (UW/Milwaukee); "Aggressive War in the Old Testament (Pennsylvania State University at Harrisburg); "Racism, Resources and Nuclear Weapons" (Arjun Makhijani (Systems Research Institute, Pune, India); "Shaking the Vietnam Syndrome" (Leonard Gambrell, UW/Eau Claire), et al.
- **November 6, 1993, Annual Fall Conference**, "Instituting Peace: Challenge and Hope" at Viterbo College. Principle Presenter, Toh Swee-Hin, Director of the Center for International Education and Development, University of Alberta; Workshops on "Pedagogical Implications," "Peace Studies from Different Disciplines," "The Global Teacher Makes Conscious Choices," "What in the World Works: Global Studies in the K-12 Program" with Virginia Floresca-Cawagas, Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, the Philippines. Conference Coordinator, Sister Anita Beskar.
- **Speakers Program for 1993-94** included: Lakshmi Bhardadwaj; (UW/Milwaukee, "Ghandian Thinking and the New World Order"); Gary Boelhower (Marian, "The Fundamentals of Peer Mediation"); Mary Hassinger (Viterbo, "Global Environmental Change: A Framework?"); Joe Hatcher (Ripon, "Psychology and Peace Studies"); Ernest Partridge (Northland, "The Cold War in Retrospective: Study in Collective Irrationality"); Don Reeder (UW/Madison, "Energy: the Coming Crisis"); Dick Ringler (UW/Madison, "The Bombing of Dresden"); Patricia Shifferd (Northland, "Women, Environment, and Development: New Hopes, New Prospects"); Bill Skelton (UW/Stevens Point, "The Military Mind: A Historical Perspective"); Jonathan Thorndike (Lakeland, "Greek Attitudes Toward War and Peace in the *Iliad*), et al.
- **Kent Shifferd, Executive Director**; William B. Skelton, Associate Director; Sharon Roberts, Executive Secretary.
- **26 institutional members.**

## 1994

- **April 22, 1994 Annual Student Conference**, "Images of War, Peace and Global Cooperation" at UW/Eau Claire featuring a debate on whether the U.S. should provide soldiers to the UN Command under Chapter 7 of the Charter as well as artistic expressions (films, slides, music, etc.).
- **October 20<sup>th</sup>, 1994 Annual Conference**, "Mexico and the United States: Conflict or Cooperation?" at Lawrence University. Keynote speaker, Dr. Luis Rubio (Director General of the Center of Research for Development, Mexico City) on "Beyond Nafta: The Future of U.S.--Mexican Relations." Respondents, Joseph Dammrell (Northland) and Dereka Rushbrook (Ripon), session chaired by Neil Richardson UW/Madison).
- **Fall**, Publication of **Vol. 4 of Viewpoints**, Editor Gary J. Boelhower (Marian College) including such articles as: "Peace Education in a Post-Modern World" (Toh Swee-Hin, University of Alberta, Canada); "Armageddon Postponed? The Threat of Nuclear War in the Post Cold War World" (Fred Lokken, Truckee Meadows Community College, Idaho) "Genocidal Rape and War: the Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina" (Karen Werner Crass, Law School, University of Denver); "Can Modern Wars Be Conducted Justly?" (Michael Duffey, Marquette University); "A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Armageddon" (Ernest Partridge, Northland College), et al.

- **Speakers Program for 1993-94** included: Gary Boelhower (Marian, "Teaching Values"); Clarence Davis (Marian, "Changes in Today's Russia"); Dan DiDomizio (Cardinal Stritch, "Towards an Environmental Ethic"); David Garnham (UW/Milwaukee, "Deterrence After the Cold War"); Ian Harris (UW/Milwaukee, "From World Citizen to Peace in the Hood"); Mary Hassinger (Viterbo, "Global Environmental Change"); Pravvin Kamdar (Cardinal Stritch, "Ghandian Economic Perspectives"); Mark Peterson (UW Centers, "Social Ecology and Eco-feminism"); Robert Vandenburgt ("Military Interventions: Some Moral Considerations"); Terence Rhorig (Cardinal Stritch, "Nuclear Weapons in Korea"); et al.
- **Distinguished Faculty Scholar Award to Edward Linenthal (UW/Oshkosh).**
- **Distinguished Student Scholar Award to Debra Sneide (UW/Milwaukee).**
- Executive Director, Kent Shifferd (Northland); Associate Director, Bill Skelton (UW/Stevens Point); Executive Secretary, Sharon Roberts.
- **23 member institutions.**

## 1995

- **April 7, 1995 Annual Student Conference**, "Race, Ethnicity, War and Peace," at Lakeland College, Keynote address, "Changing American Attitudes Toward Japan and the Japanese," Dr. Clarence Davis (Marian College)
- **July 8, 1995** Special Conference, "Teaching About War and Peace," a workshop on using the *Dilemmas of War and Peace* Annenberg/CPB course developed under the auspices of the Wisconsin Institute, held at Marquette University.
- **Speakers Program for 1995-96** Included: "The Lovely, Peculiar Power: The Imagination of Racial Reconciliation in American Literature" (Mary Blewett, Cardinal Stritch College); "Women, War and Nationalism" (Deborah Buffton, UW/La Crosse); "American Foreign Policy Toward the Persian Gulf" (Khalil Dokhanchi, UW/Superior); Walking a Narrow Ridge: Community and Diversity" (Cheri Frey-Hartel, Cardinal Stritch College); "Peace Education in a Post-modern World" (Ian Harris, UW/Milwaukee); "The Language of Vilification" (Daniel Perkins, UW/Eau Claire); "The Recuperation of German Jewish History from the Ashes of Destruction" (Ruth Schwertfeger, UW/Milwaukee); et al.
- **November 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup>, 1995 Annual Conference**, "Ecological Resistance Movements: Religion, Politics, Ethics" at UW/Madison's Wisconsin Center. Presenters included Bron Taylor (UW/Oshkosh, "Environmental Paganism"); Daniel Deudney (University of Pennsylvania, "In Search of Gaian Politics"); J. Baird Calicott (University of North Texas, "Religious Resources for Environmental Action"); Panel Discussion led by Walter Bressette (Red Cliff Band, Ojibwa Nation) and including Heidi Hadsell (McCormick Theological Seminary), David Johns (Portland State University), Lois Lorentzen (University of San Francisco), Alisair McIntosh (University of Edinburgh) and Jerry Stark (UW/Oshkosh); Workshops on "Celtic Native Land Rights," "Ecological Resistance Movements in Latin America," "Indigenous Ecological Resistance Movements," "Ecological Resistance Movements in Asia, et al.
- **Fall**, Publication of **vol. 5, 1995-96 issue of *Viewpoints On War, Peace and Global Cooperation***, editor Gary J. Boelhower, including: "Feminist Philosophers and the Re-Creation of Subjectivity" (Paula Hirschboeck, Edgewood College); "Women, Militarism, Development and the Environment" (Jennifer Turpin, University of San Francisco); "Rejecting the Middle Class Nazi Dream: Dinesen's 'Letters From a Land of Atomic Veterans'" (F. Lincoln Grahlfs, UW Centers); "Peace Studies As a Natural Extension of a Liberal Arts Education" (Joe Hatcher, Ripon College); "The New World Order: Waking Up to an Ethnic Nightmare" (Lisa Kay Fels, American Graduate School of International Management, Glendale, Arizona), et al.

- **Distinguished Faculty Scholar Award to Joe Elder (UW/Madison); Distinguished Student Scholar Award to John Graf (Northland).**
- **Executive Director, Deborah Buffton (UW/La Crosse);** Associate Director, Joe Hatcher (Ripon); Executive Secretary Sharon Roberts.
- **23 institutions participating.**

## 1996

- **April 12, 1996, Annual Student Conference, "Our World/Our Future"** at St. Norbert College.
- **August 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1996 Special Citizens Conference, "The 20<sup>th</sup> Century: Triumph or Disaster?"** in Ashland, Wisconsin including a slide show, "The Great Images of Our Century" (Don Albrecht, Northland); "War and Peace in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century" (Vincent Kavaloski, Edgewood); "My Life in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century" (Dr. Jane Smith, Ashland); "Women's Place in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century" (Deborah Buffton, UW/La Crosse); "Being a Hall Finn" (Bertha Kurki, Ashland); "The Achievements of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century" (David Garnham, UW/Milwaukee); "My Family in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century" (Joe Barabee, Ashland); "A Century of Environmental Disasters" (Kent Shifferd, Northland); "My Life in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century" (Evan Sassman, Ashland); and "National Security and Peace Movements in a Century of War" (Leonard Gambrell, UW/Eau Claire).
- **Speakers Program for 1996-97** included: "Nonviolence and Peacemaking" (Lakshmi Bharadwaj, UW/Milwaukee); "From Nairobi to Beijing: International Women's Issues" (Florence Deacon, Cardinal Stritch College); "American Foreign Policy Toward Islamic Movements in the Middle East" (Khalil Dokhanchi, UW/Superior); "Hollywood's Foreign Policy: the Response to Fascism in American Film, 1939-1941" (James Lorence, UW Centers); "Do Ask And Do Tell" (Linda Plagman, Cardinal Stritch College); "War Coming Home: the Relationship between the United States' Wars Abroad and the Peace/War Climate at Home" (Annette White-Parks (UW/La Crosse), et al.
- **November 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1996, Annual Conference, "Religion, War and Peace"** at Ripon College: Keynote by R. Scott Appleby (University of Notre Dame), "The Ambivalence of the Sacred: The Religious Militant as Peacebuilder;" Round Table, "Religion and Violence at the Millennium" with Brian Smith (Ripon), Michael Fleet (Marquette), Gretchen Breese (Ripon) and Ruch Chojnacki (University of Chicago); Panel, "Religious and Moral Values in the World of Power Politics" with David Garnham (UW/Milwaukee, chair), Col. Dan Smith (Center for Defense Information), Ira Chernus (University of Colorado at Boulder), Scott Hibbard (U.S. Institute of Peace) and Anita Streich (UW/La Crosse); Panel, "Violence, Peace and Sacred Values" with Jon Thorndike (Lakland, chair), Harry Yeide (George Washington University), Kent Shifferd (Northland), Shadja Ziaian (York University), Jess Hollenback (UW/La Crosse) and Alice Keefe (UW/Stevens Point); Panel, "Religiously-based Activism for Peace and Social Justice," with Ian Harris (chair and discussant), Brian Kane (Allentown College), Paul Nelson (University of Maryland), Melvin Bloom (UW/Stevens Point), David Weiss (University of Notre Dame) and Darlene Martin (Pittsburgh); Round Table "Just War Theory and Pacifism" with Tobias Wainright (Notre Dame), Joseph Capizzi (Notre Dame) and Jerry Thompson (Ripon).
- **November 2, 1996, Name changed to "Wisconsin Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies.**
- **Fall** Publication of **Vol. 6, 1996-97 issue of Viewpoints On War Peace and Global Cooperation**, editor Gary J. Boelhower, including: "Ethnic Conflict: The Perils of Military Intervention" (Gary Guertner, Army War College); "U.S. Covert Actions: Blowback Exemplified" (Michael Andregg, University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, MN); "Baltic Popular Movements and Their Global Context" (Signe Rierdance, Latvia); "Irish Peace Process" (Joseph Thompson, Villanova University); et al.
- Distinguished Student Scholar Award to Brooke Soles (UW/Platteville.)

- Executive Director, Deborah Buffton (UW/La Crosse); Associate Director, Daniel DiDomizio (Cardinal Stritch); Executive Secretary, Sharon Roberts.
- 20 institutions participating.

## 1997

- **Friday, April 18, 1997, Annual Student Conference, "Conflict and Peace in a Global World"** at UW/La Crosse, Keynote Robin Opels, "Conflict and Peace in a Global World: a Process-Oriented Approach."
- **October 17<sup>th</sup>, 18<sup>th</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup>, 1997 Annual Conference, "Environmental Dimensions of Firearm Violence"** at UW/Milwaukee: Opening Plenary with Susan Barlow (Director of Pediatric Surgery, Harlem Hospital); Rasuli Lawis (Director of Youth Projects, Rheedlan Center, NY City); Phil Cook (Duke University), followed by Workshops on "The Problem" and "Programs that Work;" Dinner speaker Dean Calhoun, Youth Alive (Oakland CA).
- **Fall Publication of Vol. 7, 1997-98 Issue of the Newly Retitled the *Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict***, editor Gary J. Boelhower, including: "The Social Backgrounds of Gulf War Protesters" (Gary Swank, Morehead State University); "Election Day 1996 in Russia" (Clarence Davis, Marian College); "Food, Population, Energy and the Environment in the Global Economy of the Twentieth Century" (Peter Dorner, Dean Emeritus, UW/Madison); "The Postmodern Military: Soldiering, New Media and the Post-Cold War" (Morten Ender, University of North Dakota); "Blood On Your Hands: A Personal Essay On the Ethics of Military Action" (Timothy Hanson, UW/La Crosse), "Purposeful Intervention, Christian Ethics, and the Case of Haiti" (J. Milburn Thompson, Saint Joseph College, Connecticut), et al.
- **Speakers Program for 1997-98** included: "Peace and Environmental Security" (Lakshmi Bharadwaj, UW/Milwaukee); "Forming Values in Christian Families" (Gary Boelhower, Marion); "Changes in Today's Russia" (Clarence Davis, Marian); "The Post-Cold War Regional Arrangement in the Persian Gulf" (Khalil Dokanchi, UW/Superior); "The Practice of Peacemaking: Alternatives to Violence" (Ian Harris, UW/Milwaukee); "Jainism: Philosophy of Nonviolence" (Pravin Kamdar, Cardinal Stritch); "The Future of the Dayton Peace Accords" (Garth Katner, St. Norbert); "Security Issues in South Korea" (Terrence Roehrig, Cardinal Stritch); "A History of the World, 1900-2000" (Kent Shifferd, Northland); "Mothers of the Race: The Elite Education of German Girls under the Nazi Dictatorship" (Gregory Wegner, UW/La Crosse); "Peace or Surrender? A Walk Through Belfast" (Annette White-Parks (UW/La Crosse), et al.
- **Dick Ringler Distinguished Faculty Scholar Award to Daniel Maguire (Marquette University).**
- **Distinguished Student Scholar Award to Stephanie Mesheski (UW/Milwaukee).**
- Executive Director, Deborah Buffton (UW/La Crosse); **Associate Director Daniel DiDomizio** (Cardinal Stritch); Executive Secretary, Sharon Roberts.
- **20 member institutions.**

## 1998

- **April 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1998, Annual Student Conference, "Conflict and Resolution"** at UW/Eau Claire.
- **October 30, 1998, Annual Conference, "Current Trends in Peace Studies"** at UW/Stevens Point. Keynote ""War, Peace and the Environment" (Kent Shifferd, Northland); Panel "Women and War" with Sarah Kent (UW/Stevens Point), Dennis Ciesielski (UW/Platteville), Thresa Kaminski (UW/Stevens Point), Joe Hatcher (Ripon) and Dick Ringler (UW/Madison); Panels "Contemporary Issues in Peace Research with Geoff Bradshaw (Madison Area Technical College), Walter Kendall (John Marshall Law School), Charles Rumsey (UW/Stevens Point), Eric Yonke (UW/Stevens Point), Ian Harris (UW/Milwaukee), John Wells and Andrew Hazucha

- (Carson-Newman College) and Vincent Kavaloski (Edgewood College); Panel "Theory and Practice in Current International Relations with Jin Wang (UW/Stevens Point), Bryan Brophy-Baermann (UW/Stevens Point), Leonard Gambrell (UW/Eau Claire); Panel "Nuclear Proliferation and International Security" with John Morser (UW/Stevens Point), David Garnham (UW/Milwaukee), Tom Hastings (Northland) and Kent Shifferd (Northland).
- **Speakers Program for 1998-99** included: "The Social Violence of Silence: Letters from the Kenyan Front" (Geoffrey Bradshaw, MATC); "Ethical Dilemmas and Social Consequences of a Market Economy: the Czech Experience" (Dan DiDomizio, Cardinal Stritch); "Reflections on Holocaust Literature" (Paula Friedman, Cardinal Stritch); "Islam in its Judaeo-Christian Context: (Abbas Hamdani, UW/Milwaukee); "Teaching Our Children a Second Language" (Jean Hinson, UW/La Crosse); "Francis of Assisi and Peace" (Margaret Klotz, Cardinal Stritch); "The Struggle for Human Rights: China and Beyond" (Jeffrey Robert, Carthage); "On War Systems and Peace Systems" (Kent Shifferd, Northland); "Legitimizing the Final Selection: Race Curriculum in the Schools of Nazi Germany" (Gregory Wegner, UW/La Crosse), et al.
  - **Fall, publication Vol. 8, 1998-99 issue of the Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict**, editor Gary Boelhower (Marian), including: "Countdown to a Permanent Criminal Court" (George Yacoubian, Jr., University of Maryland); "Working Women and Their World" (Terry Dickinson, Kansas State University); "No Blood for Oil: Protesting the Persian Gulf War in Madison, Wisconsin" (Mark Van Ellis, UW/Platteville); "The Military in Modern Turkey: A Lasting Political Force" (Aira Chtena, Lawrence); "Two Plaques in the Karlskirche" (David Luce, UW/Milwaukee, emeritus).
  - **Dick Ringler Distinguished Faculty Scholar Award to Charles Rumsey, (emeritus, UW/Stevens Point).**
  - **Executive Director, Kent Shifferd (Northland); Associate Director, Eric Yonke (UW/Stevens Point); Executive Secretary Sharon Roberts.**
  - **20 member institutions.**

## 1999

- **Spring, 1999, April 10, 1998, Annual Student Conference, "Globalization: Challenges and Opportunities,"** at Marquette University, Keynote address, Garth Katner (St. Norbert College), "Creating Foundations of the Emerging Global Community."
- **October 21-23, 1999 Annual Conference, "Women, Peace and Conflict"** at UW/Platteville in cooperation with the UW Women's Studies Consortium; Featured Speakers Agate Nesaule (UW/Whitewater and author of *Women in Amber*); Denise Sweet, Anishinaabe poet, (UW/Green Bay); panels and presentations on "Violence Toward Women at Home and at Work: Changing Responses," "Women making Peace: Cross-Cultural Perspectives," "Finding Peace," "Mexican Goddesses Speak Today of Peace and War," "Mulan, Kingston, and Images of the Woman Warrior," "Women Surviving Violence and War," "Bunkers, Bombs, and Babies," "Peace, Justice and Women's Roles in Society," "The Impact of War on Women, "Imaging Peace," "Sexual Violence on the Eastern Front During World War II," et al.
- **Speakers Program for 1999-2000** included: "Fighting Corporate Globalization Through New Grassroots Coalitions" (Geoffrey Bradshaw, MATC); "The KLA, Milosevic, and the U.S.: Three Faces of Terror for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century" (Bryan Brophy-Baermann, UW/Stevens Point); "Women in Central Eastern Europe" (Laura Brunell, UW/Oshkosh); "Contemporary Issues in Globalization" (Marty Farrell, Ripon); "Ghandi's Method of Social and Political Change" (Pravin Kamdar, Cardinal Stritch); "Responses to School Violence" (Ian Harris, UW/Milwaukee); "The Franciscan Tradition" (Margaret Klotz, Cardinal Stritch); "The Internet and Political Science" (Cecilia Manrique (UW/La Crosse); "The Tibetan Diaspora: Resilience and Reform"

(Pamela Maykut, Viterbo); "Kosovo: Lesons Learned and the 'New World Order,'" (Jeffrey Roberg, Carthage); "Putting the Military on Trial in Argentina, Greece and South Korea" (Terence Roehrig, Cardinal Stritch), et al.

- **Fall**, Publication of **Vol. 9 of the 1999-2000 Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict**, editor Gary Boelhower, including: "Nuclear Menace in the Mass Culture of the Late Cold War Era" (Paul Boyer and Eric Idsvoog, UW/Madison); "The Social Backgrounds of Gulf War Protestors" (Eric Swank, Morehead State University); "Election Day 1996 in Russia" (Clarence Davis, Marian); "Food, Population, Energy and the Environment in the Global Economy of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century" (Peter Dorner, UW/Madison); "The Postmodern Military" (Morten Ender, University of North Dakota at Grand Forks); "Blood on Your Hands: A Personal Essay on the Ethics of Military Action," (Timothy Hanson, UW/La Crosse); "Purposeful Intervention, Christian Ethics and the Case of Haiti" (J. Milburn Thompson, Saint Joseph College, Connecticut).
- **Dick Ringler Distinguished Scholar Award to Agate Nesaule (emeritus, UW/Whitewater).**
- **Distinguished Student Scholar Award to Leah Strobel (UW/Milwaukee) and James Hange (UW/Eau Claire).**
- **Executive Director, Marty Farrell** (Ripon); Associate Director, Eric Yonke; Executive Secretary, Sharon Roberts.
- **20 member institutions.**

## 2000

- **April 7<sup>th</sup>, 2000, Annual Student Conference, "Creating a Culture of Peace and Nonviolence"** at Cardinal Stritch University. Keynote Rev. Dr. Fidon Mwombeki (Tanzania) (Lutheran Social Services), "Beyond Debt Relief."
- **September 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup>, 2000 Annual Conference, "New Perspectives on the Shoah and the Third Reich,"** at UW/La Crosse, Keynote Presenters Christopher Browning (University of North Carolina and author of *Ordinary Men: Police Battalion 101 and the Final Resolution in Poland*); Robert O Fisch (Holocaust survivor and author of *Light From a Yellow Star*); Dr. Micael Engelhard (Counsel General of the Federal Republic of Germany); Fela Warshau (Holocaust survivor); Tzipora Rimon (Counsel General of Israel to the Midwest).
- **Speakers Program for 2000-2001** included: "The Struggle for Democracy in Iran" (Ali Abootalebi, UW/Eau Claire); "The Nationalist Repression in a Small Andalusian Town" (Richard Barker, UW/Stevens Point); "Values Integration in the Workplace" (Gary Boelhower, Marian); "Screaming Eagle, Crouching Tiger: U.S.-China Relations Today" (Marty Farrell, Ripon); "Irish Celluloid Nationalism" (Michael Gillspie, Marquette); "Zen: a Personal Path to Peace" (Raymond Reed Hardy, St. Norbert); "The Beats, the Bomb and the Problem of World Peace" (William Lawlor, UW/Stevens Point); "What to Do About Globalization" (Sanjay Paul, St. Norbert); "American (Un)exceptionalism: Are Americans Really Less Informed About Foreign Policy?" (Geof Peterson, UW/Eau Claire); "The Economic Issues Associated With Global Climate Change Policy" (Kevin Quinn, St. Norbert); "Is a Common Conscience Possible in the Modern World?" (James Stokes, UW/Stevens Point), et al.
- **Fall**, publication of **Vol. 10, 2000-2001** issue of the **Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict**, editor Gary J. Boelhower, associate editor Deborah Buffton, including: "Sarajevo, Whence Comes Thy Gloom? Ethnic and Religious Roots of the First World War" (James Holmes, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy); "How President Bush Moved the U.S. into the Gulf War" (Clark McCaulley, University of Pennsylvania); "Nonviolence in Pink: The Visual Rhetoric of Aung San Suu Kyi" (Ellen Gorsevski, Washington State University); "Inner Peace Makes Peace on Earth" (Suzanne Taylor, Los Angeles); "Psychological Dimensions of Conflict Resolution

- Analyzed in Four UN Peacekeeping Missions" (Nadia Piscini and Harvey Langholtz, College of William and Mary); "Law and the Use of Force: Kosovo Intervention" (Ana Mitrovic, Harvard).
- Executive Director, Marty Farrell (Ripon); Associate Director, Eric Yonke (UW/Stevens Point ); Executive Secretary Sharon Roberts
  - **21 member institutions.**

## 2001

- **April 7<sup>th</sup>, 2001, Annual Student Conference, "Security and Cooperation in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century"** at Carthage College.
- **October 24<sup>th</sup>, 2001 Annual Conference, "International Peacekeeping and Peacemaking"** at Madison Area Technical College: Keynote Speaker, Lech Walesa (Nobel Prize Laureate, founder of Solidarity, former President of Poland); Plenary Speakers Mel Duncan (Director of the Nonviolent Peaceforce, "Nonviolent Peaceful Intervention"); Ron Glossop (author and educator, Southern Illinois University, "Teaching About War and Peace") and other presentations on "U.S. Foreign Policy and Peacekeeping," "Community to Community Peace Building," "Human Rights and Peacekeeping," and "Regional Examinations of Peace and Conflict in Africa, Colombia, Israel, Northern Ireland and Elsewhere," and a showing of the film, "A Force More Powerful."
- **Speakers Program, 2001-2002** included: "Is Islam Compatible With Democracy?" (Ali Abootalebi, UW/Eau Claire); "Inter-religious Dialogue as a Path to Peace" (Lakshmi Bhardadwaj, UW/Milwaukee); "Representations of Violence in Contemporary Irish Films" (Michael Gillespie, Marquette); "Civil Society and Its Enemies: Coping with Extremism, Terror, and Violence in the New Century" (Garth Katner, Great Books Foundation, Chicago); "How to Build Peace in the World's Hotspots" (Rob Rigliciano, UW/Milwaukee); "Using Family Culture to Demonstrate Peace Principles" (Joe Hatcher, Ripon); "Martin Luther King's Global Vision for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century" (Vincent Kavaloski, Edgewood); "Art Against War: What Poets, Painters and Composers Across the Centuries Have Said About War" (Dick Ringler, UW/Madison); "The State of International Relations: From the Cold War to the New World Order," (Jeffrey Roberg, Carthage); "Hatred: An American Obsession" (Jody Roy, Ripon); "Russia: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow" (Joseph Tullbane, St. Norbert), et al.
- **Fall**, Publication of **Vol. 11 of the Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict**, editor **Kent D. Shifferd**, associate editor **Deborah Buffton**, including: "Algerian Conflict: An Exercise in State Terrorism" (Amandeep Sandhu, University of Victoria, BC, Canada); "How Research Can Humiliate: Critical Reflections on Method" (Evelin Gerda Lerner), "Peace Studies, Literature and Postwar Criticism" (David Jeffries, McMaster University, Hamilton Ontario, Canada); "Feminism Without Borders" (Indira Kajosevic, American Friends Service Committee); "The Crusading Ethos in International Conflict: The Strange Case of the Third Crusade" (James Holmes, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy).
- **Dick Ringler Distinguished Faculty Scholar Award** to Abbas Hamdani (UW/Milwaukee).
- Executive Director, Marty Farrell (Ripon); Associate Director, Thomas J. Bickford (UW/Oshkosh); Executive Secretary, Sharon Roberts (her last year); Sarah Stillwell appointed Administrative Director.
- 21 member institutions.

## 2002

- **April 6<sup>th</sup>, 2002, Annual Student Conference, "Globalization: Ends and Means"** at Edgewood College. Keynote Address, Dr. Martin Farrell, Executive Director of the Wisconsin Institute (Ripon College), "Globalization: State of the Debate." Luncheon

- Speaker, Sarah Bodenberg and Sarah Leiser (Recipients of the World Federalist Award) "Globalization, Human Rights and the International Criminal Court." Other winners of Student Awards were Laura Birnbaum (St. Norbert), Ada Hyso (Cardinal Stritch), Summer Kirch (UW/Oshkosh) and Daphne Meyers (Ripon).
- **November 14--16, 2002 Annual Conference, "Globalization: The State of the Debate"** at Ripon College: Keynote addresses by David Newby, President Wisconsin AFL/CIO ("Free Trade, Fair Trade and Human Rights") and Robert Staiger (UW/Madison, "National Sovereignty and the World Trade Organization"); opening plenary "Global Humanitarian Imperatives: Rebuilding Afghanistan," Panel "Philosophical Perspectives on Globalization," with Richard Huddleston (UW/Superior), John Fields (Edgewood), Richard Lara (UW/Fox Valley); Panel "Global, National and Local Economies" with Rober Bybee (Citizen Action), Robert Reuschlein (Peace Economics, Madison), Dereka Rushbrook (Ripon); Panel "Political and Strategic Perspectives" with Obika Gray (UW/Eau Claire), Sean O'Brien (Fort Belvoir, VA), Beter Baofu (SDA/Bacconi University, Milan, Italy); Panel "Nonviolent Change in Global Context" with Vincent Kavaloski (Edgewood), Geoff Bradshaw (MATC), Cheryl Rofer (Consultant, New Mexico); Panel "Inner Peace: Working to Transform Conflict on an Interpersonal Level" with Jane Jones (UW/Stevens Point); and a showing of the documentary film, "This Is What Democracy Is All About" with discussion led by Roger Bybee (Citizen Action) and Geoff Bradshaw.
  - **Fall, 2002, publication of Vol. 12 of the Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict** including such articles as: "Making and Keeping the Peace in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century" (Lech Walesa, former President of Poland, holder of Nobel Peace Prize); "Emerging Narratives on the Indo-Pak Conflict: A Women's Initiative in the Direction of Peace" (Meenakshi Chhbra and Anila Asghar); "The Role of Human Rights in Keeping the Peace" (Jeffrey Roberg, Carthage); "The Intersection Between Anthropology, Drama and Conflict Transformation" (Kira Goldstein and Erin DeOrnellas, ); "Afghanistan: An Ongoing Tragedy" (John Ryan, University of Winnipeg); et al.
  - **Dick Ringler Distinguished Faculty Scholar Award to Michael K. Duffey, Associate Professor of Theology, Marquette University.**
  - **Winners of Ray and Jeanette Short student Essay Contest Awards ("Globalization Without Representation"): Sarah Leiser (Edgewood), Judy Williams (Platteville), and Nadezdha Stoyanova (UW/Eau Claire).**
  - Distinguished Student Scholar Award to Ryan O'Leary, UW/Stevens Point.
  - Executive Director, Martin Farrell, (Ripon); Associate Director Thomas J. Bickford, (UW/Oshkosh); Administrative Director, Sarah Stillwell.
  - 22 member institutions.

## 2003

- **April 5<sup>th</sup>, 2003, Annual Student Conference, "Conflict, Cooperation, Security and Justice in a Globalizing World"** at UW/Oshkosh; Keynote Dr. Martin Farrell (Executive Director, Wisconsin Institute, Ripon College), "Cooperation or Unilateralism in Today's Global Arena?"
- **November 5-7 Annual Conference, "New Paths to Peace: Innovative Approaches to Building Sustainable Peace and Development,"** at UW/Milwaukee: Keynote Richard McCall; Learning Lab Sessions: "Mainstreaming Conflict Sensitive Approaches With Development," (Adrienne Paul and Abikiok Riak (World Vision); "Track 2 Collaboration" with Andrea Strimling (Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service) and Susan Alan Nan (Alliance for Conflict Transformation); "Framework for Strategic Peacebuilding" with Oissa Schrich (Eastern Mennonite University); "Integrating Peacebuilding, Civil Society, and Development in Conflict-Affected Environments" (Dayna Brown and Anna Young (Mercy Corps); "Catholic Relief

Services: Aiming for a Just Solid Peace" (Reina Neufeldt and Robin Gulick, Catholic Relief Services); "Understanding Theories of Change" (Donna Hicks, Harvard); "Abkhaz-Georgian Peacebuilding" (Paula Garb, University of California at Irvine); "The Role of Land and Property Rights in Peacebuilding" (Jon Unruh, Indiana University), et al.

- **Fall**, Publication of **Vol. 13 of the Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict**, editor Kent Shifferd, associate editor Deborah Buffton, including: "Making and Keeping the Peace" (Lech Walesa, former President of Poland, Nobel Peace Laureate); "Peace Efforts to End the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict" (Abbas Hamdani, UW/Milwaukee); "Emerging Narratives on the Indo-Pak Conflict: A Women's Initiative in the Direction of Peace" (Meenakshi Chhabra[India] and Anila Asghar, [Pakistan], Lesley University and Harvard, respectively); "The Psychological Consequence of Conflict" (Nicole Otallah and Harvey Langholtz, United States foreign service officer and College of William and Mary respectively); "The Role of Human Rights in Keeping the Peace: The Case of Russia and Chechnia" (Jeffrey Roberg, Carthage); "Negotiated Peace, Disputed Land: conflict of Property Rights in Guatemala and South Africa" (Mark Everingham, UW/Green Bay); "A Need for Diversity in Conflict Resolution Strategies" (Shyrl Topp Matias, University of Lawa'l Kaua'i Hawaii); "Virtual Regime: New Actor in the Geopolitical Arena" (Joseph Thompson, Villanova University); "The Intersection Between Anthropology, Drama and Conflict Transformation" (Kira Goldstein and Erin Hale DeOrnellas, Center for Peace and Security, New York); "The Positive Effects of Immersion Fathering on Men, Relationships and World Peace" (Joe Hatcher, Ripon); "Afghanistan: an Ongoing Tragedy" (John Ryan, University of Winnipeg, Canada).
- **Dick Ringler Distinguished Faculty Scholar award to Abbas Hamdani, UW/Milwaukee.**
- Executive Director, Eric Yonke (UW/Stevens Point); Associate Director, Thomas J. Bickford (UW/Oshkosh); Administrative Director Sarah Stillwell.
- 21 member institutions.

## 2004

- **April 16<sup>th</sup>, 2004, Annual Student Conference: "Promoting Positive Peace"** at St. Norbert College, Keynote Address Dr. Derek Jeffreys (UW/Green Bay).
- **Spring, 2004** Executive Director, Marty Farrell (Ripon); Associate Director, Eric Yonke (UW/Stevens Point); Administrative Director, Sarah Stillwell.
- **October 6<sup>th</sup>-8<sup>th</sup>, Annual Conference, "Challenges and Paths to Justice"** at Marquette University: keynote speaker Dr. Kenneth P. Clement, Director of the Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Queensland. Thirteen multi-presentation sessions on Justice and Peace plus a panel on the first 20 years of the Wisconsin Institute.
- **Fall**, Publication of **Vol. 14 of the Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict**, editor Kent Shifferd, associate editor Deborah Buffton, including: "Operation (Insert Country) Freedom: The Impact of United States Military Operations on Target Regimes" (John Tures); "Evaluating Peace Education" (Ian Harris, UW/Milwaukee); "Liberation Struggles and the Question of Nonviolence: A Latin American Perspective" (D.I. Gondolfo, Furman University); "John Ryan on the Middle East-- Two Essays:" Sharon's Unilateral Disengagement and the Prospects and Nature of the Geneva Accord , and The Future Government of Iraq" (John Ryan, University of Winnepeg); "Global Fear and Loathing: How the World Really Sees the American Empire" (David Michael Smith, College of the Mainland, Texas); "Jus ad Pacem" (Michael Pendergast, Marquette University); "Practical Pacifism After the War in Iraq," (Edward Fiala, UW/Green Bay), "Just Evil: St. Augustine and the Rationalizations for War," (Peter Thompson, United Theological Seminary); "Civil

War in the Democratic Republic of the Congo" (Brad D. Pears, UW/Oshkosh); 'The United States' War on Cocaine and Prospects for Peace and Prosperity in the Andes" (Matthew Rhody, Ripon College); "Palestinian-American Journal" (Lisa Salah,); "Operation Uphold Democracy: the Courtmartial of Captain Lawrence Rockwood," (Jean Marie Arrigo and John Fielding Crigler III).

- **Fall, 2004**, Executive Director Eric Yonke (UW/Stevens Point); Associate Director Thomas J. Bickford (UW/Oshkosh); Administrative Director, Sarah Stillwell.
- 22 member institutions.